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It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the 
development of risk bearing by insurance from the earliest 
times, to the period when the modern institution of insurance 
may fairly be said to have become established. The thesis 
will not cover in its scope the history of insurance, nor the 
history of any particular period, but will rather survey 
each period studied, searching for new developments of 
insurance theory, and consider particularly those contribut­
ions that represent distinct advances in development. The 
aim of the work is to assemble those early fragments of 
evidence that may be found, and so present them as to afford 
a perspective of the development of an idea. It does not 
come within the scope of the work to present a complete 
record of the numerous instances that represent reduplication 
of the idea. On the other hand mention is made of develop­
ments that at the time only remotely bear upon insurance, but 
are destined later to become important factors in the field. 
The scattering threads that appear in the early periods will 
be brought together as the development of the thesis proceeds.
In the assembling of the material, and the preparat­
ion of the work, I have been favored with the generous co­
11
operation and assistance of many. Without presenting a 
detailed list of the individuals, libraries, and institutions, 
to whom I am under obligation, I nevertheless avail myself of 
the privilege here afforded of acknowledging my indebtedness 
to all. Without the cooperation and assistance so freely 
rendered, the work could not have been completed. I must
. at this time, however, by personal mention, acknowledge my 
indebtedness to Dr. John H. Ashworth, head of the Department 
of Economics at the University of Maine. It was under the 
direction of Dr. Ashworth that this work was carried on, and 




1. Origin of Bottomry.
So far as extant records furnish us evidence,
loans of the type known during the middle ages by the terms 
"Bottomry" and "Respondentia" served as the earliest means 
in general commercial use to effect a shifting of the burden 
of risk. Such a contract was familiar to the Greeks as 
early as the fourth century before the Christian era, and 
was used in connection with maritime loans. The origin 
of the idea is clouded in uncertainty, but such evidence as 
we have warrants the presumption that the bottomry contract 
is the outgrowth of the contract made between merchants and 
their agents in Ancient Babylon.
The essential feature in the bottomry contract
-v that permits its adaption as a vehicle for effecting insurance, 
is the condition which relieves the borrower from loss in the 
event of the happening of certain undesired and stipulated 
contingencies. In the Greek contract these contingencies 
were those arising out of the "perils of the sea." The
agreement itself was concerned with a loan, made with a ship
2
as security, by which her owner was able to fit her out for 
a voyage, or to provide a cargo. The condition upon
which the loan was obtained, however, made the safe arrival 
of the ship at the agreed destination a condition precident 
to the repayment of either the advance or the stipulated 
interest or premium. A modification of the contract 
occurs where the loan is made, not upon a ship, but upon 
goods or merchandise, and in this instance the term 
"respondentia" is used. Insofar as the contingent feature 
of the contract is concerned, relieving the borrower from the 
payment of interest, and the repayment of principle, in the 
event of certain stipulated losses, the contracts are 
analogous. To both types, whether the loans are made on 
ship or merchandise, the term "bottomry" is commonly applied, 
and for the purposes of this study the term will be so used. 
In our search for its origin with the early Babylonians, we 
carry the term from the sea, and apply it to landborne risks.
Babylon, during the most remarkable period marked 
by the reign of the Hammurapi, (ciroa 2123 - 2081 B.O. ) 
occupied the position of a great trading center, and sent 
caravans abroad with her manufactured articles to every 
corner of the then known civilized world, and her contacts 
3
with the countries with which she traded necessitated long 
and hazardous journeys into strange lands, and among peoples 
of all grades of civilization. It is obvious that the 
wealthy manufacturer or merchant, with interests stretching, 
perhaps to India, China, Phoenicia, Egypt, Tibet, or any of 
the other countries in trading contact with Babylon, would 
not himself be able to go with his wares and conduct the 
negotiations for trade in person.
In the beginning merchants maintained contact with 
their various interests by sending some member of the house­
hold to represent them abroad, manage their affairs, and sell 
the goods they had to offer. With the expansion of business, 
however, and the need for many representatives, this simple 
expedient no longer served, and the great merchants or finan­
ce er8 devised the system of securing individual agents to 
represent them on these journeys.
This agency relationship, the oldest form of bus­
iness association in Asiatic life, ia known by the name 
Oommenda. Under the terms of agreement by which the assoc­
iates operated, the commendatist gave a sum of money or 
supply of merchandise to an agent with which he was to do 
business. The agent at a stipulated time, usually upon his 
4
return from a journey, rendered an account to his principle, 
paid back the loan, to which was added an agreed share of the 
profits. 1 *3
1. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws Contracts and Letters, 
p. 281.
jc 2. Code of Hammurapi, sec. 100-107.
3. Ibid.. sec. 103.
That most remarkable legal compilation, that dates 
from this early period, the Code of Hammurapi, devotes 
several of its sections to the regulation of such business
2
associations. Under the terms of agreement, the agent who 
took the money or goods of a merchant, and went abroad with 
them to trade, was liable to repayment of the loan upon his 
return, except in one definitely named instance. If the 
agent lost his goods at the hands of robbers, then he was not 
obliged to make an accounting, but was freed from the debt,
3
and the loss rested upon the merchant who made the loan. 
Such an agreement had all the characteristics of the modern 
bottomry agreement, with the exception that the risk covered 
by the insurance feature was a risk of loss from robbers, 
instead of loss from the perils of the sea.
It is now recognized by students of ancient history 
that the Code of Hammurapi was not a creation de novo by
Hammurapi himself, or by his councelors, but like other 
codifications of law that 'have served as landmarks in legal 
development, reverted back to laws of a more remote period. 
It is essentially a compilation of existing legislation
4 
rather than a presentation of an entirely new set of laws. 
Hammurapi'8 part in this great piece of legislation was 
limited to the translating and publishing of the older code
5for the government of his own people. Indicative of 
this development there is evidence to show in the code the
6
inclusion of the older Sumerian laws. Added to the older 
elements are newer statutes modifying the older regulations 
or effecting changes. It might be supposed that in the 
compilation of a code such as that of Hammurapi, older laws 
that were later modified by newer enactments would have been 
dropped to give place to the newer developments. There is 
a reason, however, for the retention of the older sections, 
in that a sacred character was attributed to the law, and 
they were considered as oracular decrees of the gods, and 
therefore binding forever. For this reason the old laws
4. Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, v.2.,p.87.
5. Jastrow, The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria, p.283.
6. Rogers, op. pit,. Note 2., v.2, p.87.
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were retained, side by side with modifications in the form of
7new laws that changed their effect and tenor. It is diffi­
cult to place a date as to the origin of the older portions 
of the Oode. A document of a far earlier petiod than that 
of Hammurapi, in the reign of Urukagina, (circa 2700 B.O. ), 
refers to certain legal reforms effected by him that presuppose 
a considerable body of law already extant. Upon this evidence 
it may be assumed that as far back at least as 3000 B.O., and 
probably much earlier than that, a considerable body of law
had been built up to govern the public and private affairs of
8the community. Bearing in mind this background to the
compilation of the Oode of Hammurapi, references to particular 
practices mentioned in the code do not of necessity fix the 
time of Hammurapi as the date of origin of the legislation.
As a matter of fact, the date of origin may extend back to a 
period much more remote than that ascribed to the compilation 
and promulgation of the Hammurapi Oode itself.
At this point we are interested in determining
whether the clause in the code that releases the agent from 
all liability in the event that he is robbed, refers to a
7. Jastrow, op. cit.. p. 284.
8. Rostovtzeff, A~History of the Ancient World, p. 29, also 
Jastrow, op. cit.. p. 285.
7
custom of merchants already in common practice, or whether, 
on the other hand, this clause represents one of the later 
enactments included in the code to soften the effect and 
mitigate the penalties attached to the older laws. If we 
conclude that the code provided legislation to govern an 
existing custom, we are permitted to conclude that a contract 
with the characteristics of the bottomry agreement was known 
to the Babylonians previous to the promulgation of the code 
by Hammurapi. In the light of the general tenor of the 
code, it seems more reasonable to conclude that this law was 
one of the latter enactments aimed to correct a situation 
into which abuse had probably crept.
A contrary opinion is expressed in a painstaking 
and laborious research into the origin and early development 
of insurance by Dr. 0. F. Trenerry who advances the theory 
that the agreement referred to in the Hammurapi code was a 
development between merchants and their agents previous to 
the compilation of the law. It is his theory that because 
of losses, traders were unable to meet their obligations, and 
in consequence found themselves and their families in a posit­
ion where they became the property of their creditors. So
9. Oode of Hammurapi, 103.
8
intolerable did this situation become that some form of com­
promise was devised, resulting in an agreement between the 
parties whereby the agent if he were robbed and lost the goods 
entrusted to him through no fault of his, was to be excused 
from further accounting. The contract thus became a custom 
among merchants, and was at the time of the compilation of 
the Gode of Hammurapi recognized and given legal force by its
(10)
inclusion in the law of the land. The theory here advanced
is of considerable interest, in that it places the origin of 
the contract at a point more remote than the Hammurapi Code.
In a field where so much is based on conjecture
and supposition, it would seem to be an unwarranted presumpt­
ion to present a contrary theory, without at the same time
recalling its hypothetical nature. However the theory 
advanced by Dr. Trenerry, that the Gode of Hammurapi speci­
fically refers to a contract of bottomry, using the term in 
a sense of a relationship whereby the borrower or agent is
exempted frem repayment in the event of certain specified 
losses, seems less probable than does the theory to be here 
advanced, that the regulations in the code were designed to 
correct an oppressive situation only, and furnished inciden­
tally and as an unforseen consequence the seed from which
10. Trenerry, Origin and Early History of Insurance, p.6
9
germinated at a later date the contract of bottomry. The 
theory is here advanced, contrary to the opinion of Dr. 
Trenerry that the Babylonians had no knowledge of such a 
contract previous to the enactment into the law of the 
clauses in question, but that out of the compulsory release 
of debtors who lost their goods through no fault of their own, 
the custom developed and spread, and was voluntarily adopted 
by merchants in communities associated with Babylonian in­
fluence, but beyond the reach of her laws.
Had an agreement similar to the bottomtfy contract 
been the custom previous to the enactment of the laws, specific 
provision for lenience to the agent would have been unnecessary. 
We get a better insight into the purpose of the law when we 
recall the painstaking care exercised by Hammurapi to prevent 
the Strong from opressing the weak." ^and to protect those 
who might find themselves without any fault of their own at 
a serious disadvantage before the law. In such a position 
the borrower or agent might easily find himself. Under the 
Babylonian law the position of the debtor was far from enviable, 
and while the Oode retains the general point of view that a 
man who contracts a debt which he is unable to pay is a criminal,
11. Oode of Hammurapi. 37-39.
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even though there was no intent to defraud, the Code likewise 
makes a move in the direction of mitigating the pressure of 
the creditor against the debtor. The severity of Babylonian 
law upon the debtor is evident from those sections of the 
Oode dealing with debtors. That a member of a debtor's 
household could be seized as a hostage by the creditor seems
12perfectly evident and death of the hostage through natural 
causes imposed no liability upon the debtor. This originally 
severe provision was softened considerably by provisions that
13permitted the operation of the lex talionis in the event of 
death caused by inhuman treatment by a creditor who should 
seize a member of a debtor's family. Likewise a move was 
made in the direction of relieving the debtor whose wife and 
children were considered part of his chattels, and who might
14 be forced to sell them for debt. The code in this instance 
provided that the wife or children thus sold should be freed 
in the fourth year. So in the laws governing the relation­
ship of agent to his principle, the agent was responsible
15for the goods entrusted to him. It became apparent, how­
ever, that in the event of robbery this was a loss entirely





beyond hie control, yet carried in its train all the serious 
consequences attaching to debt. Rather than giving voice in 
the laws to an existing custom in relieving an agent from an 
accounting if robbed, it is more probably true that the legis­
lators saw in the harsh measures that were used in enforcing 
claims against debtors and agents, an element of injustice in 
insisting upon an accounting where the loss was beyond the 
control of the agent. Bearing in mind the general trend 
toward fairness and the concern for the weaker party that is 
evidenced throughout the code, it is a reasonable presumption 
that this accounts for the enactment in the code that where 
the agent was robbed, he was not to be held accountable for 
the goods lost, but to go free. That is the agent was to 
be excused from repayment of the value of the merchandise, or 
otherwise making any further accounting.
An almost parallel situation is found in the sections 
16of the code dealing with slavery. Under the existing law
those harboring a runaway slave, or in any way assisting him 
to escape, faced the death penalty. On the other hand a 
reward is provided for whoever returns to his master a slave
16. Oode of Hammurapi, 15-20. 
12
found in the open country. However, and here we have a 
parallel instance to the law respecting robbery of an agent, 
if a slave shall escape from the one who has captured him, 
the man by swearing his innocence to the owner of the slave
17shall be acquitted of all responsibility or blame. This 
is a case where responsibility for delivery to his master 
apparently attaches, once an individual takes into his 
custody a slave not his own property:. However, if he 
loses custody of the slave through no fault, the law relieves 
him from any responsibility. Penalties were so severe both 
in the slavery legislation and in the relationship of creditor 
and debtor that the code went to considerable length to protect 
parties who might without its protective legislation incur 
serious trouble without themselves being at fault. In the 
case of losing custody of the slave, the consequence might 
have been death. In the instance of the agent of a whole­
saler, who probably might have little with which to meet 
losses, everything was at stake on the adventure, not exclud­




The importance to us of the theory that the section
18in the code that excuses the agent from making an accounting 
in the event that he is robbed, was enacted in the beginning 
to protect a helpless agent from responsibility arising out 
of a contingency over which he has no control, is found in 
the possibility that here is the seed that actually germinated 
into bottomry. In other words we conclude that up to this 
point all risk attached to the agent, but out of the compul­
sory relief furnished by the Code of Hammurapi a relationship 
was established that was later expanded into the contractural 
relationship of bottomry, and furnished a simple but early 
means for risk bearing.
The relstionship to which the code refers is quite
19
evidently that of principle and agent, with the agent liable 
to his principle for an accounting upon his return from an 
undertaking. It is but a step from the entrusting of goods 
by a manufacturer to an agent to sell, to the loaning of 
money by one individual to another to finance an undertaking, 
with the relationship merging from agency to that of borrower. 
In the new situation a contractural relationship is established,
18. Oode of Hammurapi, 103.
19. Jastrow, op. cit., p. 298. Also Sources of Ancient and 
Primitive Law., p. 406.
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whereby money to finance an adventure, or the merchandise 
necessary, was entrusted by the lender to the borrower. 
With the example already set by law, in the instance of the 
responsibility of agents, it was a natural procedure to in­
corporate in the agreement a release from liability to repay 
in the event the goods lost at the hands of robbers, or 
possibly from other contingencies that might from time to 
time have been agreed upon. Recalling the commercial 
prestige of Babylon, whose weights, measures, and coinage 
were widely adopted, it would not be an unexpected develop­
ment to find this relationship, with the contingent provision 
in the event of loss, adopted by merchants in commercial 
contact with Babylon, even though beyond the immediate jur­
isdiction of her laws. By this means, such a contract 
could easily have become a customary relationship among 
merchants, with the hazards insured against changing with 
the needs of the time, or the perils of the journey undertaken. 
In Babylon the principle hazard was robbery of the caravan.
In sea-going ventures the perils were those of the sea. In 
each instance the principle involved was identical.
Where the original agency element persisted, the 
agent secured for himself a percentage of the profits of the
15 
enterprise as compensation, the amount depending upon the 
status of the agent and his relationship to his principle. 
As the character of the transaction merged into that of a 
loan, compensation for the use of the money or goods was 
naturally the subject of an agreement, but as in the case of 
the bottomry contract of later times, it was very much higher 
than the rates of interest charged for ordinary loans.
We are permitted at this point a brief summarizat­
ion. We find we have developed all the essential elements 
that enter into the bottomry contract as it later became a 
familiar commercial usage. These essential elements include 
first a loan or advance of goods, with the security passing 
out of the control of the lender. Secondly there is the 
provision that in the event of loss through the happening of 
certain specified contingencies, the borrower is freed of 
liability to repay. Lastly, the interest charge for the loan 
is so much higher than ordinary rates of interest, as to in­
clude a payment or premium for the assumption by the lender 
of the specified risks.
For the purpose of this study, we should like to 
show that the contract of bottomry was effected in the course 
of its development during this early period primarily for the 
purpose of risk bearing. Such a development we must leave
16
to a later period. The economic effect of risk, however, 
must have made itself manifest, and the simplified form of 
the contract that we find must have served to stimulate a 
foreign trade that might otherwise have languished through a 
failure to secure agents because of the risks. We may at
this point consider the basis upon which the burden of risk 
could be carried by one set of individuals and shifted by 
another. Without departing too far into the field of 
hypothesis, we have found a development in this early Babylon­
ian period that probably gave rise to a contract, simple in 
form but having all the essential elements of the latter-day 
bottomry. We have first an agent, and ultimately a borrower, 
shifting back to the principle or lender the burden of the 
risk attached to inland marine transportation. We have no 
evidence that steps were taken by the risk bearers to effect 
a dispersion in individual cases. The inducement that prompt­
ed the lender to become a party to the enterprise is found in 
the reward for assuming the risk, and is made possible through 
the operation of the principle of marginal utility. It is 
quite apparent that the money lender who finances a voyage out 
of one of many units of his capital loses but little in com­
parison with the poor trader who borrows, and who might in the 
17
event of loss lose not only all of his possessions but his 
freedom as well. On this basis a wealthy lender could assume 
a risk that the poorer borrower could not. Lastly it is to 
be presumed that the merchant or money lender, while in con­
ducting his business, is at the same time engaged in a number 
of such enterprises, and so far as loss was concerned, in 
essentially the same position as the modern merchant with 
many ships who secures a dispersion through interest in a 
multiplicity of risks. A considerable step in the direct­
ion of marine underwritings, as it was known to us in the 
early development of marine insurance, would appear could we 
but demonstrate the division of individual risks into parts, 
each part to be assumed by different carriers. Such a 
contribution is hardly apparent from the evidence, and the 
probability of its existence is a matter of pure conjecture. 
However, in this ancient period we do have a beginning of risk 
bearing. We are certain of the operation of the laws in the 
Gode of Hammurapi, and it is a reasonable presumption that 
here was a beginning of the bottomery contract so familiar in 
later insurance developments. Because of the paucity of 
evidence we have no means of knowing just the point geograph­
ically or chronologically that the contract developed to the 
stage we find in ancient Greece.
18
2. Bottomry in India.
India furnishes us a final clue to the development
of bottomry during the pre-Grecian period. In the Institutes 
of Manu, a considerable section of the Eighth Book is devoted
20
to the matter of loans and interest. Two of these sect­
ions point to the existence of a bottomry contract that in 
scope and extent approaches the form of contract that we meet
21in the early classical period.
The time elapsed between the promulgation of the
Oode of Hammurapi and the drawing up of the Institutes of 
Manu is at least a millennium. The origin of the Institutes
in shrouded in uncertainty, and Hindu mythology attributes 
them to a semi-d^vine hero Manu, fromwhich they take their 
name. The extravagances of Hindu mythological chronology 
place the time of their compilation as far back as 6 x 71 x
224,320,000 years. In its present form the code probably
dates from around 200 B.0. but includes a compilation of pre­
cepts known and taught over a longer period. Older writings 
upon which the Institutes in their latter form are based, 
indicate a point of origin previous to 600 B.0. and possibly
20. Institutes of Manu, Vlll.
21. 156-157.
22. Smith, History of Mathematics. V.l, p. 34. 
19
go back to 1000 B.O. Unlike the Oode of Hammurapi, the 
Institutes of Manu do not represent the law of the land, or 
the promulgation of a ruler, but rather represent a series 
of precepts presented by the teachers for the guidance of the 
people.
In the light of the interpretation that we have 
given to the pertinent sections in the Oode of Hammurapi, it 
is not possible to compare the development of Bottomry among 
the Hindus in the light of the Institutes of Manu with that 
of the early Babylonians. We cannot tell where the one ends 
and the other begins. If bottomry developed out of the 
legislation of Hammurapi, mitigating the intolerable position 
of a debtor who became insolvent through losing by robbery the 
goods entrusted to him, and the theory is here advanced that 
it so developed, we have no knowledge of the point reached in 
its evolution among the Babylonians. When the contract took 
the form of a voluntary agreement entered into by merchants 
and their agents, or by money lenders and their debtors, it 
is reasonable to assume that it would be changed and modified 
to satisfy the demands created by new conditions. How much 
of the development may be attributed to the Babylonians, how 
much to the Hindus, or even to intermediary contributors, we 
20
have no means of knowing.
That the contract of bottomry had. passed, through a 
long period, of development when we meet with it among the 
Hindus is evident. Its scope has been extended, and its 
usefulness as a vehicle for transferring the burden of risk 
is more inclusive. The Institutes of Manu that deal with
23
the question do not specify or list the hazards that excuse 
the borrower from repayment, but use the expression 11 if by 
accident the goods are not carried to the place or within 
the time.From this it is apparently the intention to 
include all of the perils of the undertaking that fall within 
the meaning of the phrase "by accident". It is specifically 
provided that the laws apply to both sea-voyages and journeys 
by land, bringing bottomry at last to the surroundings in 
which it is familiar to us in connection with sea-loans, and 
as a vehicle for marine insurance. Finally we have a sem­
blance of underwriting. Men who were acquainted with sea­
voyages and journeys by land were to estimate the risk.
23. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 156, 157.
24. Ibid.; translated by Sir William Jones.
25. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 157.
That is, they were to study the hazards of the voyage, its 
probably extent, the destination of the voyage with its 
attendant dangers, and on the basis of their observations
25 to calculate a rate or premium to be charged the borrower.
21
Such regulations presuppose a considerable knowledge of risks 
and hazards, and intimate strongly that the risk bearing 
features of the agreement were beooming important factors.
It would be pleasing if we could leave the develop­
ment of bottomry among the Hindus at this point. It is 
necessary, however, to state that with the Institutes of Manu, 
as with so many of the ancient oriental documents lino er taint ies 
of translation seriously becloud our conclusions. The trans­
lation that most clearly indicates bottomry, and permits the 
conclusions with regard to this contract that have been here 
advanced, is that of Sir William Jones, who "in addition to 
being a profound Oriental scholar, had been peculiarly fitted 
to translate an Indian legal code by his own judicial exper-
26 ience in that country." In contrast, however, to the Jones
translation are others that permit quite a different interpre­
tation. To emphasize the uncertainty created by the diff­
erences in translation, without attempting to exhaust the 
possible examples, mention is made here of the scholarly work 
of Prof. G. Buhler. In his translation of the first of the
27 two sections in question, he makes no mention of a lender,
26. Trenerry, op, pit., p. 68.
27. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 156. Buhler Translation. 
22
or of the accidental loss of the goods, but interprets the 
clause as a regulation with reference to individuals who 
"contract to carry goods by a wheeled carriage for money." 
Failure upon the part of the contractor to fulfill the terms 
of his contract, that is, if he does not deliver the goods 
at the place and time stipulated, he forfeits the reward
28agreed upon. The section following, in the Buhler trans­
lation makes reference to the fixing of rates in sea-voyages, 
and omits any mention of journeys by land. Certainly no 
reference is made in either section to a loan agreement pro­
viding that the borrower is to be relieved of his obligation 
in the event of the happening of some undesired contingency. 
Considering the evidence in the light of the two translations 
cited, we are warned again of the uncertainties attendant upon 
any conclusion possible regarding this early period. In the 
face of such translation difficulties as present themselves, 
in the interpretation of the code in the light of insurance, 
the probability that the sections may refer to a bottomry 
contract with an insurance feature is sufficient to warrant 
their consideration at this point.
If, as we suppose, the contract of bottomry did 
develop out of the legislation of Hammurapi, knowing the extent
28. Laws of Manu, Vlll, 157. 
23
of the Babylonian commercial contacts, it is not unreasonable 
to assume knowledge of the practice on the part of the Hindus, 
and that the source of that knowledge either directly or in­
directly was ancient Babylon. Cornelius Walford, whose pains­
taking researches in the field of insurance history justly 
entitle his opinion to weight, in his unfinished Insurance 
Cyclopedia directs attention in his discussion of bottomry to 
the Laws of Manu. While emphasizing the uncertainty he points 
out that the material dealing with the subject is "at least 
sufficiently vague to justify a surmise." As supporting 
evidence that the Laws of Manu do contemplate a contract 
having the essential characteristics of bottomry, he cites the
* Vyavahara Mayuka, A Treatise on the Hindoo Law by Nilakamtha 
Bhatta, which in the course of a discussion on lawful rates 
of interest, states that it has been ordained by Yajnavalkya 
that "all borrowers who travel through vast forests may pay 
ten, and such as travel the ocean twenty in the hundred." 
This clause he believes seems to imply loans to merchants; the 
reference to the charge for borrowers who travel through the 
forest relating to transport insurance, while the other charge
29is for advances on bottomry. Walford uses the term
bottomry here in its more particular sense as applying to a
29. Walford, Ins. Oyo., v.l., p.334. 
24
marine loan, giving the term transport insurance to the land 
borne traffic. It is quite evident that the element of risk 
is here considered in fixing a rate for ocean travel at twice 
that fixed for a journey through the forest. The assumption 
that reference is here made to a contract for a loan, with 
the elements of the bottomry agreement, is justified upon the 
basis of the difference in rates. Likewise, it lends
30 
support to the belief that the section in the Laws of Manu 
that provides for the safe arrival of goods, is a law relating 
to an agreement having the characteristics of bottomry.
A final point is made in considering the arrangement 
of the Oode. Separate sections of the Oode are assigned to 
the treatment of a particular subject. Two regulations 
dealing with compensation or wages would hardly be found in­
serted in a part of the code dealing with loans, interest 
rates, and other allied matter. Rather than to believe 
that such extraneous matter as the regulation of wages, or 
compensation for services rendered was contemplated at this 
point, it is more reasonable to assume that ''interest1* was 
the rendering intended, and that these sections were drawn up 
with reference to loans.
30. Laws of Manu, Sec. 157.
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If at this point we may conclude that a preponder­
ance of evidence points to the practice of bottomry by the 
Hindus, we may before leaving the question consider the pro­
bability of their being an intermediary between Babylon and 
ancient Greece. When we meet with the contract as a well 
established custom in Greece. It is likewise known and 
practiced by others of the maritime nations in commercial 
contact with Greece. Legislation regarding the contract
31 was incorporated in the laws of Phodes. Whence came
the contract to the maritime nations of the Mediterranean?
While the Institutes of Manu, in the form in which 
we know them, are presumed to date around 200 B.0., it must 
be remembered that the code then compiled included laws, 
that at that period boasted great antiquity. The origin of 
the laws probably date back to a period corresponding to the 
Homeric age in Greece.
During this period there was but |ittle commercial 
aotivity in Greece. The Homeric nobles satisfied their 
simple requirements with the products of their own land, 
their riches consisting chiefly in flocks, herds, and slaves. 
Luxuries they imported, securing them from traders of other
31. Boeckh, The Public Economy of the Athenians, p. 184-5. 
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countries who stopped to dispose of their cargoes. The 
Phoenicians provided most of the articles imported during 
this early period, and they in turn secured them by journeying 
to the far corners of the then known world. Wherever there 
was a prospect of gain, these shrewd traders were to be found; 
their voyages reaching from Britain on the west to India in
32
the east. That the Phoenicians may have been the inter­
mediary by which a knowledge of the practice of bottomry was 
carried from the more ancient civilization to the Greeks seems 
very probable. This is the opinion of Dr. Trenerry who 
believes they acquired their knowledge directly from the Baby-
33lonians. This assumption, reasonable as it is, is purely
a matter of hypothesis, for there is no direct evidence that 
the contract was ever utilized by the Phoenicians in their 
commercial ventures.
During the period marked by the great commercial 
expansion of Greek commerce, which includes the rise to Commer­
cial supremacy of the city of Rhodes, great trade routes were 
established between Greece and the far corners of the world. 
Rhodes was founded in B.O. 408. The first reference to 
bottomry in Greece occurs around 350 B.O. To be sure, the
32. Gardner and Jevons, A Manual of Greek Antiquities, p. 388.
33. Trenerry, op. oit.. p. 10
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contract when we meet it in Greece had been perfected, and evi­
denced a |ong period of development. At this time the Greeks 
had established a great line of trade from Hellas, past Rhodes 
and Cyprus, along the coast of Phoenicia to Egypt. Over 
this route the Greeks secured the products of the far East, 
India, Arabia, and Babylon. It is entirely probable that 
the bottomry contract was not introduced into Greece until this 
period of commercial activity, when the influence of Phoenicia 
upon Greece was upon the wane.
It is likewise possible that India may have been the 
intermediary, taking the idea from Babylon, developing it, and 
passing it on to Greece, and the maritime nations of that 
period.
We may say in conclusion, that if the origin of 
bottomry may be attributed to Babylonia, we may likewise credit 
India with enlarging its scope so far as the risk element is 
concerned, and extending the practice to cover the hazards 
attaching to sea voyages as well as undertakings involving land 
transportation. If, as it is entirely possible, Phoenicia 
or some other people contributed to this development, the Hindus 
have at least left us a record.
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3. Fire Insurance
So far as the problem of fire is concerned, the Oode 
of Hammurapi is silent, save in a single instance. This 
mention has regard to the safeguarding of property from theft, 
after fire had started. The law is severe, placing punish­
ment in the hands of the injured party. If, says the code, 
a fire break out in a man’s house, and any one who goes to put 
the fire out shall take any of the owner’s property, he shall
34
be cast into that same fire. This has oeen interpreted
to mean that the punishment may be inflicted immediately upon
35catching the offender.
This section of the code is of interest to us here 
only to indicate that the problems arising out of fires had 
gained the attention of the law makers, and if there were at 
this time any laws that had reference either to fire losses, 
or any means of indemnifying sufferers, it might be reasonably 
presumed that they would find a place in this code. There 
is nothing to be found in the code that relates to fire insur­
ance in any form.
The question presents itself as to whether the Baby­
lonians or Assyrians, at any period following the drawing up 
of the Oode of Hammurapi, had devised any such system. In
34. Oode of Hammurapi, Sec. 25.
35. Kocurek and Wigmore, Source Records of Ancient and Primitive 
Law, p. 404.
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a paper read by Mr. Charles Stewart, of the Lancashire 
Insurance Company, before the Insurance and Actuarial Society 
of Glasgow, in the year 1881, he places the beginning of fire • 
insurance with the communes of the towns and districts of 
Assyria and the East more than 2500 years ago. The plan 
which Stewart believed to have been in effeot is a form of 
compulsory assessment, which he says operated in the follow­
ing manner
" Judges, priests, and magistrates were appointed 
for each town and district with power to levy contri­
butions from each member of the commune to provide a 
fund against sudden calamities such as drouth and fire. 
If the judges were satisfied that the fire was accidental 
they empowered the magistrates to assess the members of 
the commune in kind or in money, and in the event of any 
member being unable through poverty to meet his share of 
the contribution, the defficiency was made up from the 
common fund. These communes still exist in a modified 
form in China. In some towns of Russia the inhabitants 
are jointly resoonsable for accidental fires and the 
government make enforced contributions according to the 
status and wealth of the inhabitants of the town or 
village. These communists had and have nothing in 
common with the communism of the present day which means 
the negation of private property.'1 36.
This statement has been preserved for us by .Bslton, 
in his excellent work on the history of fire insurance in 
Great Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
36. Quoted by Relton,, An.Account pf the Fire Insurance Companies, 
Page 6.
30
. Helton gives the quotation in his introductory chapter with 
full acknowledgment to Stewart. Since its appearance in
Helton's book, either through further quotation, or the re­
petition of the subject matter in subsequent works, the state­
ment had been widely circulated. The assertion is now 
frequently made that a form of mutual fire insurance, through 
compulsory assessment, was in operation in Assyria at this 
early date.
Unfortunately, the source of Stewart’s information 
is lacking. It is doubly unfortunate, because in the light 
of the more complete information we now have concerning this 
early period, it seems that Stewart’s statement was probably 
based upon faulty information. As a matter of fact, in 1881, 
when Mr. Stewart read his paper the decipherment of Assyrian 
cuneiform had not progressed far enough to make possible, 
with any degree of certainty, the conclusion he presents with 
regard to the existence of insurance in Assyria.
Research in the works of the leading authorities in 
the field, as well as correspondence with recognized American 
authorities makes inevitable the conclusion that Stewart’s 
statement is open to doubt at least until more information is 
available. Commenting upon this quotation, Prof. A.E.R.Boak,
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Chairman of the Department of History at the University of
Michigan states:-
" I have investigated the quotation which you 
enclosed in your letter of Maroh 20, but I have 
been unable to find the source from which it is 
taken. Furthermore, I have not been able to find 
the slightest bit of evidence to support the state­
ments contained in the quotation. I. have consulted 
on this matter with Professor Leroy Waterman, who 
is a recognized authority on Assyrian history, and 
he tells me that he knows of nothing which would 
justify these assumptions. I believe, therefore, 
that the statements should at least be recognized 
as extremely doubtful." 37
Referring directly to the same quotation from Relton's book,
• • • 5
Dr. W. F. Albright, Professor of Semetic Languages at the Johns 
Hopkins University, states:-
" I am afraid that Relton’s statement with regard 
to the existance of fire insurance in Assyria more 
than twenty-five hundred years ago i» quite without 
foundation. We have a very large number of business 
documents of every possible kind from ancient Baby­
lonia and Assyria, but none of them refer to any 
kind of insurance against death or sudden calamities 
such as drought and fire." 38.
Were the matter of community assessments a common 
practice, reference to them would be found among the thousands 
of documents now deciphered and catalogued. Hot would the 
existance of such a custom be unknown to the modern scholars
37. From a personal letter to the writer.
38. From a personal letter to the writer. 
32
in the field. Insurance writers frequently consult Alton's 
admirable book for material on the early development of fire 
insurance, and his inclusion of Stewart’s statement in the 
form of a quotation has given it widespread circulation 
throughout more recent insurance works. In the light of the 
best evidence, however, it seems that Stewart’s statement is 
entirely without authority, and there is nothing to warrant 
the assertion he makes. We cannot, then, agree with those 
writers who cite . ReIton or Stewart as authorities, that 
mutual insurance in the form of compulsory assessments was 
known and practiced by the early Assyrians.
4. Early Partnerships.
For the purposes of this study, we are particularly 
interested in such developments as tended toward the amassing 
of capital for business enterprise, for without facilities for 
amassing great capital the business of insurance would have
39been impossible.
While we have no evidence that the partnerships of 
early Babylon concerned themselves with underwriting risks, it 
is of course possible that individuals should join to divide
39. Of. Smith, Wealth of Nations. V.l, iii, 1 
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the risks of an enterprise much in the same manner that they
40
did later in Greece. In fact there is evidence to show
41 that two individuals sometimes joined in financing an agent 
though there is no evidence to indicate the practice had 
assumed any of the characteristics of insurance underwriting. 
However, regardless of whether or not we can connect the for­
mation of partnerships at this early date with the business 
of risk bearing, we are interested in the development as a 
collateral contribution, because of its later importance in 
the development of insurance.
The earliest development of joint operations grew
out of the practice of renting flocks. It was the custom 
for the owner of a flock to rent it to another party for a 
considerable period of time, part of the consideration speci­
fied being a share in the wool, and in the increase of the
42flock. Records have been found in the early contracts or 
partnership agreements, that they are very simple in their 
form. An example of this simplicity is found in an agreement 
that simply states, besides naming the parties to the agreement, 
witnesses, place, date, and such legal formalities, that:
40. Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 302.
41. Of. Trenerry, op. cit., p. 52.
42. Jastrow, op. cit., 353.
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A"Whatever transactions they engage in, they share in common." °
From this simple beginning partnership arrangements 
continued to develop to a stage where individuals were able 
to invest a sum of money or a quantity of merchandise in a 
common enterprise, and could if they wished entrust the mana-
44gement of the business to another. During the period of
partnership debts contracted by one party carried with it 
liability for payment on the part of the other partners, and 
definite partnership agreements entailed a definite legal 
procedure for their dissolution. Among the requirements 
for the legal and orderly dissolution of a partnership arrange­
ment there was included the necessity of rendering an account 
before the proper tribunal, and the taking of an oath that
45the assets has been equitably distributed. From available 
data, it has been determined that such partnerships were effect­
ed at a very early period, and continued in much the same form 
for several centuries. That these partnerships were often of 
the nature of permanent business enterprises may be determined 
from the existing records. Tipical is a document dated 
around 500 B.0. describing the dissolution of a partnership
43. Strassmaier, Nabonidus Inschriften. No. 199. quoted by
Jastrow. op. cit. p. 354.




that had been a going concern for thirty-one years.
While it is not easy to determine the terms of the 
partnership Bsseeiation from the records, cases where the 
evidence is sufficient show it to be the ordinary procedure 
to effect a division of profits pro rata according to the 
amount of capital each contributed to the enterprise. To 
what extent each partner was obligated to contribute his 
personal services for the benefit of the concern was not 
always certain, but there is ground for the belief that some 
of the partnership associations were drawn up with the evident 
purpose of requiring certain partners to furnish only the 
capital for the enterprise, while others assumed the responsi-
47 bility for the actual conduct of the business.
A considerable legal terminology grew up around the 
partnership agreement. The terms and phrases are of such a 
character, when we meet with them in the early documents, as 
to give rise to the belief that they are abbreviations of much 
longer sentences. This presupposes a long period of develop­
ment and may be considered as illuminating evidence of the
48 antiquity of the partnership relationship. Further evidence
46. Strassmaier, Nabuchodnosor Inschriften. No.116. quoted by 
Jastrow. op. oit., p.356.
47. Johns, op, cit., p. 287.
48. Ibid..p. 290.
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of the advanced state reached in the development of this 
commercial relationship is found in the cognizance taken by 
the local courts in enforcing the agreements. A disolution 
of partnership was a formal procedure and involved recourse 
to the courts. Appeal to the courts is sought for the 
purpose of settling disputes. In short, even in the early 
days, when we first meet with the relationship, the evidence 
shows it to be a long established commercial custom, recog­
nized by law and protected in its operation by the courts.
Our interest in the development of partnership is 
concerned with the means such business associations afford 
for effecting a dispersion of risk. As a matter of fact, 
without some form of association such as partnership, or its 
later development, the corporate form of business organization, 
the business of insurance could never have developed to its 
present form.
As a vehicle for bearing risk, such associations 
furnish a means for accumulating small units of capital which 
the owners are willing to hazard. This accomplishment 
serves two purposes. It is obvious that if an undertaking 
involves a large unit of capital in a single risk, the number 
of individuals with aifficiently large marginal units of capital 
which they will subject to the risk will be limited. On the 
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basis then of scarcity, they can and will command a higher 
price for the use of their capital. However, because of the 
size of the unit risked, its value to the owner will be high 
and the danger of losing it all in a single enterprise will 
have the effect of fixing a high price for the use of the 
unit.
It now follows that if small units of capital that 
would be useless to finance a single enterprise may be accumu­
lated, the supply of available capital will be increased. 
Likewise, in so far as a comparison is possible, the marginal 
utility of the smaller units of capital will be less, and 
the reward demanded for their use correspondingly less. We 
have here an apparent paradox, where the sum of the parts is 
less than the whole. In other words, if twenty people 
could join in assuming a given risk, because to the owners 
of the capital the marginal utility of a twentieth part 
would be proportionately less than a twentieth of the whole, 
the compensation that would satisfy the twenty and attract 
their capital to the field would be very much less than the 
compensation that would be satisfactory to attract a single 
individual to carry the entire burden.
While these features had not yet manifested them-
38
selves in the field of risk bearing in this early period, we 
are interested at this point in recording the development 
of the vehicle that was to become such an important factor 




1. Bottomry in Ancient Greece.
Leaving behind us the pre-classical period, we pass 
from the realm of speculation. Maritime interest (
) furnished a most profitable source of income to 
the money lenders of Ancient Greece, and a bottomry agreement 
was developed, that in its essential corresponded to the con­
tract of modern times.
According to the custom developed by the ancient 
Greeks, the ship or the cargo was made security for the money 
lent. .There is a possibility that the money received for 
passage and freight was likewise pledged as security. Loans 
were made, so far as can be determined, most frequently upon 
the cargo, or a part of it, less frequently upon the ship, and 
least often, if at all, upon the money received for passage or 
freight. Because risk of loss rested upon the creditor, the 
owner of the ship or cargo, besides securing capital for use in 
his undertakings, at the same time insured himself against loss.
A well defined procedure for effecting a bottomry
1. Walford, op. cit., V. 1, p. 334.
2. Boeckh, op. cit., p. 182-3.
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agreement was developed Contracts were formed by drawing
up articles of agreement,
3 with a money-changer.
and depositing a record of them
The form of agreement developed
is a most complete and interesting document, and clauses and 
conditions that weri incorporated therein have been retained
and included as among the most essential features of the
modern marine insurance policy Fortunately we have pre­
served for us, in the oration of Demosthenes against Lacritus, 
a complete agreement, and another in part in his speech 
against Dionysodorus
Because of its importance as indicative of the con-
tribution of ancient Greece, and to facilitate our consider­
ation of the contract in the light of insurance developments,
the agreement taken from the oration of Demosthenes against
Lacritus is here given in full:- 
"Androcles of Sphettus and Nausicrates of
Carystus have lent to Artemo and Apollodorus, both 
of Phaselis, three thousand drachms in Silver from 
Athens to Mende or Scione, and thence to Bosporus, 
or, if they please, on the left coast as far as the 
Borysthenes, and back to Athens, at interest of two 
hundred and twenty-five for the thousand; but in 
case they shall sail out of Pontus to Hierum after 
the rising of Arctutus, at interest of three hundred 
for the thousand, on the secutity of three thousand 
casks of Mendaean wine, which shall be conveyed from 
Mende or Scione in the twenty-oared vessel of which 
Hyblesius is the owner. They hypothecate these 
goods, not owing upon them any money to any other 
person, nor will they borrow anything further upon 
them. And they shall bring back to Athens in the 
same vessel all the goods which they purchase in
Ibid, ^p. mo.
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Pontus for the retufn-cargo. And, if the goods are 
brought safe to Athens, the borrowers shall pay to 
the lenders the money accruing due according to the 
agreement within twenty days after their arrival at 
Athens, without any abatement, except for jettison, 
which the passengers have made by common resolution, 
or for payments made to enemies, but no deduction 
shall be allowed in respect of any other loss; and 
they shall deliver the security entire to the lenders, 
to be under their absolute control until they have 
paid the sum due under the agreement. And, if they 
do not pay it in the stipulated time, it shall be 
lawful for the lenders to pledge or to sell the 
security for such price as can be obtained; and, if 
there is any deficiency in the money which is due 
to the lenders under the agreement, it shall be law­
ful for the lenders, both or either of them, to levy 
the amount by execution against Artemo and Apollodorus, 
and against all their property, whether on land or 
sea, wheresoever they may be, in the same manner as 
if a judgment had been recovered against them and 
they had committed default in payment. And if they 
do not enter Pontus, but stay ten days after the 
rising of the dog-star in the Hellespont, and dis­
charge their cargo in some place where the Athenians 
have no right of reprisals, and thence return home 
to Athens, they shall pay the interest inserted for 
the previous year in the agreement. And, if the 
ship in which the goods are conveyed should meet with 
any irretrievable disaster, the security shall be 
saved, if possible, and whatever is recovered shall 
be the joint property of the creditors. And 
touching these matters nothing shall have greater 
effect than the agreement.
"Witnesses, Phormio of Piraeus, Oephisodotus, a 
Boetian, Heliodorus of Pithus." 4
We are interested in the insurance features of this
agreement. It is to be noted first of all that the contract 
expressly provides that all of the property of Artemo and Apoll­
odorus, as well as the return cargo, to be purchased by them, 
4. Translation by 0. R. Kennedy,
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is made liable for the repayment of their loan. The agree­
ment provides that if the security for the loan, when sold by 
the creditors, shall prove deficient to meet the obligations, 
then the creditors are empowered to seize any other of the 
debtor’s property, wherever it may be found, in the same 
manner as if a judgment had been recovered. These features 
are concerned with the loan and security therefor. Our in­
terest centers chiefly upon the clause that provides as a con­
dition precident to repayment of the loan and interest, (the . 
money accruing due according to the agreement) the safe 
arrival of the goods at Athens. This is the feature of the 
agreement that introduces the insurance element. If the 
goods offered as security for the advance be lost on the 
voyage, the lender loses his money. But if it arrives in 
safety at the point of destination agreed upon at the time 
the advance is made, then the amount of the loan is to be re­
paid together with the interest agreed upon by the parties. 
Only in the event of the safe arrival of the cargo pledged as 
security have the creditors a right to levy against the debtors, 
and seize their property in execution after a sale of the 
security fails to satisfy the claim. In other words the 
debtors are insured to the full amount of their loan. In 
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the event that the security fails to arrive safely at the 
agreed destination, the entire loss rests upon the lender, 
who is, as a matter of fact, the insurer.
The hazardous nature of the undertaking, from the 
point of view of the lender, seems to have been fully recog­
nized by the Greeks, particularly in such a commercial center 
as Athens. Because the loss of the property hypothecated 
carried with it both loss of principle and interest, the yield 
on such loans was very much higher than could ordinarily be 
obtained in the ordinary course of lending money. Such 
contracts, in which the creditor did not undertake the risk, 
were prohibited by the Rhodian laws. The element in the 
charge, made for risk was fully recognized, and by the terms 
of their law unless the lender undertook the risk of loss he 
was not allowed to charge the interest customarily allowed in 
the bottomry contracts. There was no such restriction in
5 
the Attic law, though the risk element was fully recognized. 
This is demonstrated by the regulation which prohibited using
6
the money of orphans for loans on bottomry.
5. Boeckh, op. cit.,p. 184.
6. Ibid..p. 186.
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In the contract we are discussing, there appears 
another most interesting development. The insurance element 
of the agreement is extended to permit an adjustment of the 
amount due the creditor in the event of jettison in the first 
instance, and again for payments made to enemies. Both of 
these sources of loss were incorporated as hazards covered in 
the later development of the marine insurance policy. Their 
appearance at this point is worthy of note.
From the earliest development of a distinct insur­
ance contract, jettison was recognized as an insurable hazard, 
and losses arising therefrom were covered by the marine policies. 
One of the first policy forms of which we have record, was 
established by a Florentine ordinance of 1523, and provides:- 
"The said assurers taking upon themselves the risk of all 
perils of the sea, fire, jettison, reprisals, robbery by friend 
or foe, and every other chance, peril, misfortune, disaster, 
hinderance, misadventure, though such as could not be imagined
7 or supposed to have occured, or be liable to occur ---"
And yet we must go back to this agreement, furnished us by 
Demosthenes, to find the first mention of jettison, included 
7. Fire Insurance Contract, p. 73.
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as one of the risks in the insurance feature of the bottomry 
contract.
Jettison finds its justification in the principle 
of natural equity. If the goods of one merchant on a ship 
are sacrificed for the benefit of all, then he is entitled 
to a contribution from those who have benefited thereby in 
proportion to the value of the property they have thus been 
able to save. The levy made to compensate the owner of goods 
jettisoned is termed "general average". The earliest law 
dealing with the subject originated in Rhodes, and was adopted 
in the Digest of Justinian where mention is specifically made
g
of its origin. The Rhodian law, as adopted by the Digest
remains unchanged in its essentials to the present day.
In the bottomry contract of ancient Greece, while 
jettison is specifically mentioned as a reason for abatement 
in the repayment of the loan, the borrower must comply with 
conditions specified in the contract. Certain formalities 
are ordinarily required before goods may be jettisoned, even 
today. In the contract we are considering, in order that 
jettison might be the grounds for a claim on the part of the
8 Digest, XIV - Tit 11. 
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debtor against the creditor, it was necessary that the property 
be sacrificed only after the adoption of a common resolution 
by all on board. Whether this reference to an abatement in 
the event of jettison extended to the sacrifice of property 
other than that offered as security for the loan is not clear. 
Whether the custom of general average was known to the Greeks 
is a point upon which we have no knowledge, but the fact that 
all on board shall vote to throw over, for the common good, 
all or part of the goods of any one of the owners, would seem 
to imply a liability on their part to compensate for the 
benefit secufed. It would be an interesting point to deter­
mine, whether jettison during the course of a voyage that in 
no way affected the physical value of the security, but involved 
a claim for general average, was contemplated as a ground for 
abatement in the Greek contract of bottomry. In reference 
to modern insurance practice, it is the custom of the under­
writer to include in his contract an express agreement to in­
demnify the assured for losses arising out of general average.
Equally interesting, though less pertinent, in the 
light of modern developments is the stipulation providing that 
losses originating out of payments made to enemies, shall be 
borne by the lender of the money. Under modern practice, the 
rule with respect to payments made to enemies, has in all 
respects been similar to those applied to jettison. Lack­
ing any feature of fraud, and having used reasonable means to 
protect the goods, if part of a cargo be voluntarily delivered 
to a pirate or enemy, as an inducement to save the vessel and 
the rest of the cargo, or if instead of goods, money be advanced 
as a ransom, then the value of that which is saved thereby must 
contribute to the loss. An interesting sidelight as to the 
extent to which the equitable principle is carried, is found 
in the provision that there is no obligation for contribution 
if the enemy or pirate shall by force overpower the ship, and 
choose for himself such goods or money as he desires to take. 
In this instance the goods lost is not the purchase price paid 
for the safety of that which remains. We are at loss to know 
whether in this agreement, in Demosthenes, it was intended that 
liability for contributions to general average should furnish 
grounds for a claim, or in fact, whether or not there was any 
liability even to contribute. So in the event of payments to 
enemies, we know that losses of the hypotheticated goods fur­
nished grounds for a claim. Further than this we cannot go.
With these ancient Greek contracts we need not go 
into the question of insurable interest. The very fact that 
the borrower was under obligation to repay the amount of his 
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loan, and that he pledged his entire assets as additional 
security, is evidence of his interest in the safe outcome of 
the undertaking, and that the risks of the voyage rested upon 
him, until by means of his bottomry contract he had shifted 
them back to the lender of the money.
The doctrine of warranty was operative both as to 
statement of fact and promise of performance. We find the 
borrower warranting that the goods hypothecated are free of 
any encumbrance, and agreeing not to further encumber them. 
Likewise a definite destination was provided for the journey, 
and no deviation from the route was allowed unless provision 
was made for it in the agreement. Failure to comply with 
similar warranties in a fire or marine insurance contract 
would furnish grounds for voiding the policy. Likewise 
there is the provision in the agreement, that requires the 
discharge of the cargo in some place where the Athenians 
have no right of reprisals. Oommissions to make reprisals 
were granted in ancient times in a manner not unlike the 
letters of marque and counter-marque were issued in more modern 
times. It was therefore essential to the safety of the cargo 
that the ship should not be unloaded at any place where the 
Athenians had the right of reprisals, because Athenian property 
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and consequently the hypothecated goods in the particular case 
under discussion, might and very probably would have been taken 
by those upon whom the Athenians were authorized to prey. 
Consequently the condition is inserted in the agreement. Non 
compliance would increase the hazards of the risk beyond that 
contemplated in the undertaking at its inception. This of it­
self would furnish ample grounds to void a modern insurance 
policy, in addition to the grounds furnished by failure to comply 
with a specific condition of the agreement.
The contract shows further a considerable development 
in the underwriting procedure. First of all a specific ship 
is named in which the undertaking is to be carried out. Pre­
sumably the lenders of the money ware familiar with the ship, 
its size, speed, condition of its rigging and hull, and in 
general what factors were present that contributed to the risk. 
Likewise periods dangerous to navigation were recognized. In 
the agreement we are considering three thousand drachmas were 
lent upon a quantity of Mendaen wine, on the voyage from Athens 
to Mende or Scione, and thence to Bosphorus. If the bofrowers 
wished it was provided that they could proceed along the left 
shore of the Black Sea as far as the Borysthenes, thence back 
to Athens. The interest charge for this voyage was 22^, or 
as it is expressed in the agreement, two hundred and twenty- 
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five for the thousand. But here is the interesting point. 
It is provided that if they shall sail out of Pontus to Hierum, 
after the rising of Arcturus, the interest rate is increased 
to 30$ or three hundred on the thousand. The additonal rate 
is charged to compensate for the increased hazards of nagi-
g
gation of early autumn. Finally as evidence of the care
exercised by these lenders in estimating the risks and perils 
of the journey in the event that the borrowers should exercise 
a choice permitted them, and decide not to enter the Pontus, 
they were then bound to stay ten days after the rising of the 
dog-star in the Hellespont. This was at the end of July, 
the period characterized by the storms of the dog-days.In 
the event this option was exercised, they were to unload at a 
safe port and return to Athens, paying the interest inserted 
for the previous year in the agreement. This means, because 
the year ended about mid-summer, that a delay until the rising 
of the dog star carried the borrowers into the succeeding year, 
and hence it was stipulated that the lower rate was to apply 
if they did not enter the Pontus, and shielded themselves from 
the dangerous storms of the dog-days by delaying in the pro­
tection of the Hellespont for ten days.
9. Boeckh, op. cit.. p. 190.
10. Ibid, p. 191.
11. Ibid.,p. 191.
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Then there is incorporated into the contract the 
feature so important in the later development of insurance, 
the limiting of indemnity to actual loss. We have already 
seen that in the instance of jettison, or payment to an enemy, 
provision is made for an abatement of the amount due the 
creditor. This is presumably limited to the amount of the 
loss. There is, however, another interesting section that 
provides that if the ship in which the goods are conveyed 
should meet with any irretrievable disaster, the security 
shall be saved if possible, and whatever is recovered shall 
be the joint property of the creditors. If the borrower is 
no longer obligated to repay the loan, he is not entitled to 
profit by the mishap through retaining the salvage. As in 
the case of the modern insurance agreement, however, hecis 
under obligation to do whatever he can to salvage and protect 
the property, and turn it over to the creditor, who 'in this 
instance is likewise an insurer. As the agreement is drawn, 
and in the absence of fraud, there is no opportunity for profit 
to accrue to the borrower through the happening of the contin­
gency that results in a loss.
The question naturally presents itself as to the 
penalty for non-compliance with the terms and conditions in 
the agreement. To be sure no penalty is set forth in the
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contract, but if there were no recourse to law, and no satis­
faction for the injured party, the inclusion in the document 
of so many specific conditions would have been a useless 
superfluity. It is to be presumed that any violation of 
the terms of the agreement would be fraught with legal conse­
quences. Just what the nature of the procedure would be is 
uncertain, but probably would include a forfeiture of the bene­
ficial features of the agreement that accrued to the borrower. 
It may safely be presumed that if the borrowers should deviate 
from the route permitted in their agreement, and the hypothecated 
goods should be lost, the creditors would not be obliged to 
suffer the loss of their capital, but might proceed against the 
property of the debtors on the same basis as they would if the 
security arrived safely but failed to satisfy the claim. A 
deviation furnishes grounds for voiding a modern marine insur­
ance policy. The place of departure and destination being
specified in the agreement, it is an implied condition upon 
the part of the assured to be performed, that the ship shall 
proceed to her destination without•delay and without deviation 
from the shortest course. A change in the voyage, after the 
departure of the ship, is considered to be a different voyage, 
and the insurer is no longer liable for loss, even if the loss 
be not a consequence of the deviation. When the deviation
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12 
is effected liability ceases. That such was the penalty in 
the Greek bottomry contract we are considering seems a most 
reasonable assumption.
Up to this point the insurance element in the 
bottomry agreement has been emphasized. Because it is our 
purpose here to trace the thread of development of the insur­
ance idea, this is the feature in which we are interested. 
While every bottomry contract from its very nature must contain 
some element of risk bearing to maintain the proper perspective 
the fact must not be submerged that the contract of bottomry 
is not in all instances per se a contract of insurance. The 
contract had other uses than that of risk bearing, and it is 
to be presumed that while this feature of the agreement is not 
to be minimized, it was nevertheless for a considerable period 
a subordinate factor. The joint enterprise was a hold over
from an early period. It is interesting in passing, and essen
tial to our purpose in tracing the contributions of ancient 
Greece to the development of the insurance idea, to examine 
the evolution of the bottomry agreement. We are interested 
in determining at what point the insurance feature became the 
important element in the agreement, and in contrast, to what
12. Burgess v. Equitable Mar. Ins. Go, 126 Mass. 70. 
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extent the marine loans represented in the beginning a joining 
in a business venture by the lender for a stipulated share of 
the profits. We are interested in considering the elements 
of the contract that constitute it an insurance agreement, 
and have as an end the shifting of the burden of risk from 
the shoulders of one to which the risk already attaches to 
those of another more willing to bear it.
At this point we are called upon to distinguish 
between carrying the risk on the one hand, and becoming a 
partner in the enterprise on the other. Let us take first 
as an example for consideration the case where a capitalist 
enters into an agreement with a merchant to finance a venture 
for a share of the profits, the merchant furnishing the know­
ledge and skill, the capitalist the required finances. Such 
an arrangement, even though the ship or cargo are given as 
security upon safe arrival, is not a contract of insurance, 
for there is no placing of the capital of the risk bearer in 
the position of the capital of another to meet anticipated 
risks. It is essentially a joint venture. Such a situation 
more closely resembles the position of the silent partner in 
the modern partnership or business enterprise. This was the 
relationship found in the commanda of the Babylonians. In 
the bottomry loan, unless the adventurer, because of risk, 
deliberately avoids the use of his own capital, there is little 
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to justify calling the transaction insurance, but rather more 
to include it as a form of business association.
Perhaps another comparison might be made, not in the 
form of organization, but in the relationship of capital to 
the risk. In our modern form of corporate organization we 
have a general classification of securities into three groups. 
Regardless of the various forms to be found included in the 
main classifications, the three principle groups include first 
the bonds issued to lenders, second preferred stock issued to 
limited proprietors, and lastly the common stock issued to 
proprietors. Now then, the lender or bondholder expects the 
return of his money regardless of the success of the venture. 
The preferred stockholder knows that with failure of the ven­
ture he will salvage nothing until all obligations are met, 
then he may have a preference as to remaining assets. On the 
other hand his share in the profits is definitely determined 
by the articles of agreement. Now then, even though the rate 
of interest that a corporation must pay for an issue of pre­
ferred stock to attract buyers is in excess of the interest to 
be paid upon a bond, the difference cannot be termed an insur­
ance premium paid by the common stock to guarantee the safety 
of part of the capital. To partake of the character of insur­
ance, the capital risked must stand to bear the losses of other 
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capital to which the risk would ordinarily attach.
If it was difficult in the beginning to distinguish 
the insurance feature of the bottomry loan because it had more 
the characteristics of a joint venture, eventually the insur­
ance element became more important and the payment on the 
loans instead of being at a rate that included a sizeable 
portion of the profits, more closely coincided with a premium 
charge above the current interest rates for risk. Presumably, 
as business advanced, borrowers were able on their own credit 
to finance their adventures, and were unwilling to pay the 
exorbitant interest that was originally demanded. They were 
willing to pay the lender a premium for carrying the risk, but 
no more. When the borrower reached the stage where he might 
borrow at one rate of interest, but be under obligation to pay 
baok regardless of the success of his adventure, or borrow at 
a higher rate but be free of any further obligation in the 
event his' ship or cargo was lost, the difference in rate measur­
ing the element of risk, then the bottomry loan became insurance. 
It coincides with the definition, by then having as its principle 
end the shifting of the burden of risk. It is now an accepted 
belief that merchants who might well' have financed themselves 
upon sea-ventures out of their own capital, often preferred to 
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borrow under the bottomry contract because of the risk inherent 
in the undertaking they contemplated, and pay the higher rate of 
interest required in return for the security offered. It 
follows if they were at the same time to invest their own 
capital in lees hazardous undertakings, that the difference 
between the yield upon their own capital, and that paid for the 
sea loan, represents a premium paid for risk bearing, and—io 
•^herefore-ar-pr-enriTtm-paid ■ f or insurance-.
The contract of bottomry thus developed into a form 
of marine insurance, and may be regarded as the earliest form 
of indemnity to become a widely known and common practice in the 
commercial world. The commercial nations of antiquity secured 
through this means the benefits of insurance, cumbersome in its 
operation, this method of indemnifying loss was a decided step 
in the development of a means for risk bearing, and for the 
people of the ancient world, for whose benefit it operated, it
13
was real insurance in its results.
2. Risk Bearing By Groups.
To ancient Greece belongs the credit, not only for
developing the bottomry contract to a high state of usefulness,
13. Huebner. Histofy of Marine Insurance Annals of American
Academy of Political ana social Science.v.xxvi.1905- --------------  
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but also for devising a means dividing the risk so that a single 
loss would bear heavily on no single individual. It is here for 
the first time that the partnership organization makes a contract 
and contribution to the business of insurance.
The earliest of these associations known in Greece 
were the marine trading companies, naturally formed by a group 
of associates aboard ship who were uniting their efforts in a 
common venture. The tradition that thus developed in connect­
ion with marine undertakings was bound to survive, and the step 
from forming groups to go to sea in a ship as partners in an 
enterprise, to the formation of groups to finance an enterprise 
by means of the bottomry loan, was both simple and logical. 
This form of partnership arrangement for effecting bottomry
14loans was an usual and well known business practice.
The association or grouping of individuals for the 
purpose of dividing the risk involved in a single bottomry 
transaction furnishes us a striking parallel to the modern 
Lloyds associations. While the Lloyds associations of the 
present represent t.he accumulation of years of experience in 
conducting the business of insurance, the theory involved in
14. Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 302.
101874 
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carrying the risk is essentially the same as that employed 
in the partnership associations of ancient Greece.
This partnership association developed in Greece was 
well adapted to the purpose of risk bearing, and was utilized 
not only in connection with the underwriting of marine loans, 
but also to finance undertakings of other kinds that involved 
too great a risk for a single individual. Athens, a city of 
great commercial enterprise, facilitated business operations 
through its wide spread adoption. Ma,ny companies of great 
importance were formed there, and included among the partners
15 some of the wealthiest and most influential men of the city.
The usual form of organization included a leader oT 
chief, as well as any number Of associates. All of the mem­
bers were not responsible before the law, but upon the leader 
or principle associate fell the duty of answering for the
16others. As to whether there was any provision in the law
that regulated the affairs of the members or enforced the con-
17 
ditions of their contract of association is uncertain. It 
is to be presumed, however, that the law took cognizance of a




contract of association that occupied, so important a place in 
the commercial life of the time. It seems certain that the 
company secured, a considerable degree of unity and mobility of 
action through the device of making the leader the official 
representative of the group who entered an appearance for them 
whenever necessary. This form of association admirably 
adapted itself to the business of marine underwriting, and 
served as a means for carrying on the business of insurance.
The procedure for arranging to carry a bottomry loan, 
and at the same time effect a wide distribution of risk was 
simple. To begin with, a single individual might negotiate 
a loan on his own behalf, or it might have been arranged by a 
leader and two or three partners who were united, for the purpose. 
The individual, or the partners who have negotiated the loan, 
and who are alone known to the borrower, then proceed to effect 
a form of re-insurance. That is, they further spread the risk 
by assigning part of it to other partners whose names do not 
appear in the original articles of agreement. The result of 
this dispersion makes each individual liable for but a small
18 part of the total of any one risk. It is obvious, then,
that an individual with a given sum of money, instead of being 
obliged to risk it all in a given venture, or risk it in large
18. Glotz, op. cit., p. 302
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sums, may go about and place part on one risk, part on another. 
The loss of a ship in which they are interested would therefore 
involve but a fraction of their capital. There was likewise 
afforded an opportunity for the individual whose wealth was 
not all in a form to use for bottomry loans, but who might 
occasionally have small units available for risk to participate 
in a venture. He too could join in the underwriting of one 
or more of these groups. In this way more capital was made 
available for the purpose. The associations thus formed were 
npt permanent partnerships, like companies, but like the Lloyds 
underwriters, formed a separate group for every transaction.
Each group formed to underwrite a loan was a societas unius rei. 
lasting for a pre-arranged time, usually dependant upon the
19time of the voyage for which the money was davanced.
3. The Insurance of Slaves.
The earliest example we have of carrying on the
business of insurance, following the method adopted in modern 
times, is found in Aristotle. Today as the business of insurance 
is carried on, if a given risk is to be transferred by means of
19. Ibid.,p. 302.
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insurance, it is accomplished by means of the insurer assuming 
the burden of risk by contract, in return for the payment of a 
stipulated premium by the assured. Surprise has sometimes 
been expressed, considering the development of commerce and 
business among the ancient peoples that no form of providing 
indemnity in the event of disaster, for the payment of a premium 
in advance, was effected on a commercial scale, at least so far 
as the available records afford us evidence. That the princi­
ple was not unknown, the Oeconomica attributed to Aristotle,
20affords us an outstanding example. In the instance cited,
Antimines a Rodian has been placed by Alexander in charge of the 
roads around Babylon, and turned uo the problem of raising money. 
Among other devices, he went into the business of insurance. 
Owners of slaves, if they wished, were permitted to register the 
value of each slave, and to pay eight drachmae a year. In 
consideration of the payment of this sum (premium) the owner 
would receive the price he had registered in the event the 
slave should run away. It is recorded that many slaves were 
registered, and that Antimines accumulated in this way a consid­
erable sum of money.
20. Oecon. 11, 1352 (b) 33
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The special significance that attaches to this instance 
is found, not in its commercial importance, but in the fact that 
it demonstrates to us the fact that the principle must have been 
well known long before it became a common commercial practice.
21With the authorship of the Oeconomioa we are not here particul­
arly concerned. The fact that it has been handed down to us 
in the Aristotelian Corpus assures us that it was widely known 
and read. If the case of Antimines were an isolated instance 
and the report buried in some obscure document that had since 
come to light we could not be sure that the instance was- known. 
But to be included in Aristotle was to assure the material being 
familiar at least to the scholars and students. Because of
its importance in giving body to an idea that was subsequently 
to be of great commercial importance, as well as making a record 
thereof, the passage is here included in full:-
"On another occasion, when providing slaves who were 
to serve in the army, he commanded that any owner who 
wished should register the value which he put upon them, 
end they were to pay eight drachmae a year; if the 
slave rqn away the owner was to receive the price which 
he had registered. Many slaves being registered, he 
amassed a' considerable sum of money. And whenever any 
slave ran away he ordered the satrap of the country in 
which the camp was situated to recover the runaway or 
else to'pay the price to the owner." 22
21. Of. Bonar, op. cit., p.32. Also Preface to Forster translation 
of Oeconomioa. Works of Aristotle. Vol.X., W.D.Ross, editor.
22. Oeconomioa, 11. 1532 (b) 33 ff. Forster translation.
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This was indeed insurance, and so far as we .have any 
knowledge from the records that have been preserved for us, 
represents the first instance of risk bearing where the insurer 
in return for the advance payment of a premium, agrees to in­
demnify the assured upon the happening of the undesired contin­
gency for which protection is provided. As to what exteirt the 
idea was used by others, or whether it was used at all, we have 
no information. That the idea was presented in the Oeconomlca. 
not merely as a record of the past, but as an example to be 
followed by others who desired to engage in an undertaking for 
profit, may be gathered from a further reading of the text.
In the beginning of the second book of the Oeconomica. the 
author distinguishes four kinds of economy. After mentioning
I
and describing them, he then presents a collection of all the 
methods that he conceived to be worth mentioning, devised or 
employed by men of former times as money-making schemes, The 
information was presented with the idea in mind that others 
might make use of it as a means for securing a profit for them­
selves. Then follows a number of examples showing how different 
individuals were able to secure money. Among the examples thus
' 23listed, is to be found this insurance project of Antimines. 
Whether, as the writer suggests, others availed themselves of
23. Aristotle, Oecon. 11, 1346 (a) 26 ff
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the insurance idea thus described, there is no information.
It is to be presumed that at this time the idea failed to sur­
vive, for there is no evidence that it ever became at this 
early date an important commercial practice.
It is interesting to note in passing, however, that 
the project apparently developed in response to a decided need, 
and involved a recognition of the economic effect of risk.
The conditions under which slaves were held in military service 
facilitates escape, and made slave owners reluctant to subject
24their slaves to this hazard. It is obvious that such a
situation would not tend to further the project of Antimines 
of providing slaves for the army, on the other hand it would 
tend to make the task more difficult. It might have been ex-
I
pected, as the most logical step, that the authorities furnish 
the owners with some form of guarantee that their slaves would 
be returned. This they were apparently unwilling to do. The 
shrewd Antimines, however, was able to meet the situation. He
** /
provided a means of eliminating the risk as far as the slave 
owner was concerned, and at the same time provided a source of 
revenue for himself. He went into the business of insuring 
the slaves.
24. Of. Boeckh, op. cit., p. 101.
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The voluntary feature of the project is worth noteing. 
While he commanded that facilities be made available to the 
owners for registering slaves, the matter of registering was 
entirely optional. Only those who wished were required to 
pay the premium, and thereby secure the protection that was 
offered. It was entirely a business proposition. The risk 
was present. The person upon whom the burden rested could 
for the payment of a premium secure relief by shifting the 
burden to the shoulders of the risk bearer or insurer.
We are interested in considering at this point as 
well the position of the insurer. Had Antimines determined 
his premium charge on the basis of experience? Did he set 
up out of.his premium collections a reserve for losses? 
Were the reserves adequate? Had he any knowledge of the 
elements to be considered in computing an adequate premium? 
So far as Antimines is concerned that problem of devising a 
premium to meet losses, and leave a compensation for capital 
risked, as well as for other expenses, does not concern him. 
The problem of the insurer or risk bearer is solved by the 
simple expedient of putting the burden on the shoulders of 
third parties, who are not concerned with the enterprise.
He provided himself with a means of making good all losses
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by ordering the satraps to recover runaways, or make good 
their value to the owners. .
The agreement made by Antimines was not unlike that 
contract known to modern insurance as the valued contract. 
Under the valued policy contract, in the event of a total loss, 
the face of the policy for the purpose of adjusting the loss 
represents the measure of the damage. Likewise in the contract 
provided by Antimines, the insured is permitted to register the 
value which he himself puts upon the slave. Unlike the modern 
insurance agreement, however, the premium amounts to a flat sum 
of eight drachmae a year, regardless of the value put upon the 
slave. As in the valued policy, however, in the event of loss 
the owner of the slave was to receive the amount for which he 
was registered.
From the method of placing the values on the slaves 
insured, it might at first glance seem as though sight were lost 
of the principle of indemnity, and that the insured would tend 
to place a value upon his slaves in excess of their actual worth. 
From the text we read that the valuation accepted was that fixed 
by the owner. Nor was the premium fixed upon the basis of val­
uation. Doubtless it was true that the owners who took advan­
tage of the opportunity did tend to place a high valuation upon 
their property. Nevertheless, we may assume that those in 
charge of the registration were familiar with the upper and 
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lower limits of the prices of slaves used in the army, and 
probably exercised a control over the valuations. It is not 
to be expected that in a venture of this sort excessive pay­
ments would be made, consequently it would be natural to guard 
against excessive valuation at the time of registration.
However, it may be that the insurer did not parti­
cularly concern himself with value, and the owners could over 
insure. As a matter of actual concern, since the insurer does 
not intend himself to meet the losses out of his resources, 
but had ordered third parties to provide the indemnity, 
valuation means little to him. And since no effort is made 
to make the premium vary with the amount of the risk, and a 
flat sum is fixed for each individual slave registered, regard­
less of the value placed upon him, it may be reasonably con­
cluded that the insurer anticipated as much inconvenience in 
securing the return of a low priced as a high priced slave. 
The matter of valuation was a concern ultimately only to the 
satrap called upon to return the runaway, and then only if he 
failed to capture the fugitive. And the satrap was not a 
party to the insurance agreement.
This instance of Antimines:the EdsLiap.from the 
Aristotilian corpus, is considered here at some length, not 
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because his venture was of itself of any commercial importance, 
but because here in his case, a record was made of an idea that 
failed for centuries to be adopted as a widespread commercial 





1. Bottomry and Marine Insurance.
Whether or not ancient Rome ever developed a contract 
of insurance having embodied in it the essential features of 
the modern policy, is a question that has been widely debated. 
So far as direct evidence affords us grounds for a conclusion, 
it would seem that an agreement for shifting the burden of 
risk to an insurer having no privity of interest with the in­
sured, in consideration of a premium paid in advance, was 
entirely unknown to the Romans, and that the only vehicle used 
by them for effecting marine insurance contracts was to be 
found in their adoption and commercial development of bottomry. 
Even though direct evidence is lacking, however, there is 
reason to believe that both contract forms were known and in 
commercial usage.
Regarding bottomry there is no doubt. The contract 
was widely known and extensively used in the ordinary course of 
business. The titles de nautice fenore and de usuris, which 
bear upon these contracts afford ample and undisputable 
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evidence of the extended use made by commercial enterprise 
of this form of agreement. Bottomry with the Romans was in 
its essentials the same contract as that developed by the 
Greeks. Trajeticia pecunia, the term applied in Roman law 
to money lent on bottomry, referred to money lent for mer­
cantile adventure beyond the sea, with repayment conditional 
upon the safe arrival of the security at its destination.
The insurance element in the agreement was clearly 
defined in Rome. The risk assumed by the creditor was con­
sidered as a sufficient reason to warrant a higher rate than 
the usual rate of interest. Contrary to the situation that 
existed in Greece, however, the nauticum fenus or usurae 
maritimae could be charged, not for the time the borrower held 
the money, but only for the time over which the creditor’s
2 risk in the voyage extended. If this voyage came to an
end, and the loan was not repaid, only the legal interest rate 
might be collected, from the time that marked the termination 
of the voyage until the loan was repaid. There was, however, 
a provision for a fine in the event that repayment was delayed 
beyond the appointed time. This risk element in the bottomry 
agreement was recognized by Justinian, when in 533 he fixed the
1. Roby, Roman Private Law, v.2, p. 75.
2. Ibid.?p. 75.
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rate of interest to be charged on ordinary loans at 6 per 
cent. In the case of fenus nauticum, a special exemption 
was made, and twelve percent was permitted on the ground 
that such transactions went beyond the mere lending of 
money, and constituted an adventure involving the lender,
3which was subject to the risks of the sea> Commenting
upon this phase of the Justinian edict, Gibbon, in his
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, says:-
"Persons of illustrious rank were confined 
to the modest profit of four per cent; six was 
pronounced to be the ordinary and legal standard 
of interest; eight was allowed for the convenience 
of manufacturers and merchants; twelve was granted 
to nautical insurance, which the wiser ancients 
had not attempted to define; but, except in this 
perilous adventure, the practice of exhorbitant 
usury was severely restrained." 4
The legislation of Justinian marks.the first limitation of
5 the rate of interest that might be charged on bottomry loans.
In placing a limit on the rate, however, he clearly recognized 
the risk element, and permits a charge therefor.
The utility of the contract as a vehicle for risk 
bearing, and therefore a means for effecting insurance, was 
readily recognized by the Romans. JTor did they confine its 
use solely to marine undertakings. As a matter of fact, loans
3. Martin, History of Lloyds, p. 3.
4. Vol. 3, p. 706.
5. Duer, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance, v. 1,
p. 20 - 22. footnotes.
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were made, with a condition inserted in the agreement calling 
for the satisfactory outcome of the undertakings financed, as 
a condition precident to any obligation of repayment, whefe the 
risks covered were not the ordinary hazards of the sea. There 
is, for example, an instance cited of a loan made to a fisherman 
for the purpose of purchasing apparatus, repayment of the loan 
depending upon the catch of fish. This was an instance where 
the borrower was insured against loss arising out of disburse­
ments, in preparation for an undertaking that might turn out 
unsatisfactorily. There is another case, where money was 
lent to an athlete for training purposes, repayment to be
6made in the event he won at the contests. From these
instances it may be seen that the Romans used the conditional 
loan agreement as a means for shifting the burden of risk in 
widely different fields, and did not therefore limit them­
selves in its application to the field of marine undertakings.
Of the fact that bottomry was well known, and ex­
tensively used, there is ample evidence. Turning, however, 
to consider the possibility of the existence of a contract of 
insurance, us’ed by the Romans in carrying on their commercial 
undertakings, the evidence is less certain, and would seem at 
first consideration to justify the conclusion that such a 
contract was unknown. Weight is given such a belief, when 
6. Roby, op. cit., p. 76.
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after a consideration of the frequent references and ample 
treatment of the question of bottomry to be found in the Roman 
laws, in contrast we find a complete silence when we search 
for evidences of legislation dealing with an insurance contract. 
As a matter of fact, there is no reference in all the civil 
law of Rome to the contract of Insurance. Upon the subject, 
not only are the Institutes, Pandects, Code, and Novels, com­
pletely silent, but also there is no trace to be found of in­
surance as a separate and distinct contract in any of the laws 
of the Emperors who succeeded Justinian. This- fact alone has 
led many eminent scholars to conclude that the Romans were 
wholly ignorant, both of the term and of the contract of insur-
7ance.
Nor does such a conclusion at first thought seem to 
be unreasonable. The full treatment of bottomry to be found 
in the law, contrasted with the complete silence concerning the 
insurance would seem to permit the presumption that this silence 
was due to the fact that the contract of insurance was unknown. 
The problem, however, is not so simply solved. More complete 
investigation tends to explain the silence of the law, and 
reverses the older opinion that the insurance contract was un­
known to the Romans.
7. Duer, op, cit.. v.l, p. 7-8.
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The learned, and. scholarly Duer, in discussing this 
question, believes that insurance, if practiced in Ancient 
Rome, was effected by a mutual guarantee of associated merchants, 
or by the "'division of the burden of the risk among several in­
dividuals, who were not otherwise interested in the adventure, 
each assuming a proportionate part of the risk. Hence, it 
is his conclusion that marine insurance retained its original 
form of a mercantile usage, without finding a place in the law.
Bottomry on the other land, occupied quite a different 
position. Patricians and Senators of Rome during the final 
days of the Republic, and Nobles under the Empire, had become 
the capitalists of the world, and sought profitable sources of 
income by loans outside the city, wherever high rates of interest 
might be obtained. Voyages of great importance were often 
projected in neighboring cities where the local capitalists 
were unable to arrange the necessary financing. In such an 
instance the natural procedure was to turn for assistance to 
the great financial center of the world in the city of Rome. 
Because of the high rate of interest, maritime loans became 
a favorite investment with the capitalists, and as the business 
grew in importance, and extended its scope nationwide, careful 
regulations concerning it were enacted, and ultimately incor-
Q 
porated into the works of Justinian.
8. Duer, op, cit., v.l, p. 22 et seq.
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There is, however, a further explanation for the 
omission of any legal regulations covering the subject of 
marine insurance in the works on Roman law. Such laws as 
effect marine affaire that are to be found in the Code or 
Pandects are rather of a supplementary nature than original 
in their character. There are many subjects of great com­
mercial importance, besides marine insurance, that find no 
laws for their regulation, yet this fact will not warrant a 
conclusion that no such laws are in existence. The explanat­
ion of this apparent inconsistency is found in the fact that 
the Romans had early adopted the laws of Rhodes as the Roman 
legal code for maritime affairs. ’.Then they were first incor­
porated into the law of Rome is not clear, but as early as the 
time of Augustus they were formally adopted, and their authority 
was proclaimed by Justinian through the adoption in the Pandects 
of an edict of Antonius in which the' Rhodian laws were directed 
to be observed in all cases where they were not contrary to
g
the laws of Rome. Hence it is to be expected that if there
was in Rome any law regulating the practice of marine insurance, 
it was to be found in the adopted Rhodian law, laws which are 
now lost to us.
9. Kent, Oommentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 5; 
Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 25.
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There are in the writings of the classical authors 
four passages, upon which have been centered, the attention of 
writers on insurance, and. which have been held, forth as proof 
that insurance was not only known to the Romans, but was also 
a common commercial practice. The passages in question include 
two references in Livy, dated around 215 B.O., another from a 
private letter of Oicero dated 49 B.O., and a final instance 
from Suetonius dated at 58 A.D. Writers have by no means 
agreed in their interpretation of these passages in the light 
of their proving a reference to a contract of insurance.
They do, however, afford evidence that the insurance idea was 
known and understood by business men.
The earliest of these references comes to us from
10 Livy. The forces operating in Spain, he tells us, had
become destitute, and an urgent appeal had been sent to Rome 
for assistance. Conditions in Rome were not promising; the 
treasury was empty, and the people had been taxed to the limit. 
In the crisis it was decided to call upon the people for credit, 
and to urge those who had already profited through goirennment 
contracts, to furnish the needed materials and be paid when 
the treasury should succeed in getting money. On the day 
appointed for letting the contracts, the historian tells us
10. Livy, xxiii, c. 49 
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there were a sufficient number who came forward, to take the 
contracts, but named two conditions under which they would 
advance the supplies on credit. The first of these was 
exemption from military service, and the second was the 
assumption by the state of the risks of storms or attacks of 
the enemy while the supplies were on shipboard and in transit 
to destination. Both of these demands were granted.
The second mention of this agreement in Livy has to 
do with abuses that followed the state guarantees. Merchants, 
he tells us, who had entered into agreements with the govern­
ment fabricated fraudulent claims, and attempted to collect 
because of pretended losses on the basis of the government’s 
ag-reement to indemnify. Small amounts of supplies were sent 
out in old and unseaworthy ships, and after sinking them at 
sea, their owners presented false claims as to their value. 
This practice continued for two years, and became so great a 
scandal as to cause a popular uprising.
The next reference that may possibly be interpreted 
as indicating a knowledge of insurance is found in the letter 
of Oicero to Caninius Sallust. The letter was written follow­
ing Roman victories in Cilicia and the writer stated that he 
expected to receive guarantees to protect himself and the state 
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from the possible loss of the public moneys while in transit. 
Those who cannot see in this arrangement a contract of insur­
ance, assert that what Cicero referred to was a bill of exchange. 
On the other hand, if he actually contemplated transferring 
money and treasure, then the agreement to guarantee the safe 
transportation, was most certainly an insurance agreement.
The final instance mentioned in the classical writers 
brings us down into the Christian era, with an elapse of approx­
imately 275 years from the instances mentioned by Livy. This 
is related to us by Suetonius, and has to do with the period of 
the reign of the Emperor Claudius. There was, the historian 
tell us, in A.D. 58 a severe famine in Rome, resulting in great 
distress and popular demonstrations. With the suuply of corn 
low, and little prospect of further importations during the 
winter season, Claudius, in order to encourage a resumption of 
trade, and continued imports of this valued and much needed 
commodity, offered not only to pay a bounty on all corn imported, 
but further agreed to be personally responsible for all losses
12 
arising from the storms. Here, as in the cases mentioned
by Livy, we have a similar set of circumstances. Ownership 
of the goods to be shipped remained with the vendors until 
delivery at the points specified. While the goods were aboard 
ship the shippers would have been responsible for losses, had
11. Cicero, Epistolae. ad C. Sallust.
12. Suetonius, de vita Caesarum. v., 18.
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they not required an agreement to indemnify them in the cases 
mentioned by Livy, and had not such an agreement been volun­
tarily offered in the case mentioned by Suetoniun. The 
government, then, is in each case the risk bearer. It is 
therefore correct to refer to the agreement entered into be- 
tween the government and the merchants as insurance contracts.
These historical facts, while they prove that in an 
emergency the government recognized the effects of risk in 
tending to defeat its ends, and proceeded by means of an in­
surance agreement to shift its burden, do not of themselves 
prove that marine insurance as a private contract was known 
to merchants. The instances are, however, not without value. 
If they accomplish nothing more, they clearly demonstrate the 
reluctance of merchants to enter upon hazardous ventures with­
out some assurance of indemnity. In the cases here mentioned 
it is probably true that the risks were so great that there 
would have been difficulty in securing an agreement to indem­
nify from private individuals, and because of that, the govern­
ment met the need to serve its own ends. It is not an un­
reasonable conclusion, however, to assume that when merchants, 
tempted by the allure of great profits, entered upon a hazard­
ous adventure in which the government had no interestj they 
provided themselves with the required indemnity through a
13. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 17-8. 
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contract with private individuals.
Serving to confirm the theory that insurance was 
effected as a private agreement between individuals, there is
14 
a passage in the Digest that seems to refer to such a contract. 
This consists of the incorporation in the Digest of a judgment 
of the learned Preatorian Praefect Ulpian, who passed upon the 
validity of the agreement contained in the stipulation: - " Do 
you promise that my ten thousand shall be safe? " (Decern milia 
salva fore promittis? )' If the second party to the agreement 
replies, " I promise", then he binds himself to assume the 
ri^ks attaching to the ten thousand of the party to whom the 
promise was made. When the question of the validity of this 
agreement was submitted tonUlpian, he made an affirmative 
decision that ultimately found its way into the Digest. 
Commenting upon this passage, Marshall, states that it affords 
"greater color for supposing that the contract of insurance 
was not altogether unknown to the Romans, than any of the 
passages above referred to." He adds, however, that whatever 
sort of contract the passage referred to, it was very little 
known when Ulpian made his decision, since he found it necess-
15ary to state that it was not illegal. On the other hand
14. Digest, xiv, tit. 1, frag. 67.
15. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, v.l, p. 8. 
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there is the possibility that the contract had been commonly 
used in business, but that this occasion marked the first time 
that its validity was brought into question. It is not un­
common that a custom among merchants is found to persist for 
many years before disputes arising out of it come before the 
established courts for settlement. Such may have been the 
situation in this case. The validity of this agreement was 
settled for all time in Roman law by Ulpian’s decision, and 
its subsequent incorporation in the Digest.
The form in which this agreement was made represents 
probably the most ancient of the forms of contract recognized 
in Roman law, and was known by the name stipulatio. The 
agreement was entirely verbal, and its validity depended among 
other requirements, upon a strict conformation to a specified 
formula. A question containing the terms of the contract was 
put by the stipulator, or promisee, and the reply was made by 
the promisor. The act of putting the question, and receiving
16the reply was called the stipulatio.
It can readily be seen that if the reference in the 
Digest to Ulpian's decision regarding the validity of an agree­
ment to keep safe the ten thousand of a stipulator, was a
16. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 318.
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reference to an insurance agreement, then the stipulatio may
have been widely used for effecting insurance contracts.
Insurance, would therefore not be of necessity confined to 
marine risks, and the regulations in the law that effected 
contracts of insurance would be those that applied to contracts 
in general.
Whether the contract of insurance was known to the
Romans, however, aside from the insurance element to be found 
in the bottomry agreement, will until further information 
comes to light, remain a matter of speculation. In the light 
of such evidence as we have, the following conclusion of the 
learned Duer warrants thoughtful consideration:-
"The desire of merchants of limited means to obtain 
the necessary capital for enterprises in which they 
wished to embark, combined with the desire of pro­
tecting themselves against the loss of the capital 
employed, led to the invention and practice of marine 
loans, in which the lender assumes the risk of the 
voyage. It is evident that the same desire of pro­
viding an adequate indemnity against the perils of 
the sea, must have existed in cases where no advance 
of capital, as a loan was needed or desired; that is 
in cases judging from our own experience, forming a 
vast majority of commercial adventures. That, to 
persons thus situated, to minds actuated by this 
desire, the utility of an insurance unconnected with 
a loan, should not have occured, it is difficult to 
believe, and still more so, that appreciating its 
utility, they neglected its introduction and use. 
Let it be admitted that the contract of bottomry was 
first in the order of invention; reasoning from pro­
bability, we should say that the separation in a 
distinct contract, of the insurance from the loan 
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was an immediate and almost necessary consequence. 
For myself, I am persuaded, that were we wholly 
ignorant of the laws of the Romans, but knew from 
history the extent of their commerce, we should deem 
it far more probable, that marine insurance was in 
frequent and general use, than loans on bottomry and 
respondentia; for these plain reasons, that the contract 
of insurance is simpler in its provisions, less onerous 
in its terms, more easy to be affected, and of far 
wider utility.11 17
While any conclusion with reference to the existence of an in­
dependent Insurance contract, due to'the paucity of evidence, 
must of necessity be based upon speculation and therefore in­
volve much uncertainty, no such uncertainty exists with refer­
ence to bottomry. The evidence here leaves no doubt. We 
know that the contract was well known and frequently used in 
the mercantile practice of the Roman people, and served as a 
vehicle for providing insurance.
3. Collegia and Life Insurance.
Of particular interest, because possessing many of 
the characteristics of life insurance as written today by the 
fraternal or beneficial societies, was the practice at Rome of 
organizing burial societies, whose functions were, among others 
the payment of the funeraticum or death benefit upon a member’s 
decease. Here we- have a situation involving the risk of an
17. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 13-14. 
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undesired contingency. To ward off the undeeired effects, 
steps are taken by the individuals concerned through organi­
zation and contribution to reduce the undesired probability 
to a reasonable degree of desired certainty. Payment is 
made in advance for the service rendered at the time agreed. 
Differing from insurance in that it provides for a certain 
payment ultimately, there is found here nevertheless the 
insurance element of the life policy in that it provides for 
the uncertainty of the contingency on a time basis, thus the 
protective element is added to the accumulation of a fund 
undertaken to meet a certain payment. This development of 
death benefits found its medium in the highly specialized and 
widespread system of gilds organized among the Romans.
The tendency to form into groups and organizations 
made itself manifest in Rome at a very early date. According 
to tradition the early kings were believed to have organized 
the first gilds. Romulus is said to have been responsible 
for the military and political institutions, and Numa, his 
successor, is credited with having carried the work from war 
to peace with the establishment of such gilds as the shoemakers,
18 dyers, carpenters, and others engaged in peacetime pursuits.
18. Abbott, The Common People of Ancient Rome, p.216,; also 
Plutarch. Lives^ (Numa Pompilius) v.l, p.139.
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To what extent such tradition corresponds with historical 
fact we are not here concerned. It is sufficient for our 
purposes to note that the formation of the gilds reaches back 
in Rome to a very early date.
The information that comes to us concerning their 
development during the period of the Republic is meager.
The position of the poor citizen was not a particularly happy 
one, nor were the aristocratic writers concerned with includ­
ing his affairs in their records. Under the Empire, however, 
the poor workingman began to emerge into a better position. 
They became an active and industrious class, interested in 
their affairs, and concerned with their welfare. This period 
affords a wealth of inscriptions from which it appears that 
the lower classes, that is the grades of workmen including 
freedmen and slaves, lived under favorable conditions hitherto
v 19
19. Waltzing, Etude Historique sur les Corporations chez les
Romans. p. 33 ff.
Stobart, The Grandeur that was Rome, p. 284.
unknown.
It was in this atmosphere that the social tendency 
that manifested itself in the organization of gilds found a 
favorable environment for development. Such groups were to 
be found in every strata of the cosial structure, and their 
development was particularly fostered among the workmen in 
the various trades and occupations. There were clubs that 
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were particularly religious in character, others political 
in their nature, groups organized, for the purpose of amusement,
20
and lastly the professional organizations. Just as in this 
country today there are clubs, unions, and societies of every 
description, so among the Romans, the capitalists, veterans, 
religious and laborers united to further their own aims and 
interests. Fascinating as is the examination of their or­
ganization and development, we here are concerned only with 
the insurance element which they provided. This element, 
closely resembling the life insurance provision of the modern 
friendly society, is to be found in those societies, which in 
return for the required contributions, rendered prescribed 
benefits to their members.
While others of the Roman societies provided benefits 
for. their members, notable among these were the veterans organ­
izations, for our purpose the collegia tenuiorum serve as the 
best example of a Roman gild organized with an insurance feature.
✓
Because of a similarity or organization, And the practice of 
providing a death benefit, compared with the mutual fraternal 
benefit insurers of the present time, these ancient societies 
have been termed the first writers of life insurance.
20. Waltzing, op. cit., p. 33 et seq.
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The death benefit of the flollegia tenuiorum. it is 
interesting to note at the outset, was designed not as an in­
surance feature to benefit the heirs of the deceased, but 
originated in a fear on the part of the poor Roman that he 
himself after death would be lacking in the necessary religious 
rites and a proper burial. Hence, in its beginning at least, 
the death benefit of the collegia tenuiorum, was designed to 
provide the member himself against the unhappy lot of remaining 
unburied.
On the lowest plane of the Roman social structure 
stood the proletariat, the free wage earners and slaves employed 
in the shops and households. With very low wages, scarcely 
above the minimum necessary to procure the means of a bare 
subsistence, in the course of providing themselves with a 
means for social contact and at the same time insure themselves 
against the most dreaded of all risks, burial without proper
21 rites, the gilds that served these purposes were organized.
Because of the extreme poverty of the lower class 
Roman, the risk of dying without means of carrying out the 
religious rites he believed to be essential was a grave one. 
Money of course might be saved, but to the very poor this was 
a difficult undertaking. Nor was there any assurance that
21. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman 
Empire, p. 178.
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he would live long enough to save the necessary money, if he 
had planned to do so, or should he succeed, that the money 
would be used as he desired. Nevertheless the difficulty 
was admirably solved. From his meager wages the poor work­
man, however, might well manage his dues to the collegia, and 
thereby transfer the difficulty. He provided security.
Nor is the importance of this protective feature 
to be minimized. A’’decent burial" has concerned the people 
of every age and generation. Among the civilized countries 
today it is matter that influences everyone, yet as society 
is now organized every individual no matter how humble his 
position or poor his circumstances, need have no fear of the 
indignaties that haunted the poor of ancient times. In 
ancient Rome the possible fate of the poor and friendless 
presented a picture that was not pleasant. During the 
Republic, and at the beginning of the Empire, there were 
provided for the disposal of their remains great public burial 
places constructed in the form of cisterns closed at the opening 
by a great stone. Here bodies were thrown, one upon the other.' 
A startling and gruesome picture of the common burial place for 
paupers, (miserae plebi stabat comune seplucrum) is provided by
22. Waltzing, op, cit., v. 1,, p. 258.
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Horace when he alludes to their bodies cast out (electa 
cadavera) upon the ground white with bleaching bones (alb is 
ossibus agrum) and infested with thieves and beasts, (furesque 
feraeque suetae hune vexare locum.)
This, the ’’Potter’s Field” of ancient Rome, with 
the attendant neglect of proper religious ceremonies and burial 
rites was the risk, that in relation to all others, loomed in 
importance to the poorer people. In their move to meet the 
risk, and to provide security for themselves, through the 
agency of the collegia tenuiorum, a protective system was 
effected that served the times, satisfied a need, and created 
a system that has been carried forward in its essentials to 
the present through the widespread operation of the modern 
fraternal and beneficial societies.
In estimating the relative importance of the risk
I
it is especially necessary first of all to bear in mind the 
deep religious nature of the Roman, together with the fact 
that the last solemn rites in honor of the dead with a fitting 
burial were strictly proscribed. The poor freeman, and the 
slaves in Rome had little or nothing in the way of wealth. 
There was no ris> of loss here. As a matter of fact they
23. Horace, Sat. I, viii, 8-18 
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could scarcely be said to have hope. So then, to these people 
the nearest and most important risk with which they were con­
cerned was the possibility of a future life of unrest. The 
importance of the proper fulfillment of the religious rites is 
made clear by Professor Becker, who says:-
"At a very early period the belief was rooted in
peoples' minds, that the shades of the unburied 
wandered restlessly about, without gaining admittance 
into Hades; so that non-burial came to be considered 
the most deplorable calamity that could befal one, 
and the discharge of this service a most holy duty.
This obligation was not restricted to relatives 
mearly, and near connections; it was performed towards 
strangers also; and if one happened to meet with an 
unburied corpse, he at any rate observed the form of 
throwing earth thrice upon it." 24
Having recognized the risk, the poor Roman proceeded 
along the most natural lines to provide for himself a greater 
degree of security. Whenever there is an end of any sort, 
if there is a common interest in its accomplishment, the tendency 
to unite into groups for the purpose of effecting the common end 
manifests itself. The organization and widespread growth of 
the gilds of ancient Rome was a response to this natural tendency. 
Occupying its own position of no inconsiderable importance among 
all the many types-and kinds of associations thus formed, are 
those which have for their end social relationships, to which 
have been added the feature of mutual benefits. Such societies 
are numbered among the most important insurance carriers of today,
24. Becker, Gallus. p. 400.
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and such was the type of society founded by the workingmen of 
ancient Rome to provide not only a means for cosial contact 
but as well an insurance feature that relieved them of the re­
sponsibility of providing in some other way for funeral rites 
and proper burial. Such societies were the collegia tenuiorum.
The statutes of one of these organizations found in
Lanuvium Illustrates admirably the points of similarity between 
the modern beneficial society and the collegia. They say in 
part: -
"It has pleased the members, that whoever shall 
wish to join this guild shall pay an initiation fee 
of one hundred sesterces, and an amphora of good wine, 
as well as five asses a month. Voted likewise, that 
if any man shall not have paid his dues for six con­
secutive months, and if the lot common to all men has 
befallen him, his claim to a burial shall not be con­
sidered, even if he shall have so stipulated in his 
will. Voted likewise, that if any man from this 
body of ours, having paid his dues, shall depart, 
there shall come to him from the treasury three 
hundred sesterces, for which sum fifty sesterces, 
which shall be divided at the funeral pyre, shall go 
for the funeral rites. Furthermore, the obsequies 
shall be performed on foot." 25
The income for the organization comes from two main 
sources, the initiation fee, and a system of monthly dues, a 
system identical with the custom usually in vogue in the modern 
fraternal beneficial society. In addition there is evidence 
that a system of fines and gifts added to the funds in the
26 treasury. Dues were paid directly to the common treasury,
25. From Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.XIV,2112. Quoted by
Abbo11. Common People of Ancient Rome.p.225.
26. Ibid.,p. 224, and 227.
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and out of this fund all expenses of the organization of what­
ever sort were paid. Next come the provisions and penalties 
attached to nonpayment of dues, a six months period of grace 
being allowed before the failure to pay operated to cancel 
the member's benefits. Lastly a provision is made for the 
benefits, part of the fund to be used for the expense of 
burial, and the balance presumably to be distributed to the 
heirs or dependants of the deceased. The likeness here in­
dicated between the ancient and the modern is indeed striking.
It is worth mentioning here that it does not seem 
to have entered the minds of the Romans that these organizat­
ions, in addition to providing the necessary burial rites, 
could have served to render assistance in sickness or other 
time of need. As a matter of fact, there probably was in the 
beginning at least no intention on the part of the members of 
the burial societies to provide even for those whom they left 
behind. The payment to be made upon the decease of a member 
was designed for two purposes. The first of these was to 
provide for burial and pay for carrying out of the necessary 
funeral rites. The sum left over after these expenses were 
met was to be used in errecting a monument. Any part of this 
money that the family of the deceased should retain for their 
own use was in the beginning a diversion of the funds to a use
27not intended by the collegia.
27. Waltzing, op, cit.. v.l, p. 301, et 303
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It is to be observed, however, that the funeratioum 
could be considerably in excess of the actual funeral expenses, 
and the balance was paid to the heirs of the deceased. If, 
originally, it was the intention of these societies to provide 
only an amount sufficient to pay for a burial and monument, as 
the death benefits were increased, it is to be presumed that 
such sums as were left after the necessary expenses were met 
would then be retained by the heirs for their own use. 
Hence, an institution that was designed originally to provide 
only for a need of the deceased developed to provide likewise 
for his family.
The question has been raised as to the effect of 
Christianity upon these burial societies, with a view to as­
certaining whether their benefits were broadened by the con­
tract. The question is answered by pointing out that these 
societies had for their end the fulfilling of a religious 
rite of a pagan people, and because of the religious character 
of the organizations, Christians did not participate in their 
activities. To render comfort and assistance to the unfor­
tunate the Christians organized various charitable societies
28of their own.
28. Waltzing, op, cit., v.l, p. 321. cf.
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An examination of the conditions under which fraternal 
organizations operate today, and the organization, aims, and 
purposes of the collegia tenuiorum reveals a startling similar­
ity between the two, and justifies the conclusion that here 
indeed was commenced a system of insurance still in operation 
with changes only in the details. A very substantial percent- 
ege of all lives insured today in the United States are insured
29by fraternal societies. These societies are primarily
social in purpose, effecting mutual aid among members in time 
of need, and providing the usual death benefit upon the decease 
of a member. That these organizations are primarily clubs is 
well established, and their character as such now rests firmly 
upon court authority. While the insurance feature and general 
economic aspect has been an important factor in their development, 
it can in no way be subordinated to the social appeal; and the 
opportunities offered to partake in the activities of these or­
ganizations of a purely social nature have likewise contributed 
to their growth and popularity.
The funds upon which these fraternal organizations 
operate and out of which expenses and benefits are paid are 
derived from dues, usually monthly, together with additions
29. Of. Nicholas, Fraternal Insurance in the United States. Annals 
of The American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. V. 70. (March 1917) p.120 ff. 
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made to the treasury through assessments, fines, gifts, enter­
tainments and the like. They are co-operative in their oper­
ation, and the claims of members against the organizations are 
on the basis of membership and not upon a contractural relation­
ship as is set up by the issuance of the life insurance policy. 
Non compliance with the rules of the organization, one of the 
most important of which is the meeting of dues and assessments, 
results in the member being cut off from participation in the 
society’s benefits. There is little in common in the relation­
ship of the member to the organization with that of the holder 
of a life insurance policy to the commercial company of modern 
times. Yet the benefits do fill a need, and experience shows 
that as attractive as is the social side, many members join 
alone and solely for the economic benefits, keep their dues 
regularly paid, but never take part in the other activities of 
the society.
While .the purposes which modern life insurance policies 
are designed to meet are many, an analogy may be drawn here 
between the present and the past, in that the cost of dying 
today furnishes an important problem, important enough to be 
sure for the poor or those in moderate circumstances, but in­
creasingly complex as the value of the estate of the deceased 
mounts in value. While in the case of the poor workman or 
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slave of ancient Rome the concern was to provide a means for 
defraying the expenses of burial and funeral rites, the cause 
of concern today with the rich arises out of the problem of 
providing ready cash to meet taxes thereby protecting assets 
in the estate from the necessity of forced or unfavorable 
liquidation for this purpose. The life insurance policy has 
solved the problem today, the system of the collegia tenuiorum 
solved the problem of unusual expense attendant upon the death 
of the poor among the ancient Romans.
■Lt is hard to see how this system could have been 
improved upon with the knowledge of insurance available to the 
people of those times. Likewise it must be remembered that 
these organizations were carried on by the lowest classes in 
the city, including in their membership slaves and free wage 
earners, people whose economic status provided but the most 
meagre living, and it is not to be doubted that the benefits 
were as welcome and served as well in those days as they do 
today.
Because these ages are so far in the past, because 
we ao;e unable without some effort to place ourselves in the 
place of the peoples of other times, we are inclined to forget 
they they were very human, they were moved by the same impulses 
and guided by essentially the same instinctive tendencies 
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And. this effort of these humble people in a mighty empire, 
where wealth and luxury are the bywords,is. worthy of note in 
the development of the principle of insurance. And great as 
is the business of life insurance as it is practiced today, 
surrounded by science, technical and complicated in its com­
putations and calculations, yet it is not an uncomplimentary 
statement to term the efforts of the collegia of ancient Rome 
as the beginning of this great branch of the insurance business, 
because if it lacked in technique at least it was not failing 
in purpose.
3. The FirBt Mortality Tables.
The development of acturial science, without which 
the modern plan of life insurance would have been impossible, 
depends first of all for its point of departure upon the con­
struction of tables of mortality. So far as the records furnish 
us evidence, the first efforts towards the construction of such 
tables followed the enactment in Rome ( 40 B. 0. ) of the 
Falcidian Law, (Lex Falcidia de Legatio.)
The purpose of the Falcidian law was to restrict the
power of leaving legacies Originally this power was unlimited, 
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for by the Twelve Tables it was ordained that whatever dis­
position .anyone made of his estate, so shall be the law. (utl
30 
legassit suea rei ita jus esto). The law, as represented 
by the Twelve Tables, made it possible for a testator to so 
diminish his estate in legacies that the heir or heirs to 
whom the residue was due would decline to enter, with the
31 result that the will became ineffective.
The reason that prompted an heir to refuse to enter 
when the estate was nearly exhausted, or entirely so, because 
of numerous bequests, is found in the Roman doctrine of univer­
sal succession. A universal succession involves a trans­
mission of the aggregate of the rights and duties at one given 
moment from one person to a successor. Such a succession 
followed upon a death, and the heir was immediately clothed 
with the legal person of the deceased, and instantly acquired 
not only all of his rights, but likewise all of his duties. 
Among the duties was a responsibility for the debts of the 
. „ 30 12 deceased.
30. Twelve Tables, Tabula V., 3.
31. Roby, op. cit., v. 1, p. 344.
32. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 174. et seq.; Muirhead, Law of Rome,
p. 158, et. seq.
It can readily be seen that the heirs to an estate 
exhausted by bequests might succeed to little more than an
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accumulation of duties, and steps were early taken by the legis­
lators to remedy such a situation. Three laws in succession
were passed with this end in view. The first of these, the
lex Furia, as well as the lex Voconia which followed, while 
limiting the power of leaving legacies, were still inadequate, 
and the third law, the lex Falcidia was passed, and took its
33 place as a part of the permanent body of Roman Law. It
is with the provisions of the lex Falcidia that we are here 
concerned, because it was in an effort to make them effective 
that the first mortality table was developed.
The law was passed in 40 B.O., and while under its 
terms the right was left to any citizen to leave his property 
to whomever he chose, nevertheless, and this is the important 
feature of the law,' it was required that the amounts of all 
the bequests should be so restricted as to leave the heirs
34under the will not less than one-fourth of the estate.
Under the operation of this law it became necessary 
to ^evaluate not only the entire estate, but in the event that 
it appeared the heir or heirs were not to get their fourth part, 
if all bequests were paid, it was likewise necessary to appraise
33. Roby, op. cit., V. 1., p. 344 et seq.
34. Institutes, Lib. II, Tit. xxii. 
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each separate bequest. In the case of property the matter 
of valuation was not difficult. Each article was to be 
appraised at its true value as an article of commerce. How­
ever, in the event that a testator left a beneficiary a certain 
sum, to be paid him annually for life, then the problem of 
evaluating the annuity presented itself. It was in the solution 
of this problem that the Roman jurists devised the first mortality 
tables.
Wh.- t the earliest means were that were attempted to 
ascertain the value of an annuity for the purposes of this law 
we do not know; Aemilius Macer furnishes us the first record. 
According to him the method in common use in his time (c.230 A.D.) 
for making this computation was as follows: - The value of the 
annuity was to be computed at thirty years purchase for all 
ages up to thirty, and above that age it was to be computed at 
so many years purchase as equaled the difference between the age 
of the annuitant and sixty. Using this method described by
35Macer an annuity value never exceeded thirty years purchase.
Recognizing the inadequacy of this system, the dis­
tinguished jurist, the Praetorian Praefect Ulpianus, in 364 A.D.
35. Walford, op, cit., v. 1, p. 98; Roby, op. cit.. v.l, p. 350. 
102
undertook to compute a table that more nearly adjusted itself 
to the probable life term of the annuitant. The system of 
Ulpian placed the value of an annuity at thirty years purchase 
for all annuitants under the age of twenty. The value of the 
annuity decreased with the increasing age of the annuitant
♦
until the age of sixty. At that age and upwards, the value 
was placed at five years purchase.
The table as computed by Ulpian follows
Age. Years' Purchase.
Birth to 20............. ......... 30
20 it 25 .........   . . ....... 28
25 it 30 ............. . ....... 25
30 II 35 ............ ......  22
35 II 40 ............ ......  20
40 II 41 ............ .......  19
41 II 42 ............ .......  18
42 II 43 ............ ......  17
43 II 44 ............. ...... 16
44 II 45 ............ ........ 15
45 II 46 ............ ......  14
46 II 47 ............ ......... 13
47 II 48................... 12
48 II 49 ................... 11
49 II 50 ............ ....... 10
50 II 55 ............ ......  9
55 II 60 ............ .......  7
60 and upwards ..... .......  5
The table computed and used by Ulpian represents the 
first attempt of which we have any knowledge to measure annuity 
values taking age as a basis for making the computation. The
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elements that entered into his computations are unknown. How­
ever, in the eomputatleii of Ulpian we find the first step in
36the direction of modern actuarial science.
4. The Fire Problem.
In Rome we find the problem of fire coming prominently 
•77to the front. Constant reference is made by contemporary
writers to its threats and dangers, and the burdens imposed by 
the tremendous losses were recognized. It may be fairly 
stated that the Romans were fire conscious. Bearing this point 
in mind, and recalling the advanced state of development reached 
by business organizations, particularly during the period of the 
Empire, it would not have been surprising to have found a method 
of indemnifying for losses from fire developed on a commercial 
scale. Yet as a matter of fact there were no offices or com­
mercial organizations that afforded insurance against losses
_ 38from fire.
That the city was particularly susceptable to fire
39seems to be borne out by contemporary writers. Livy tells
36. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 98-9; Roby, op. cit.. p. 350.
37. Homo, Problems sociaux de jadis et d»a present, p. 15.
38. Becker, Gallus. p. 1, note.
39. Livy, 5:55.
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us that when the city was rebuilt after its destruction by the 
Gauls, in their rush the people gave little care to making the 
streets straight and orderly, and built wherever they found a 
space. To show to what extent this hit or miss system of 
locating buildings were carried, he points out that the sewers 
which used to pass through the streets were in his time to be 
found under the private dwellings (nunc privata passim subeant 
tecta). The result of all this was a mass of building 
through which passed a network of narrow and crooked streets, 
giving the city according to the historian the appearance of 
having been built upon ground that was seized, rather than
40 upon lots marked off with any degree of regularity. Suetonius 
likewise mentions the narrow and twisted streets and the delap- 
itated buildings, when we accuse Nero of burning the city 
because annoyed by them. A final contribution to the risk 
created by flimsey and crowded construction, delapitated build­
ings and narrow and crooked streets, was a result of the diffi-
41culty involved in lighting fires, as well as the religious 
custom that necessitated constantly burning fires or lights in 
the buildings. The attitude of the people is well espressed
40. Suet, Neron. 6:38.
41. Morgan, De Ignis Eliciendi Modis Apud Antiquos. p. 16 ff,
et 56 ff.
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by Homo, who says:-
"Incendies, ecroulements, deux mots qui 
reparaissent comme une obsession et reviennent comme
un refrain chez tous leB e'crivans du debut de 1’Empire.
To Augustus must go credit for taking the first steps 
involving action on the part of the state to meet the risk. 
Recognizing the gravity of the situation, he took the first 
and most natural step in the direction of greater security, that 
of provided protection. His biographer tells us that in 
addition to adorning the city, Augustus, recognizing that it was 
exposed to flood and fire, (inundationibus incendiisque) made it 
safe for the future so far as human judgment was able to provide. 
(Tutam uero, quantum providere humana ratione potuit, etiam in
, 42 3 44posterum praestitit.)
42. Homo, op. cit.. p. 15.
43. Suet, Aug., ii, 28, 30.
44. Ibid.,28. 30.
To accomplish his purpose, Augustus divided the city 
into sections corresponding perhaps to the ward divisions of the 
modern American city, and arranged for their supervision. Night 
watchmen were detailed to patrol the streets, and a particular 
concern of theirs was to be on the lookout for incipient fires.
44 (Adversas incendia exubias nocturnas vigilesque commentus est.) 
It was to these nightwatchmen that Professor Becker alluded when 
he. mentioned "the occasional tramp of the Nocturnal Triumveriri,
42
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as they passed on their rounds to see that the fire watchmen
45were at their posts." For the purpose of fighting fires
46 there were assigned seven cohorts. Not only were the
duties of ,the members of these organizations so assigned as 
to permit a high degree of efficiency through specialization, 
but they were also equipped with every conceivable device for
47 fighting fires that the ingenuity of the times afforded.
The organization and equipment of the Roman fire department
is here aptly described:-
"Certes les pompiers ne manquaient pas a Rome et 
ils etaient dotes d'une organization remarquable, 
Divises en sept cohortes, 'a raison d’une par deux 
regions, avec autant de casernes et quatorz postes- 
vigies, les vigiles atteignaient un^effectif total 
de sept mille hommes chiffre ^ui, meme pourzune 
ville d’un million et demi d'ames, comme l’etait la 
Rome imperaile, ne lassait pas que d'etre fort 
respectable,z A l'int^rieur du corps, suivant les 
habitudes methodiques romaines, la personnel 6tait 
strictement specialise; pompiers proprement dits 
(sifonarii), .vigiles charges de alimentation en eau 
(aquarii), demolisseurs (falciarii uncinarii). 
sauveteurs (emitularii). Le material etait aussi
compl^t que le permettaient les moyens techniques 
de l'epoque. Le pompiers de Rome --- nous le
savons par les textes contemporains et aussi par 
^Les trovailles arch^ologiques---avaient des pompes
a bras (sifones), des crocs (unoinae), des haches 
(dolabraej. des scies (serrae), des marteaux (maillei), 
Sdes faux (falces), des perches (perticae), desz echelles 
a crochetas (scalae), des seaux (hamas)T des eponges 
(spon^iae). jusqu' a des pieces de drap (centones). 
imbibees de vinaigre et des matelas (emitpla), pour 
sauvetage des locataires. 48
45. Becker, op, cit.. p. 1.
46. Waltzing, op. cit., p. 127.
47. Homo, op. cit.. p. 15-6.
48. Homo, op. cit.. p. 16.
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In addition to the firemen who manned the pumps, the 
water carriers who in addition to working at the fires familiar­
ized themselves with all possible water supplies in their 
territory, the life savers, and those in charge of demolitions, 
there was also an official known as the 11 Questionarius11 whose 
duty it was to investigate questionable fires, and who had at 
his command that interesting and ingenious means devised by the 
ancients for eliciting information, namely torture. It is 
supposed that an interview with the 'Questionarius11 was a dread 
affair. The matter of life saving was under the supervision 
of four doctors attached to each cohort, and the general super­
vision of the entire operation of fighting the fire fell to
49 the Praefectus Vigilum, the fire martial of the time.
Following the inauguration of a system of fire pro­
tection and an organized fire department in the city of Rome 
the idea spread. Ultimately the problem of fighting fires 
was entrusted to certain of the collegia, and these organizat­
ions, because of their political activities, became a source 
of considerable annoyance to the authorities.
Light is thrown upon the situation in the correspon-
50dence of Pliny with the Emperor Trahan. Pliny writes con­
cerning a fire at Nicommedia, where a number of private houses,
49. Kenlon, Fires and Fire-Fighters, p. 19-20.
50. PlinJ, Letters. 42-3.
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several public buildings and a temple were destroyed. These 
buildings occupied two sides of a street, and while there was 
a violent wind, Pliny blames the loss to the indolence of the 
people and the lack of engines, (sipho) or other fire fighting 
equipment. He tells the Emperor that he has given directions 
for the preparation of fire fighting apparatus, and suggests 
the organization of a company of fire fighters limited to a 
hundred and fifty members. Bearing in mind the abuses that 
had crept into these organizations, he promises that privileges 
as well as numbers will be limited, in order to keep the organ­
ization under proper regulation. Trajan in his reply refers 
to the companies of other cities, and because they had in 
instances formed themselves into factions and caused considerable 
disturbance he suggests an alternative soultion. Rather than 
permitting the organization of a fire company, he advises rather 
the provision of fire fighting equipment to be used by owners 
of buildings, aided when necesaary by the populace.
In the face of this reception of the risk of fire, it 
would not have been surprising to find a commercial system of 
insurance. While there has been nothing left us by contem­
porary writers to show that there was any such business carried 
on, nevertheless there was a well established custom among the
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more wealthy, of making voluntary contributions to those 
suffering from losses by fire. Such a custom has sometimes 
been termed insurance by compulsion. That is, there is no 
legal requirement that makes necessary a contribution by one 
to the losses of another, but the mores of the group sometimes 
exert a force more powerful than law. Then again the contri­
bution to the fire losses of a neighbor is a means- of assuring 
for one's self a like treatment in the event of loss. That 
there was such a system in vogue in Rome seems well established.
51Juvenal gives us an intimation of the extent to which the 
custom had been carried among the rich. Before the fire is 
extinguished he says, there begin to arrive gifts of marble, 
building materials, statues, bronzes, silver, books, works of
52 art and other valuable presents. Martial likewise in his 
epigrams refers to the contributions that poured in when a 
house was destroyed amounting to many times its cost.
We may safely assume that the custom of making con­
tributions by neighbors and friends to indemnify the owner of 
property who suffered a loss from fire was well established and 
the procedure mentioned by Juvenal and Martial was the expected
51. Sat, iii, 215.
52. Epigrams, iii, 52. 
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one, rather than reports of isolated cases. This we may 
assume from the fact that in both the cases cited, the writers 
are of the opinion that the owners of the property were connect­
ed with the origins of the fires, and that they themselves
53burned the property for gain. Juvenal points out that 
because oftentimes the fire enabled the owner of the property 
to; restore his losses with more and better things, (meliora 
ac plura reponit) he may with good reason be suspected of 
burning his own home ( et merito iam suspectus tamquam ipse 
suas incenderit aedes). We may assume by inference that 
Juvenal was of the opinion that could the doctrine of indemnity 
have been enforced in these situations, fires might have occured 
less frequently. Nor was the attitude confined to Juvenal.
54
Martial in his Epigrams has no easy feeling about Tongilianas, 
who had purchased a house for two hundred thousand sesterces. 
Because contributions.poured into the amount of a million 
sesterces, Martial asks if Tongilianus may not be suspected 
of having set fire to his own house. It is certainly true, 
that unless the custom of making these contributions were well 
established, and the owner of the property reasonably certain
53. Sat, iii, 215.
54. Epigrams. Ill, 52. 
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of help, he would never have taken the chance of setting fire 
to his house, nor would he have been suspected of such a step.
Suetonius and Tacitus furnish us another interesting 
glimpse of the fire situation in Rome. While the friends of 
an individual, through their contributions, could restore to 
one who had a fire the amount of his loss, it is obvious that 
if there were a great many sufferers, contributions might not 
fill the need. Yet, within limits, the oatastrophy hazard 
found its solution. An instance to the point is related by 
Suetonius, who tells us that during the reign of Tiberius a 
fire broke out of the Oaelian Mount, destroying many clusters, 
or blocks of houses. The Emperor, in his private capacity, 
came forward to reli'eve the suffering ( ad mitigandam temporum 
atrocitatem). and restored to the sufferers their losses.
54(pretio restituto). According to Tacitus, on two occas­
ions such assistance was rendered by Tiberius, He mentions 
first the fire on Mdunt Caelius, after which the Emperor con­
tributed to each of the sufferers the amount of his loss. For 
this, according to the historian, he received the thanks of the 
senate and the applause of the.people. The second instance 
mentioned in the Annals, refers to the fire which burned part
54. Suet, Tib..xlviii 
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of the Circus near the Mount Aventine, as well as the area of 
the Mount itsel-f. Again, as in the previous instance, Tiberius 
made good to the owners the value of the tenements destroyed, 
expending according to the record, a hundred thousand great
55sesterces. The means for ascertaining the amounts lost
by the different individuals is of interest, in that it furnishes 
the earliest record of a committee selected for the purpose of 
determining the amount of losses by fire. The four sons-in-law 
of the Emperor were chosen for this duty, and to assist them 
there was appointed to the committee a fifth member nominated 
by the Consuls. It was this committee who ascertained the 
damage, before payments were made by the Emperor to the suffer-
56
era.
To what extent contributions in the event of a disaster 
could be depended upon from the Emperor is not easy to state. 
Such contributions, however, would not be altogether unexpected 
in Rome. Private benefactions were so usual as to be expected 
by the people, and particularly once a precedent was established, 
it would be a natural sequence that the people would look to the 
Emperor or the very rich for assistance in such disasters as 
were so great that friends could not with their contributions
55. Tacitus, Annals. 4, 64; et 6, 45.
56. Ibid.. 6, 45.
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reimburse the sufferers. Contributions from the Emperor or 
the State, however, would, ordinarily be expected only in the 
event of disasters. Of more interest is the custom of contri­
butions from friends in the case of the isolated loss. Such 
instances are more important, because more frequent, and tend 
to show that the Romans by means of this customary insurance 
had effectively shifted the burden of the risk of fire.
The business element in Rome was ever seeking new
57 
sources of income, and when we recall the exploit of Crassus 
during the last century of the Empire, whose salvage brigade 
accompanied him to fires where he would make a bid to owners 
for their property still burning, it is indeed surprising that 
the fertile minds of the Romans did not turn to the field of 
fire insurance. It is worth noting in passing that the in­
genious Crassus is said to have amassed a fortune that left 
to his estate after the most liberal donations, property to 
the value of nearly ten million dollars. This must have been
t
a most profitable undertaking due to the value of some of the 
properties. Cicero, classed as a man of moderate tastes, is 
said to have possessed eighteen different estates, and to have 
paid for his city house a value equivalent to approximately
57. Stobart, The Grahdeur that was Rome, p. 131.
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$150,000. It seems as if insurance would have been a
profitable venture as well as salvage. However, from the 
records available, we are forced to the conclusion that among 
the ancient people the business of fire insurance did not exist, 
and that such recognition as was given the hazards, concerned 
itself with the twofold problem of prevention, and providing 
indemnity for losses by contributions from friends and neigh­
bors,
5. Partnership and the Corporation.
A final contribution to the science of insurance from 
ancient Rome is found in the development of the corporate forms 
of conducting business. This form has proved one of the most 
satisfactory means for the accumulation of capital for the pur­
pose of providing the indemnity promised by the insurance 
carrier under the contract of insurance.
The cooperative principle of carrying on big business 
enterprises through the formation of companies (societates) was 
in practice in Rome at a very early date. It was to these 
companies that Livy referred, when in 215 B.0. the Roman state 
appealed for supplies on credit, and three companies of nineteen
59men each came forward to supply' the needs. Polibius, like­
wise throws light upon the development of the company, as well
58. Ibid, p. 154~
59. Livy. 23;28.
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as the widespread business interests of the Romans, as far back 
as the second century before the Christian era. He refers in 
his history to public contracts let for repairs and construct­
ion in all parts of Italy, for the collection of revenues from 
rivers, harbors, gardens, mines and the like, and comments 
that nearly everyone is interested financially in this work 
either as a contractor or as an employee. The contractors, 
he says, purchase the contracts from the censors, in some in­
stances for themselves, in other instances they have partners 
in the undertakings, while a final group concern themselves 
with going as surities for the contractors, pledging for them
60their property to the treasury.
Business in Rome in these centuries just preceeding 
the advent of the Christian era passed through a great period 
of expansion. The period is recalled as one of prosperity and 
development, and the degree of organization reached by business 
cannot but excite admiration. A financial center was developed 
in the city, and a market was in daily operation in the Forum 
near the temple of Castor. Here trading in real estate, slaves, 
and other goods was carried on daily, and likewise here was to
60. Polibius. 6; 17. 
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be found the banking center of the city. Because Rome had 
not yet developed the corporate form of business organization 
with transferable shares, the need for a stock exchange or 
market had not yet made its appearance and there is no evidence 
of the existance of such an institution. The importance of 
the companies and the corporations in the field of business in 
Rome, and the business arising out of their organization and 
financial needs, however, developed here a great banking and 
financial center.
The interests of the shareholders in these companies 
extended to every quarter of the then known civilized world, 
nor were these shareholders limited to a few wealthy financiers 
of the capital. On the contrary ownership of shares in an 
enterprise was quite the usual thing among those whose resources 
would permit. "Poor crops in Sicily, heavy rains in Sardinia, 
an uprising in Gaul, or 'a strike!- in the Spanish mines would
61touch the pocket of every middle class Roman."
Roman law took careful cognizance of the partnership 
as a business relationship, and under its direction it reached 
a high state of development ultimately culminating in the cor-
62poration.* The law provided for combinations of a temporary
61. Abbott, op. c.it., p. 212.
62. Justinian,Institutes, Lib. iii, Tit. xxv. 
117
character, that is for doing a particular piece of business, 
as well as for the more permanent organizations designed to
63.carry on a continuous trade or enterprise. These assoc­
iations or partnerships were easily formed and needed no formal 
procedure to become effective, the only essential element re-
64 
quired being the simple consent of the parties to the agreement. 
Dissolution was equally simple, depending either upon the consent 
of the partners, or the renouncement of the agreement by one of
■ 65the partners. A break occured in the partnership likewise
at the death of a partner, for under the law a partner’s heir 
did not become a partner, even if it were so provided in the
66agreement at the beginning of the association.
A step in advance from this simple form of association, 
the private partnership, ia found in the large companies of tax 
farmers. Dissolution in this instance did not follow the
67death of a partner and steps were provided for registering 
the share of the deceased in the name of the heir, thereby 
making him a partner. In such an instance the companies were 
said to corpus habere, that is to be corporations. They were
63. Roby, op. cit., v. ii, p. 128.





recognized as entites by law. They had a dbmmon treasury, 
and a manager who could sue, be sued, and make agreements on 
behalf of the corporate body. The shares or interests, how­
ever, were not transferable. This corporate organization of 
the Romans marks a decided step in the direction of the joint 
stock corporation with transferable shares. Recognizing the 
importance of the corporate form of business as a vehicle for 
risk bearing the contribution of this development to the 
science of insurance is at once apparent.
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CHAPTER IV.
MIDDLE AGE8 AND RENAISSANCE.
1. The Gilds as Insurers.
With the decline of the Roman influence early in the 
sixth century we are brought to the period of the Middle Ages. 
During this period the principle of mutual insurance received 
an impetus in its development and expanded to include in its 
8cope many risks that had hitherto remained imiMBiirsd.. The gild 
was the agency through which this development was effected.
Gilds were voluntary associations for religious, 
social and commercial purposes. Their origin is shrouded in 
uncertainty, and is a much debated question. Attempts to 
trace their origin from the Roman collegia, have not been 
attended with success, nor does’the evidence warrant the con­
clusion that their beginning may be traced to the sacrificial 
feasts of the anicent Teutonic nations. In fact there is 
good reason now to believe that there is no single source from 
which they sprung, but that they are rather a manifestation of 
the social instinct in man that has given rise from the very 
earliest times to the tendency to form groups when drawn 
together by a common interest.^
However, because the Roman collegia flourished for
1. Seligman, Mediaeval Guilds in England, p. 9-10.
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centuries before the rise of the gilds of the Middle Ages, and 
because there is a point of contact between the two, especially 
in those countries where the Roman influence had manifest itself, 
the question presents itself as to whether the collegia made any 
direct contribution to the gilds. Any conclusion to that 
effect is based upon presumption, there being nothing in the
2 way of documentary evidenoe to substantiate such an inference. 
However, recalling the tenacity with which tradition clings, it 
is not to be expected that Roman customs and institutions were 
entirely without influence is those centuries to which Roman 
dominion had extended, and a presumption is created that here 
at least the gilds in their development reflected the influence 
of the earlier collegia of Ancient Rome.
The word gild has a special significance. It is 
derived from the Anglo-Saxon gylden, or geldan meaning "to pay", 
and in the earliest records it appears meaning in some cases a 
contribution, in others a feast, and still again an association. 
It is not difficult to trace the relationship of one meaning 
with the other. The common contribution with a distinguishing 
feature of early unions, and the word gild, meaning to pay was 
eventually applied to the society as well as to festivities whose 
2. Walford, op. cit., vol. v, p. 342.
121
expenses were met by the common payments. The word, gild 
in the course of time same to be used generally to mean a 
'’society", and was eventually used to designate organizations 
whose aims and purposes differed from the earlier Anglo-Saxon
4unions.
The gilds as they developed among the Teutonio 
nations during this period may be divided into four general 
classifications, (1) religious, (2) firth, (3),merchant, and 
(4) craft gilds. Their development was fostered and encour­
aged by the Church, and its teaching of charity and mutual aid 
and assistance in times of difficulty prompted many of the pro­
visions that were included among the benefits available for 
members. Besides such activities as almsgiving, care of the 
sick, burial of the dead, providing Masses for the souls of 
the deceased, there were likewise established insurance funds 
for the benefit of the members from which they received indemnity 
in the event they suffered certain losses. Thus, in addition 
to the other purposes for which they were organized, they were 
essentially mutual insurance associations, aiming to indemnify 
the few in the event of great losses through the cooperation 
of the many. They were in truth, says Walford, the insurance
3. Seligman, op. cit.. p.103-4, also Smith, Ehglish Gilds, p.xix.
4. Ibid,.p. 105.
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associations of the Middle Ages, and probably the only ones 
which were required or could have existed in that state of
5 society. It is with the insurance features of the gild
organizations that we are here concerned.
The insurance feature of the gilds was usually made 
effective through regular payments by the members into a common 
fund, out of which disbursements were made to- those suffering 
losses from certain specified disasters. The more common 
of these included fire, flood, or robbery, though the gild 
system of indemnity was eventually extended to cover most of 
the risks which attached to the enterprises of the time.
This recognition of risk, and the formation of an 
association operating on a mutual basis, having for one of its 
aims the dividing the losses of the few over the many, is a 
distinct step in the direction of the modern practice of insur­
ance. As a matter of fact, so far as there is any available 
information, these gild organizations of the Middle Ages were 
the first permanent associations to effect property insurance.
The benefits that each gild provided were those pre­
sumably that were of greatest concern to the membership. 
While some gilds were organized for special purposes, or in­
cluded unusual provisions in their regulations, there were
5. Walford, op. cit.. vol. v, p. 341.
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other features that were nearly always to be found. Care for 
the fitting burial of the dead at the cost of the gild was a 
feature most generally incorporated in the regulations. This 
it will be remembered was the chief concern of the members of 
the collegia tenuiorum of ancient Rome. Continuing, however,
6at the point where tne Romans left off, the gilds likewise 
provided help to the poor, the sick, the infirm and the aged, 
sometimes with money, sometimes with food or clothing. Next 
they extended.the arm of protection so as to render assistance 
to those who were unfortunate enough to suffer losses caused by 
fire, flood, or robbery. Relief not unlike the accident and 
health insurance of modern times was provided in the event of 
need in old age, at the loss of signt or limb, upon becoming 
deaf, dumb, or being afflicted with a serious malady such as 
leprosy. Then there were gilds who rendered assistance to 
those who lost cattle, or for the fall of a house. Others 
provided relief in the case of shipwreck, in the case of 1»= 
pris9Jsmentt or for the legal defense of members who became in­
volved with the law. Sometimes provision was made for gifts 
to the young people so that they could get started in the world, 
and for young women doweries were provided. Assistance was 
frequently rendered in temporary pecuniary difficulties, some­
times as special instances, and in others as a regular feature
6. Waltzing, o,p. cit., v. 1, p. 300-1.
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of the gild benefits. In short the insurance feature of the 
gilds was expanded and extended to meet the needs of the times,
7 and the manner of accomplishment cannot but excite admiration.
In the Anglo-Saxon period (827 - 1013) gilds with a 
feature of protection can be traced to an early date. The 
earliest mention of gilds occurs in the laws of Ine, and in the
Q
laws of Alfred. These laws, as well as those of Aethelstan 
and Henry I. reproduce still older laws that recognize the
9 
universal existance of gilds as a well known and accepted fact.
The advances made in gild organization early in this 
period are shown by the Judicia Oivitatis Lundoniae, the Statutes 
of the London Gilds, which were made a matter of record in the 
time of King Aethelstan (925 - 941). The insurance features
to be found in the gild organizations are admirably illustrated 
in the regulations made for governing these tenth century London 
associations. Commenting on their provisions the learned Dr. 
Lujo Brentano says that one might call these gilds "assurance 
companies against theft." The insurance feature was cer­
tainly one of the important purposes of the association. The 
gilds in and about London at this time seem to have united to
7. Smith, op. cit.. xxxvi. Walford, op. cit.tv.5. p. 343.
8. Seligman, op. cit., p. 13.
9. Walford, quotes Smith, op. cit., v. 5, p. 342.
10. Bretano, English Gilds. 1 xxv.
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form a single gild, apparently under the direction of the 
authorities. The preamble to the statutes states that they 
were ordained by the bishops and reeves of London and confirmed 
by the pledges of the gild-brethern.^^ The gild had for its 
object the recovery of stolen stock and slaves, if recovery 
were possible, but where recovery could not be accomplished, 
then the gild was to indemnify the loser by means of pro rata 
contributions from the members.
Among the chief regulations were the requirement that 
all of the members should contribute a stipulated yearly payment 
to the common fund. If any property were stolen a common
8 earch was undertaken, and the members contributed a shilling 
toward expenses. Poor widows unable to make the payment were 
exempted. The regulations specified the amount of indemnity 
to be provided in particular instances. For example a horse 
commanded a half pound "if it be so good". If it was deemed 
nojt worth the maximum payment, then the sum to be received by 
the owner was to be determined by the value of the lost animal. 
Provisions were likewise made for payment, in the event of the 
loss of an ox, a cow, a hog or a sheep. A slave who succeeded 
in escaping was paid for "according to his value." The money
11. Brentano, op. cit., p 1 xxv.
necessary to meet these losses was taken from the funds on hand 
but it was provided that such funds as were needed over that on
12 
hand were to be secured by a call among the members.
Payment for the lost property was made as soon as the 
contributions were secured, but in the meantime, the owner of 
the property who had suffered the loss was required to continue 
the search until payment was made him, and provision was made 
for compensating him for ithi§> expense. Whoever suffered 
loss was obliged, if he intended to make a claim, to give 
notice within three days, and to continue the search, for "the 
gild will only pay for stolen, not ungarded property; and many
13men make fraudelent claims 1 "
aere we have at this early date a mutual insurance 
association designed to indemnify its members for losses from 
stolen cattle or slaves. A slave who escaped was said to 
have stolen himself. Those who drew up the regulations for 
the association had a clear understanding of the fundamental 
principles that should govern an insurance organization. 
For example, first of all, insistence upon indemnity without 
profit is a feature of the regulations. A maximum indemnity 
is provided, but payable only in case the property lost warrants 
it. In the case of inferior property, the value only is to be
12.Seligman, op. cit., p. 14. Walford, op. cit., v.5, p 360-1.
13.Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 361.
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paid. This rule serves the double purpose of minimizing 
the moral hazard, and at the same time setting an upper limit 
to possible claims. Finally the gild is wary of fraudelent 
claims. If the owner of the property is negligent and does 
not report his; loss promptly, or if he fails to carry on a 
search, then he is not entitled to compensation. From the 
standpoint of the development of insurance principles the re­
gulations of this gild are noteworthy.
Gilds were widely organized during the eighth, ninth,
14and tenth centuries, and in the Norman Period (1066 - 1154) 
continued to be established for the purposes of promoting 
religion, trade, and charity. The specific aims and purposes 
of the many organizations that sprang up varied with the needs 
and circumstances of the gild members. Each gild had its 
own regulations, governing the contributions of members, the 
benefits provided for them, and their various duties and obli­
gations. At the pinacle of their development they were very 
wealthy, and had acquired no inconsiderable power. At the 
beginning of the Reformation in England their wealth was so 
notable as to attract the attention of Henry VLL1, whose needs 
were still unsatisfied after he had exhausted the resources of 
the church. Indicative of the great wealth accumulated by 
14. Walford, op, cit., v. 5, p. 387
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the gilds at this period is the loan advanced by twelve city 
gilds, of over twenty thousand pounds, secured by lands mort-
*
gaged to them, for the purpose of providing Henry means for 
carrying on his wars with Scotland. The cupidity of the 
crowns was aroused, and shameless acts of confiscation followed. 
The policy of Henry was carried on by Edward VI, and Elizabeth,
15with the result that the gilds rapidly declined.
It does not come within the scope of this discussion 
to describe the many different rules or purposes to be found 
in the course of the ’ development of the gilds. For our 
purposes we are not concerned whether the payments to the 
common fund were yearly, quarterly, or as was the case in one 
instance, weekly. Nor need we trace in the different organ­
izations the great diversity of benefits. In each instance, 
the principle was the same. The insurance protection that 
the gilds afforded was a form of mutual protection, with losses 
met out of a fund built up by regular payments and augumented 
by special assessments. So far as the insurance idea is con­
cerned a lengthy examination of many gilds would involve needless 
repetition.
It is sufficient to say here, that when the burden of t
risks that attach themselves to human enterprise began to weigh 
too heavily, the gilds served as the first means among the 
15. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 387.
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general populace for effecting insurance. They stood, says 
Dr. Brentano, "like a loving mother, providing and assisting, 
at the side of her sons in every circumstance of life, cared 
for her children even after death; and the ordinances as to 
this last act breathe the same spirit of equality among her 
sons, on which all her regulations were founded, and which
1 6 constituted her strength." They took the place in old
times, says Mr. Toulman Smith, of the "modern Friendly or
17Benefit Society," and "the idea by which all were penetrated", 
says Dr. Seligman ,"was the partial realization of the doctrine 
of universal brotherhood which the early church so zealously
18strove to diffuse."
2. The Joint Stock Company.
We have considered in passing the development of 
business associations, because of their ultimate importance qs 
providers of the means for amassing the great capital necessary 
for conducting the business of insurance. Partnership assoc­
iations were developed in the Babylonian times, and were used 
in the business life of Greece and Rome. In Rome a permanent
16. Brentano, op. cit., p. cxxxiii.
17. Smith, Introd. English Guilds, p. xiv.
18. Seligman, op. cit.. p. 19. 
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form or organization was developed, said to have a body (corpus 
habere) and here was the beginning of the corporate form of 
business organization.
In the Middle Ages the private partnership continued 
a standard form of business association, and was commonly com­
posed of a number of individuals who were relatives. Then 
there was the association furnished by gild membership. Here 
each member furnished his own capital, and carried on his bus­
iness undertaking, but under the guidance of the group regulation. 
Lastly there was still in common use that earliest of all assoc­
iations, the commenda. As used during the Middle Ages, the 
"Oommendator" furnished the capital for some business venture 
or undertaking. The second party to the transaction was known 
as the "Tractor". He was the manager, and to him fell the 
responsibility of carrying out the undertaking. His compen­
sation for his services was usually one-fourth of the profits, 
though this was often varied, particularly if the "Tractor" as
19 he often did, furnished part of the capital.
However, in quite another direction we find the earl­
iest appearance of the stock company. It developed in mediaeval 
Italy, out of the custom of managing the public debt. The
19. Knight, Barnes and Flugel,Economic History of Europe, p. 124 
and Day, History of Commerce, p. 116-7.
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system in operation in the event of a public loan, involved 
first the division of the total amount to be borrowed into a 
large number of smaller sums, so that a number of borrowers 
might participate, thus facilitating the undertaking. The 
procedure was not unlike that followed today in public finance, 
by dividing the amount of a loan into a number of smaller sized 
bonds.
To guarantee payment of both principle and interest, 
it was a customary procedure to turn over certain sources of 
revenue to the creditors, or assign for the purpose certain 
taxes. To handle the revenue thus obtained, the creditors 
were obliged, on their part to effect some suitable form of 
organization. They had to provide for the receipt and admis- 
istration, or division of the monies that were turned over to 
them, and this involved the employment of agents, book-keepers, 
and other administrative assistance. In short they were 
obliged to form a corporate organization whose shareholders 
were the public creditors.
The first actual stock company, however, to develop 
out of this association for the administration of the payments 
on a public debt, occured in Genoa, and dates from the fourteenth
<
century. The Genoese government, had in carrying out her 
conquest of Chios and Phocaea, become heavily involved in debt, 
132
and was without resources to meet her obligations. Chios 
and Phocaea were sources of alum and gum mastic, valuable 
commercial products, and because the state had no other means 
for paying the debt, the alum works and other properties were 
themselves placed in the hands of the creditors for a period 
of twenty years, so that they might secure themselves through 
the income thus to be obtained. At the end of the twenty 
year period the state was still unable to fund the debt. The 
property already turned over to 'the states creditors was there­
fore left in their hands. The shares into which the debt was 
(divided now represented shares or Interests in the alum company, 
the status ohanging from that of state creditor with oertain
♦
recource8 held as security, to that of proprietor, with shares 
that were transferable representing the holdings of each stock 
holder.
An example of the application of the corporate principle 
to a business organization is found in the Bank of St. George 
in Genoa, said to be one of the most famous of the mediaeval 
business institutions. This bank grew out of a merger of these 
state creditors, one group being the owners of the alum works 
already mentioned. Its organization effected in 1407, it 
carried on an extensive banking business, accepting deposits, 
and investing its funds, as well as managing state revenues, 
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and. carrying out other business enterprises. There were said, 
to be approximately five hundred, shareholders who elected the
20 boards who managed the banks affairs.
Thus for the first time was developed the joint stock 
corporation with transferable shares. Hundred of individuals, 
foreigners, children, women, or others who knew nothing about 
conducting the business of the undertaking could furnish small 
or large units of capital and derive a share in the profits of 
the business. At the same time the individual investor, be­
cause his shares were transferable could readily withdraw from 
the enterprise, without any interuption in the company’s affairs, 
by the simple expedient of selling his holdings. Finally the 
shareholders all have an interest in the management of the 
company proportional to their holdings, and are thereby enabled
21 to choose, for managers those in whom they have confidence.
It is not the place here to go at length into the 
advantages and disadvantages of the corporate form of business 
organization. These are too well known for repetition at this 
time. We are interested, however, in recording the development 
of the joint stock company, for not until the joint stock com­
pany was used as the vehicle for risk bearing did the business
20. Knight, Barnes and Flugel, op. cit.f p. 125.
21. Day, History of. Commerce, p. 147, 
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of insurance expand with any great degree of stability. In 
fact it may be stated that the modern business of insurance 
marks as its point of inception the chartering of the first 
incorporated insurance companies. This however, was at a con­
siderably later period.
3. Fire Insurance.
The need of protection from fire was recognized during 
the peridd of the Middle Ages, and one of the more common pro­
visions in the rules of the gilds, was the insurance feature 
that provided the members assistance in the case of loss from 
this cause. Fire insurance as a commercial undertaking, how­
ever, was slow in developing.
The earliest law of which there is a record bearing 
upon the question of fire and indemnity was promulgated in the 
year 1240 by Thomas, Count of Flanders, and Johanna hie Countess. 
Under the terms of this law a means of indemnity is provided, 
and a community of liability established, and is known as the 
custom of Furnes. By article XI of the law termed Oora. or 
Keure it is provided:-
"In quacunque villa combustio facta fuerit occulte, 
tota villa statim solvat damnum per illos quos eligent 
coratores; quod si malefactor sciri poterit, bannetur 
perpetuo, et solvetur damnum de ejus;residuum vero 
cedat comiti. Qui vero de nachbrant aoclamatus fuerit, 
per quinque coratores purgare se poterit; alioquin
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suspendetur, omnia bona sua erunt in gratia comitis, 
restituto prius damno illi qui damnum habuet: si prius 
tamen querimoniam fecit," 22
Thus it is provided by the law that in whatever house a fire 
shall have been secretly made, the whole place immediately 
makes good the damage through those whom the guardians select. 
But if the malefactor can be found out, he is banished forever, 
and the damage is made good out of his property, the residue 
he yields up to the court. The law then goes on to state that 
he who can exculpate himself from the accusation will be commended 
by the guardians, but in the meantime he is suspended. All of 
his goods are at the pleasure of the court; the damage being 
first made good to the injured who has made complaint. Thus
it is seen that whoever suffers a loss by fire is assured of 
indemnity if the cause of the fire is unknown. If, however, 
the person responsible for the damage can be found, the loss is 
made good out of his property. Presumably he has the oppor­
tunity to appear and free himself from blame, thereby relieving 
himself of the punishment of being banished forever, though 
his goods remain in the custody of the court to make good the 
loss caused by the fire.
The custom is not unlike the French law known as 
"voisinage" in that a property owner, if a fire starts on his 
premises, and damages a neighbor, is responsible to him for
22. Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 438,
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that damage. In France one insures not only his own property,
2; but his liability for loss to his neighbor’s property as well."" 
In the community of liability under the custom of Furnes, is 
found one of the earliest instances outside the gilds where the 
risk of fire was definitely recognized, and steps taken to 
effect a shifting of its burden.
The instances in this period that relate to providing 
indemnity for losses arising out of fires are scattered and un­
related, but may indicate a gradual increase of attention to 
the ri&k and a groping in the direction of fire insurance. In 
1302, in the oily of London, we find an instance of a guarantee 
of indemnity for loss originating from fire made by an individ­
ual. On January 13, one Thomas Bat is reported as having come 
before John le Bund, Mayor of London, and the Aidermen of the 
city, and bound himself to keep the city of London indemnified 
from "peril of fire and other losses" which might arise from 
his houses that were covered with thatch and situated in a 
certain designated parish. He further agreed to roof his 
houses with tile, and have the work finished about the next 
Feast of Pentacost. Failure on his part to make the agreed 
improvements carried the right to the city’s officials to roof 
the house with tile themselves, and pay for them out of the
' ■ • * ....---------------- - ---- -----
23. Shepley, Insurance Practices in Foreign Countries, p. 41.
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rents. As security for the indemnity, his rents, lands, and 
24tenements were hound.
The instance here referred to seems to relate to a 
guarantee by an individual to assume responsibility for damage 
arising out of his property until such time as he can correct 
objectionable features to the satisfaction of the authorities. 
It is an agreement to indemnify, but a limited contract. It 
can hardly be termed a shifting of the burden of the risk of 
fire, for the indemnitor is not concerned with fires that ori­
ginate from any source other than from his houses covered with 
thatch. Such being the case, the agreement furnishes the most 
limited form of protection, though it furnishes us the earliest 
record we have of an individual assuming the responsibility for 
indemnification from loss by fire.
There is a reference that would indicate the practice 
of fire insurance in Scotland early in the fifteenth century. 
The information is vague, and furnishes no evidence as to the 
form in which the insurance was effected.
It is stated that in 1427 an act was passed in the 
Seventh Parliament of King James I., of Scotland which bore the 
title "The leave to Merchants to sure their gudes." The act
24, Relton, op. cit., p. 8. 
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itself is now lost, and information concerning its details are 
wanting. Such knowledge as we have of the legislation of 
James, dealing with the subject of fire concerns itself with 
fire protection and not with the matter of insurance. The 
shred of evidence found in the title of the foregoing act 
furnishes us little information that is of value, though we 
may conclude from this title of the law that some form of fire
25 insurance was known to the merchants and used by them.
The lag in the development of fire insurance is 
readily apparent, and such fragments of evidence as we have 
from this period indicate a lack of interest in fire risks. 
To a certain degree the problem was handled by the gilds. It 
is nevertheless true that the advantages of fire insurance made 
less of an appeal than did those offered by marine insurance, 
and in consequence fire insurance failed to keep pace in its 
development with the insurance of sea-risks.
This lag may be attributed, not so much to a failure 
to apply the principle of insurance to the risks arising from 
the hazards of fire, but rather to a characteristic of human 
nature. There is tendency on the part of individuals to dis­
regard risks to which they have become conditioned. They
25. Relton, op. cit.. p. 8. 
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become entirely unconcious of their existence. There is an 
inertia whose importance must not be underestimated that grows 
out of habit, and serves at the same time as a protection to 
our institutions and a drag upon progress. When the individ­
ual had adjusted himself to an accustomed method, he will deviate 
from the habits thus established only upon the application of 
some extra stimulus. Man likes to do things the old way, and 
has a dread of new methods or change, and for this reason tends 
to postpone the adoption of something new that through the 
action of his intellectual capacity he has fully decided to 
accept.
The application of the principle to insurance readily 
illustrates the reason for the development of marine insurance 
while fire insurance lagged. A casual consideration of the 
risks attaching to every sort of human enterprise classifies 
them roughly into two divisions, the absolutely unavoidable, 
and those assumed by choice. Disease, accident, the onset of 
physical incapacity with old age, and death are risks that all 
must face.and non may escape. On the other end of the scale 
there are forms of business enterprise where hazards attach, 
which, attracted by profits, the individual undertakes through 
choice. Between these two are many degrees of risk attaching 
to an individual in modern society, in theory assumed from choise 
14D
but as a matter of fact undertaken because of the requirements 
inposed by the group of which the individual is a member. As 
a matter of theory one need not make use of furniture, nor use 
a dwelling for shelter. As a matter of fact, however, the 
mores of the group eliminates free choice, and the individual 
is faced with risk. Such risks as offer no choice as to 
whether they will be assumed or avoided are those to which the 
individual tends to become conditioned. These he tends to dis­
regard. But if a new and strange enterprise is suggested, 
before making a step he weighs all the risks, is conscious of ' 
all possible consequences, and his decision regarding the under­
taking is made upon the basis of this appraisal.
8uch was the relationship between the hazards of fire 
and those of the sea. Buildings, stocks of merchandise, fur­
niture, and the like were always owned. The individual became 
conditioned to the risks to which they were subjected. The 
human tendency to do things as they had always been done mani­
fested itself, and current custom and methods as a matter of 
habit were accepted as good enough. Not so with marine ventures. 
Here a choice must be made. The unconscious acceptance of risk 
changes to the conscious assumption. Because there is a greater 
range of free choice, risks that seem too great will be avoided. 
One of the means devised for relief was found first in the 
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bottomry loan, and ultimately in the marine insurance contract. 
Because the assumption of fire risks was part of an automatic
*
order they received little attention.
A passage from the Wealth of Nations seems to illus-
26trate this tendency as it operated in Smith's day. Comparing 
fire and sea-risks, the later are more alarming to the greater 
part of the people, and the proportion of ships insured to those 
not insured is much greater than is the case with houses. This 
is indicative of the conclusion already drawn that where: risk 
imposes a burden, the intensity of the desire to shift it varies 
directly with the ability of the individual to avoit it. Man 
as has already been pointed out may in theory be free to live 
without the customary habitation*, yet as a matter of fact the 
dictates of the mores of his group are such as to make the occu­
pation of a habitation compulsory. Shipping on the other hand
to the average citizen offered a free choice, and before an in­
dividual takes his fortune, or a part of it and risks it in a 
sea voyage, he weighs carefully the consequences of loss against 
possible gains, and finds himself willing to forego part of the 
gains for the sake of a. greater degree of security. In the 
instance of the house there was no element of choice, the individ­
ual finds himself conditioned to the'risk, and tends to bear it.
In the case of the sea risks a venture is proposed that offers 
26. Smith., Wealth of Nations. I, x, pt. 1.
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a complete freedom of choice as to whether or not the under­
taking with its attendant hazards will be entered upon, and here 
we find the tendency veering toward seeking a means of protect­
ion before the project to which the risk attaches is commenced.
As individuals acquired greater properties, and as 
cities grew, and hazards increased, the tendency to ignore the 
hazards of fire continued. It was not until the great fire of 
London in 1666 that brought the world face to face with the 
menace, and broke down the unconscious and habitual disregard 
for the risk.
4. Marine Insurance.
We now come to the d evelopment of the modern form of 
effecting insurance. The risk bearer, or insurer in return 
for the payment of sn agreed premium assumes the burden of a 
designated risk by agreeing to indemnify the assured in the event 
that he suffers a loss.
With the decline of the Roman influence, there is little 
in the way of recorded evidence to throw light upon the development 
of marine insurance until the revival of commerce in the Middle 
Ages. It is not easy to believe, however, that an insurance 
institution such as bottomry, so widely known and so useful in 
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the commercial world, should fall into disuse without providing 
a substitute in its place. It is easier to believe the records 
as lacking, than to believe the great shipping centers carried
27 on their business without insurance protection.
Under the feudal system there were trade organizations 
of cities, and of separate callings, that may have furnished
28 some form of marine insurance, and marine risks were among
29 those covered by certain of the gilds. Even though some
protection was afforded from these sources, recalling the extent 
of the diffusion of Roman influence particularly through the 
incorporation of Roman laws into later codes, it is not to be 
presumed that bottomry was unknown or fell into disuse only to 
be revived again at a later time.
The period from the fifth to the eleventh century is 
extremely poor in 'documentary evidence, and records of business 
transactions or mercantile practices that might throw light upon 
the field of insurance are lacking. It may be supposed, however, 
that the practice of bottomry was uninterrupted down to the 
ninth century, for in the Basilica, a compilation of laws made 
by the Byzantine Emperor Basilius in 867 - 880 A.D., there are 
to be found regulations regarding the practice that follow in all
27. Campbell, Insurance and Crime, p. 69.
28. Ibid., p. 69.
29. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 343. 
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important particulars those that appear in the Digest of 
Justinian.
Beginning with the twelfth century, the Jus Navale 
Rhodeorum, A Greek compilation whose date is placed earlier than 
1167 A.D., likewise contains regulations regarding loans on 
bottomry essentially the same as those to be found in the earlier
30Digest. At this point, however, we come to a break, for
the two important marine codes governing the European nations 
are conspicuously silent regarding either bottomry or marine 
insurance.
The most ancient collection of European maritime law
' is the famous II Oonsolatio del Mare. There are few obscure
I
marine ordinances that anti-date the Oonsolatio, but they are 
rela.tively unimportant and are not generally included among the
31sources of European commercial law. The origin of the
Oonsolatio is shrouded in obscurity, being attributed on the one 
hand to the ancient kings of Arragon, while on the other the 
credit is given to Pisa. Regardless of the point of origin, 
the importance of the compilation in the’ legal system of the 
day is readily recognized. Having been completed and in force 
as early as the eleventh century, the regulations it contained
30. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 337.
31. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 36.
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were regarded as law and followed during the period succeeding
32their promulgation by all the nations of Southern Europe.
The Oonsolatio, although it contains a full account 
of other marine customs and usages contains no mention of in­
surance or loans on bottomry, though there are several chapters
33that indicate or presuppose the use of bottomry. There is,
likewise, provisions for- a contract that has a trend toward 
mutual insurance. It indicates that owners of ship and of 
goods often agreed that all losses should be apportioned among 
them in accordance with the interest of each. This amounted 
to an agreement by the parties concerned to apply the principle 
of general average to all losses suffered by any of the contract-
34ing parties. The inclusion of such a provision, however,
only serves to emphasize the failure to mention directly either 
boftomry or insurance.
Another important legal compilation of this period is 
found in the Roles 0*01eron, known also as the laws or judgements 
of Oleron. Concerning the time and place of their origin 
there is considerable controversy between the Ehglish and French
32. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 37, also Marshall, Law of Insurance
v. 1, p. 15-16, and Qretiia.8, De jure Belli ac Pads, 
lib. 3, c.l, f 5, N. 6.
33. Walford, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 337.
34. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 38, note (c).
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authorities. On the one hand it is stated that they were first 
published in their present form by King Richard I, on his return 
from the Hold Land, and intended to have the force of law in 
English as well as in French possessions. On the return hand 
French jurists claim that the laws were first compiled under the 
authority of Queen Eleanor, mother of Richard, and were published
35 
by her at her favorite isle of Oleron.' Others reject both
the English and French claims, and place the date of publication 
at 1266, a half century after the death of Queen Eleanor and her
36son. Upon insurance as a distinct and separate contract, as
well as upon the subject of bottomry, the judgments of Oleron
•n 4. 37are silent.
Considerable importance has sometimes been attached to 
the fact that during this period two important compilations of 
law, such as the Oonsolatio, and the Roles D^leron, mention 
directly neither bottomry nor insurance, and has given rise to 
the belief that the one had fallen into disuse and the other had 
not yet been developed. The danger of concluding, however, 
that bottomry was no longer used in commercial practice, and that 
insurance was unknown, solely because affifmative evidence is
35. Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 16.
36. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 38-9.
37. Walford, op, cit., v. 1, p. 337. 
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lacking in legislative expression is easily demonstrable. 
Practices common to merchants have existed for long periods 
before it was deemed necessary to incorporate regulations 
concerning them in the legal system. Experience shows that 
in the case of insurance, it has existed probably in every 
country for a long time as a practice among merchants before 
the subject became a matter of law. In the case of insurance 
a negative decision based upon the absence of positive legal 
evidence is far from convincing or certain.
When we turn, however, to the legal code of the 
Hanseatic League, the language of the law leaves no room for 
doubt. This famous confederacy of merchants and traders, who 
were mostly of Teutonic nationality, through its members 
carried on a vast foreign trade and became the great sea carriers 
of the northern nations. The League published various sea 
codes during the thirteenth century that were ultimately con­
solidated in a single authoritative code, known as the Laws of 
the Merchants and Masters of the magnificent city of Wisby.
The laws take their name from Wisby, an ancient city of Sweden,
38 on the western side of the Isle of Gothland in the Baltic.
Located about equally distant from Sweeden, Russia, and Germany, 
this city during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries rose
38. Mason, The Royal Exchange, p. 69.
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to a position of great wealth and power, and became a center 
for the extensive commercial and trading operations of the
39members of the League.
The date of the promulgation of these laws is not 
certainly known, the claim being made by some that they are 
older eveh than the Roles D1Oleron, by others that they are a
40translation of the Roles. The similarity in their context
lends weight to the hypothesis that they at least were founded
41upon the laws of Oleron. Instead of anti-dating them it
is believed that in drawing up the Laws of Wisby, use was made 
of the regulations found in the Roles D'Oleron, modifications 
being made for the purpose of better adapting them to the needs 
and usages of the commercial states of northern Europe, for
42whom they were compiled. The claim of the northern writers
that the code is older than the laws of Oleron, or even as some 
state, the Oonsolatio del Mare, is not considered to be well 
founded. That learned and distinguished French writer Oieirat 
ventures the opinion that when the Roles D1Oleron were published
43the Magnificent city of Wisby had not yet become a town.
39. Parsons, Treatise on Maritime Law, v. 1, p. 10.
40. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 17.
41. Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10.
42. Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10.
43. Marshall, op, cit., v. 1, p. 17.
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While the date of their promulgation is now conceeded
44to oe near the close of the thirteenth century, or early in
45the fourteenth, their importance is not to be underestimated. 
Following their publication they became the sea code and recog­
nized law of the northern nations. Their authority and impor-
’ tance was recognized by Grotius when he wrote:-
"Lex Rhodia navalis pro jure gentium, in illo mari 
Mediterraneo vigebat; sicut apud Galliam leges 
Oleronis, et apud onmes transrhenanos, leges 
Wisbuenses." 46
In the Laws of Wisby mention is made for the first
47time in an European code of the practice of bottomry. Re­
ference is made to the practice in such a way however, as to 
permit the inference that it was a well known commercial custom 
that had long been in use. Bottomry during the Middle Ages 
furnishes no new contribution to the science of insurance, but 
remains in its essentials the same contract as practiced in 
ancient Greece fifteen hundred years earlier. There is evidence, 
however, tha.t the cumbersome features of bottomry as an insurance 
contract had manifested themselves to the far seeing and able
44. Duer. op. cit.. v. 1, p. 41.
45. Martin, History of Lloyds, p. 4.
46. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. 2, c.3, quoted by
Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 17.
47. Martin, op, cit., p. 4.
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traders of the Hanseatic League, and a step was made in the 
direction of a contract of insurance apart from a loan. There 
is no mention of insurance as such in the Laws of Wisby, though 
a section of the code refers to a practice that would Indicate 
such a dontract. It is stated in Article 66 of the laws:-
"Si le maistre est contraint de bailler caution 
au bourgeois pour le navire, le bourgeois sera 
parcillement tenu bailler caution pour la vie du 
maistre." 48
It is pointed out that giving security for the safe return of 
the ship is the same thing as insuring her, and counter security
4 for the life of the master indicates the insurance of his life. 
Oleriac, in his version of the laws included in Article 66, the 
following, which follows immediately after the paragraph already 
quoted:- .
"O’est d dire que, contre les hazards de la mer et de 
la mort, il ne peut echoir de requisition raisonnable 
a bailler caution; regullerement le bourgeois doit 
risquer son bien, et le maistre sa liberte et sa vie, 
bien y puet estre fait polisse d'asseurance." 50
This second paragraph, which mentions directly the subject of 
insurance, does not appear in some of the older editions in
48. Quoted by Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 41, not e (a).
49. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 41.
50. Quoted by Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 17. 
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which the laws are published., and it is believed that instead 
of being a part of the original text it represents a comment 
upon or exposition of the paragraph in the laws that immediately
51proceeds it. Regardless, however, of this second paragraph,
Article 66 of the Laws of Wisby have been interpreted to mean 
that.if the merchant obliged the master to insure the ship, the 
merchant shall be obliged to insure the master's life against
52 the perils of the sea. Hence, in a single regulation, pro­
vision is made for a contract of marine insurance, and a contract 
of life insurance, and in terms that imply a familiarity with 
the practice upon the part of those whom the law was designated 
to effect.
While it has been suggested that the Laws of Wisby 
are of a much later date than that commonly ascribed to them, 
and for that reason a section devoted to insurance is not sur­
prising, the evidence against this theory is strong. Another 
opinion accounts for the mention of insurance by stating that 
the section relating thereto is an interpolation of a later 
date. The final view, and this has the weight Of authority, 
being held by the eminent Emergion and others, holds that both 
marine and life insurance were known and practiced at this early
, . 53time.
51. Marshall, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 17.
52. Angell, Law of Fire and Life Insurance., p. 29.
53. Parsons, op. cit., v. 1, p. 10-11.
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There is a passage from an old. historical work, the
Oronyk van Vlaenden which tends to confirm this belief, and 
affords further evidence that insurance, as effected by the 
modern insurance contract, was" understood and in common use 
by the members of the Hanseatic League. In the Chronyk there
Is a reference to insurance in the following terms
"On the demand of the inhabitants of Bruges, the Count 
of Flanders permitted in the year 1310, the establish­
ment in this town of a Chamber of Assurance, by means 
of which the Merchants could insure their goods, 
exposed to the risks of the 8ea, or elsewhere, in 
paying a stipulated Percentage.. But, in order that 
an Establishment so useful to Commerce might not be 
disolved as soon as formed, he ordered the laying down 
of several Laws and Regulations which the Assurers as 
well as the Assured, are bound to observe." 54
Bruges was at this period a great trading center of the North, 
and a chief market, and one of the principle sea-ports of the
League. Indicative of her importance as a sea-port and trading 
center, it has been stated that it was no uncommon thing for a 
hundred and fifty tall ships to enter the outer harbor of the 
city on a single tide. If we could stop at this point and 
rely upon the statement of the Ohronyk, the practice of insur­
ance by the members of the Hanseatic League would seem to be 
demonstrated.
54. Quoted by Martin, op. cit., p. 6 .
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Referring to this passage,however, Walford, states that 
some of the best authorities on the subject, metioning Pardessus 
and Reddie, do not regard the authenticity of this part of the 
work as established. Bar w#ri there any insurance ordinances 
from Bruges, that might confirm the statement in the Ohronyk. 
Walford believes, however, that an explanation of this lack is 
to be found in the suggestion that the regulation was so anala- 
gous to the Roles D^leron as to have been either drawn from 
them, or as he says some writers have affirmed, been adopted
55 into them. Martin, in his discussion of the history of
Marine insurance, sees no good reason to doubt the authenticity 
of the Ohronyk. and presents a forceful argument when he says 
that if there is no evidence that has come down to us in Confir­
mation, neither has there been any to disprove the statements, 
and there is an extreme probability that far seeing merchants 
of the Hanseatic League should have devised the institution of
56 
modern insurance.
In the evolutionary development of risk bearing by 
insurance, a degree of continuity is to be found in the field of 
marine coverage. In the Laws of Wisby, however, a mutation 
develops, in that in addition to ship or merchandise, the life
55. Mason, op. cit., p. 71.
56. Martin, op. cit., p. 6. 
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of the master of the ship is made the subject of insurance. 
Here for the first time we find in the law a definite provis­
ion for effecting insurance upon the life of an individual. 
That the idea of life insurance may have developed from this 
beginning is not an unreasonable supposition. There is in 
1641 an English case that would intimate that the practice 
here provided for was adopted by the English. It had to do 
with recovering under a policy effected upon the life of the 
captain of a vessel during a voyage he was about to make to 
the West Indies. The contract had been effected in the same 
manner as an ordinary shipping policy, and suggests an early
57 
connection between marine and life insurance. It would
have been a simple and reasonable sequence for insurance upon 
lives to develop as a form of protection entirely apart from 
marine insurance or marine hazards. If such a development 
can be recognized, it takes as its point of departure Article 
66 of the Laws of the Merchants and Masters of the Magnificent 
city- of Wisby.
The legal evidence now takes us to the other end of 
the continent. The first definite ordinances concerning marine 
insurance come to us from Spain. The Magistrates of Barcelona
57. Angell, op. cit., p. 388. 
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on four separate occasions during the fifteenth century promul­
gated ordinances dealing directly with the subject of ma,rine
58 insurance, dating respectively 1436, 1458, 1461 and 1484.
These-laws are designed, not to make provision for effecting
insurance, but rather recognizing its existence, are designed
to secure its full benefits for the community, to prevent over
59 insurance, and to eliminate fraudulent transactions.
The earliest of these ordinances to be found affords
evidence of the existence of older regulations dealing with
marine insurance that have been shown through the passing of 
time, and other circumstances to be defective and inexpedient.
A translation of this ordinance in Spanish from the original in
Catalan ri® in the records of the city of Barcelona. The evi­
dence of the earlier laws is found in the preamble:-
"Oomo las ordenanzas hechas para los seguros 
maritimas y mercantiles que se hacen en Barcelona 
sobre generos y mercaderias de vasallos del Senor Rey, 
y se cargan en navios o fustas de extrangeros, prohiben 
que ninguna persona pueda asegurar en ellos sino la 
mitad del ooste; y atendieno al tiempo que oorre y a 
otros respectos, no son practicables en provecho de la 
causa publica, antes necesitan de coreccion y enmienda." 
60.
The date of the earliest appearance of marine insurance in
Spain is therefore shrouded in uncertainty, but antidates by a
58. Duer, op, cit.. v. 1, p. 35.
59. Martin, op. cit., p. 25.
60. Quoted by Duer, op, cit., p. 34, note (c).
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considerable period the law of 1436.
The insurance ordinances of Barcelona are of especial 
interest, not only because they furnish evidence that marine 
insurance was known and practiced in Spain at this early date, 
but they likewise throw a light upon the understanding that 
these people had of the real purpose of insurance. With the 
view of eliminating fraud, numerous clauses were inserted in 
the laws prohibiting insurance for full value, but leaving some
61of the risk upon the insured. Likewise the principle of
indemnity was recognized. With the advent of marine insur­
ance as a separate contract, it immediately became possible 
for the owner of a vessel to insure it for full value, then 
borrow a like amount by means of a bottomry contract. Having 
no investment in the ship, a loss would mean to the owner a 
return of double its value, less expenses for insurance and 
for fitting out the voyage. The loss of the ship would be a 
decidedly profitable happening for its owner under such circum­
stances.^ Steps were taken to make this situation impossible. 
The Barcelona ordinance of 1436 provided that if anyone borrowed 
on bottomry, in estimating the interest of the owner these loans 
first must be deducted. The law further placed a limit of 
insurance that might be obtained at three-fourths the value of
61. Martin, op. cit., p. 25.
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the ship, from which again must be deducted, all loans on bottomry.
Here, so far as the records are a guide, we have the first 
effort made to limit the amount to be collected by the assured 
in the event of the happening of the contingency insured against, 
to a sum not in excess of the actual loss sustained. These
old ordinances of Barcelona coincided, in their provisions re­
garding the payment of losses, to the modern theory that insur­
ances is designed solely for indemnity.
In these ordinances we meet a further regulation that 
is of interest as marking a step forward in the development of 
insurance. For the first time we find in the law evidence cf 
steps taken to prevent the issuance of wager policies. Under­
writers were required to make oath that the “insurances are real 
and not fictitious," and were forbidden to use the words in their 
contracts, "value more or less, or done or not done" —vsleguen
63mes o menys, o haje o no haje. Here we have an ordinance
concerning the important principle now incorporated into modern 
insurance law, that the insured must have an insurable interest 
in the property covered. It may be added here, that the prin­
ciple fell into disuse, and gambling policies, where there was 
no insurable interest whatever on the part of the assured, were
62. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 338.
63. Martin, op. cit., p. 24.
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a common practice for many years after. The existence of 
these early regulations in Barcelona, however, furnish illumi­
nating evidence of the degree of understanding of the aims and 
purposes of insurance possessed at this time.
7ith the ordinances of Barcelona in the fifteenth 
century we find marine insurance an established institution. 
By the way of confirmation and evidencing the extent of its 
use, there are records of decrees bearing upon the subject of 
insurance from Venice that in point of time ante-date the earliest 
of the recorded ordinances of Barcelona, though as has been stated 
the earliest of these Spanish ordinances recorded are not the 
first. The Venitian decrees, while not strictly insurance 
regulations, in the sense of making provisions regulating the 
contract, as do the Spanish ordinances, nevertheless are con­
cerned with the subject matter of insurance, and demonstrate 
beyond a doubt the existance of an insurance system among the 
Venitians at the dawn of the fifteenth century. The earliest 
of these documents is a manuscript act in Latin, dated May 15, 
1411, and refers to insurance as an established practice. The 
purpose of the act is to prohibit the inhabitants and citizens 
of Venice from making insurance contracts on foreign vessels. 
It is pointed out that the insurers cannot have information 
concerning the condition of foreign ships, or of the merchandise
159
upon them, yet influenced by the hope of small profits, they 
incur the risk of great loss. After setting a date, beyond
which such contracts were no longer to be effected, for -those 
who failed to comply with the degree severe penalties were pro­
vided. Another document dated June 1424, refers to the state 
of war existing between the Genoese and Catalonians, and the 
Florentines and the Genoese. - It then states that the custom 
in Venice of insuring foreign property .may be the means of in­
volving the state in these wars,and citizens, subjects, or 
allies of Venice are therefore prohibited, under penalty of for­
feiting twenty-five percent of the value of the thing he has
64 insured, from making such contracts.
A comparison of the decrees of Venice, and the ordinan­
ces of Barcelona furnish us no evidence as to which of the 
countries were first to practice insurance. In both instances 
the earliest of the records supply evidence that insurance was 
then an institution of long standing. The trade of Barcelona, 
was at the time of the promulgation of the early insurance or­
dinances, carried on principally with Italy, and presumably there 
was an exchange of ideas concerning the practice of insurance 
between the two countries. The insurance ordinances of Barcelona 
were followed before the close of the century with the promulgation
64. Hopkins, A Manual of Marine Insurance, p. 20-21.
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of similar legislation in Venice.
Nor is it to be supposed., that the practice of insur­
ance thus evidenced, in these two countries was beyond any doubt 
limited to the Mediterranean. A mercantile practice of Venice 
was certain to find its way to England, because the Italians, 
or Lombards, as they were known, had already secured a strong 
foothold in England and were competing commercially with the
65 powerful Hanseatic League of the North. Presumably, by
this time marine insurance had spread through the lanes of 
commerce, and was well known and commonly used by merchants and 
ship owners throughout the whole of continental Europe.
Up to this point we have been concerned with examining 
the evidence to be found in the law. Useful in indicating the 
degree of development of the insurance contract, the law, how­
ever, offers us but little help in determining its time and 
place of origin. We are interested in this point and must 
turn for assistance to historical opinion.
The oldest treatise in a modern language dealing with 
the subject matter of insurance is that entitled Le Guidion' de 
la Mer, published in 1671 by Oleriac, a learned French jurist, 
in the second part of his work on the usages and customs of the
65. Mason, op. cit., p. 71-72. 
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sea. (Us et Ooutoumes de la.Mer.) No account is given by 
Oleriac of the author or origin of the work. Dr. Duer is of 
the opinion, basing his conclusion upon the character of the 
style, and other internal evidence, that it was probably written 
close to the end of the century preceeding its publication in 
Oleriac's work. This is in agreement with Pardessus and 
others who fix the date between 1590 and 1600, making Rouen
66the place of issue. Concerning the authorship of Le Guidion,
the theory has been advanced that it probably was not the work 
of a single individual but the combined labor of a group, possibly 
an association of underwriters such as Lloyds, who prepared a 
code for the benefit of themselves and the public as well.
References to insurance in the Guidion are many, and 
there is evidence that at the time of its appearance marine 
insurance was in general practice on the continent of Europe
67as well as in England. Oleriac states of it "that it was
originally composed for the use of the Merchants of Rouen, and 
is so complete in itself, that it fully explains all that is 
necessary to know on the subject of marine contracts and naval 
commerce; and that nothing is wanting to it but the author's
68name."
Olaeriac, in his commentary upon the first article of 
Le Guidion, gives us the earliest statement in any work on in-
66. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 45.
67. Martin, op. cit., p. 41, ff.
68. Marshall, op. cit.,v. 1, p.22.
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surance concerning its origin. He asserts that insurance 
was invented by the Jews, who when they were expelled from 
France by Philip Augustus in the year 1182, sought and found 
refuge in Italy. This opinion is founded, he says, upon a 
statement in the universal history of Giovanni Villani, who 
according to Dr. Duer, died at an advanced age in 1348 " the
69 most justly celebrated of the early Florentine historians." 
Oleriac’s theory, based upon Villani*s statement, is that the 
Jews in transporting their effects from France to Italy, devised 
the insurance idea to protect themselves from loss. They 
accomplished this by making the payment of a presentt called a 
premium, the consideration to the insurers for assuming all the 
risks of the voyage. It is his idea that the Italians and 
Lombards, who were spectators of the Jewish transactions, pre­
served the forms of the instruments used, and afterwards adopted
70them in their own commercial undertakings.
Marshall in his Treatise on the Law of Insurance, com­
menting on the opinion thus advanced by Oleriac, states that 
although adopted by so respectable a writer, it carries very
71little of the air of probability. Duer, on the other hand,
69. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 29.
70. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 4.
71. Ibid..v. 1, p. 4.
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relying upon the evidence of Villani, in whom he places the 
greatest confidence, agrees with Cleirac that it would have 
been a most reasonable thing for the aBtute and sagacious Jews 
to have resorted to the idea of insurance in protecting them-
72 selves while transferring their property. It may be added, 
however, that regardless of the soundness of this theory of 
the origin of insurance, it cannot be questioned that the in­
stitution of insurance was known in Italy at the time of 
Villani’s work, and had already been in existence for a con­
siderable period of time.
Another hypothesis concerning the beginning of the 
insurance contract as used in modern times was advanced by 
Vilagut, a docter of canon law, in his treatise De Usuris 
published in Venice in 1589, and involves a consideration of 
the teachings of the church concerning interest. The corpus 
juris canonici, prohibited interest, though from the teachings 
of St. Thomas Aquinas ( 1227 - 1274) it will be seen that 
certain exceptions were made. Apparently the payment made for 
bottomry loans, where the risks attaching to the venture fested 
upon the lender, were not included in the prohibitions relating 
to interest, and in the latter Middle Ages the doctrine that
72. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 30.
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73 risk justified interest payments became well established. 
Bottomry, which was the insurance vehicle for carrying marine 
risks, until the insurance contract was developed, was there­
fore considered permisBable and a high rate of interest in 
such cases legitimate. In 1234, however, a decree was pro­
mulgated by Pope Gregory IX which declared:-
"Naviganti vel eunti ad Nundinas certam mutuans 
percuniae quantitatem pro eo quod suscipit in se 
periculum, recepturus aliquid ultra sortem, usurarius 
est censendus." 74
This decree created an entirely new situation. Alauzet, a 
French writer commenting upon this decree states that while 
some grammatical doubts were at first raised as to its true 
interpretation, it was soon understood to be a total prohibit­
ion of loans on bottomry and respondentia as usurious, and he 
adds that it was for the purpose of evading this prohibition, 
by separating the assumption of the risk from the loan of the 
money, that the contract of insurance was invented.
With this theory advanced by Alauzet, Dr. Duer is 
not inclined to agree. While admitting that the quotations 
of passages from the early writers cited by Alauzet give to 
his hypothesis "an air of great probability", he nevertheless 
believes that if the decree of Gregory IX gave rise to the 
invention of the contract of insurance the fact would have been
73. Spann, History of Economics, p. 27-8.
74. Quoted by Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 31.
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notorious. He further objects that if the decree had been an 
authoritative interdiction of the church and if the practice of 
bottomry were ever discontinued, why was it so soon revived as 
to become almost universal in every country in Europe subject 
to Papal sway, with no evidence that would point to a modificat­
ion or revocation of the decree of Gregory. Alauzet states, 
however, that soon after publication, by reference to the con­
text of the entire document, it was apparent that the true 
meaning intended was "usurarius non est censendus11. the important
75word non having been omitted by mistake. If this were true,
then the decree instead of condeming the practice of bottomry 
was designed specifically to exempt it from the usuary prohib­
itions, presumably intending to give expression in a decree to 
an exemption that custom and precident had previously sanctioned. 
It is possible, then, to answer Dr. Duer’s objection that the 
practice of bottomry spread throughout the nations under Papal 
sway, following the promulgation of the decree of Gregory, with 
the assumption that when the decree was finally understood, it 
was interpreted as a specific permission to take interest for 
loans on bottomry. At the same time, the hypothesis that the 
decree was the immediate cause for developing a contract for
75. Duer, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 32. 
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risk bearing without the advancing of a loan is equally tentable. 
If the decree as originally promulgated inadvertently stated 
that such loans were condemned when it was the intention to 
state that they ^ere not condemned as usurious, then a period 
of doubt and uncertainty must have followed, and during that 
period the contraot for risk bearing without the attendant loan 
could have been developed.
Whether or not the decree of Gregory IX was actually 
the immediate cause of the development of the insurance contract, 
it is not unreasonable to believe that the pressure exerted 
against money lending by regulations against usury were instrum­
ental in bringing it about. Shakespeare has protrayed for us 
in the figure of Shylock, the position of the money lender.
The business of money lending in Christian countries was regarded 
as illegitimate, and those engaged in it despised aB usurors.
The fact that there were certain exceptions made to the rule 
prohibiting interest would hardly succeed in removing the stigma 
that attached to the business, and as long as the Church regul­
ations were interpreted to prohibit interest taking, most of the 
business of money lending was carried on by the Jews and other 
non-Chrisitans.
With the development of commercial enterprise, and 
167
the increasing use of money for the purposes of production, 
the difference between usury and interest was brought out in the 
Papal decrees. The crime of usury was limited to consumption 
loans at exorbitant rates, while Pope Innocent IV (d 1254) 
defined as legitimate a charge for the use of commercial and 
industrial capital, if risk of loss or sacrifice of gains were
76an element of the transaction. With this distinction
clearly understood, there was a tendency for the Lombards and 
other Christians to engage in the business of lending money 
for productive purposes, leaving the smaller personal loans 
to the Jews. With the dawn of the thirteenth century the 
civil laws in Italy began to distinguish loans on the basis 
of risk. There was permitted first the simple charge of in­
terest, that might be compared to the pure interest rate of 
modern economic theory. To this might be added a charge for 
perdictable risks, and lastly a charge for the varying risks
77 that attach to any business undertaking. This emphasis
upon risk and the charge therefor tended to place a decided 
measure upon the cost of its assumption. It was but a step 
from this point for merchants, who borrowed on bottomry for the 
protective feature, when they required no financial assistance,
76. Knight, Barnes and Flugel, op. cit., p. 115.
77. Ibid.,p. 119.
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to pay for the protective feature without taking the loan. 
And the Lombards, described by a contemporary poet as: " A 
nation clever, sagacious, prudent, active, adroit, far seeing 
in council, learned in the science of laws and right,1’^® 
might be expected to see the advantages of the insurance con­
tract, and provide a means for taking the step.
Regardless of the date of the introduction of the 
contract in the other nations of Europe, weight must be given 
to the hypothesis that the contract originated in Italy. As 
already suggested, it is of course possible that the Lombards 
were not the absolute originators of the idea, but to them at 
least the credit seems due for introducing it throughout the 
continent. During the Middle Ages the spread of commercial 
institutions was from the south to the north. As early as 
the twelfth century the Papal collectors had penetrated to the 
remote parts of northwestern Europe, and were instrumental in 
disseminating the financial ideas of the south. Nor were they 
the only carriers of the Italian influence. The Italian 
merchants followed the travelling markets of fairs of Northern 
France, Germany, and England, and they were accompnaied by the 
Lombard money changers. Expanding their operations
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throughout the continent during the thirteenth century, the 
Lombards became powerful financiers and their influence was 
great. In the hands of their colony in London rested the 
foreign trade of the kingdom, and to them tradition ascribes 
onthe introduction of insurance to England.
Added to tradition is a powerful argument from 
etymology. The word policy which is uded today to designate 
the name of the written insturment containing the contract
r
comes to us from the Italian. The word in the English lan­
guage, or in any other language than the Itadian, has no meaning 
save that arbitrarily ascribed to it. Polizza, the Italian 
word from ★hioh policy is derived is used as the name of a con­
tract in writing that furnishes evidence of, or creates a legal 
obligation. Hence its application to the insurance contract 
by the Italians was perfectly correct, though it was by no 
means limited in its meaning to such contracts alone, and 
applied equally well to a promissory note, bill of exchange, 
or other similar document. The term has been carried out 
of the Italian as a name for the insurance contract, and it is 
to be interpreted as meaning that when the Italians introduced 
the insurance idea they designated the agreement a polizza, and
80. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 33. 
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the Italian term was accepted and used to designate that parti­
cular type of contract, the insurance agreement.
As there is no absolute certainty as to the place of 
origin of insurance, so the time of its beginning is likewise 
shrouded in uncertainty. We know that a custom of merchants 
can exist for many years before the usage becomes a matter of 
formal law. Such customs have the force of law where they
31prevail. It is reasonable to presume that insurance was
known as a custom among merchants for a long period before it 
became the subject of formal legislation. The evidence from 
the laws, and from the historians, however, is not to be doubted, 
and we can with reasonable certainty fix the time'of the appear-
82 ance of insurance as not later than the close of the twelfth
83 or the beginning of the thirteenth century. Likewise, a
preponderance of evidence favors the conclusion that the idea 
originated with the Italians.
81. Marshall, op, cit., v. 1, p. 19.
82. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 18.
83. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 28.
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CHAPTER V.
PERIOD OF FINAL DEVELOPMENT, 1500 - 1720.
1. Marine Insurance.
The arrival of the sixteenth century found, that in 
the maritime nations the practice of marine insurance had be­
come general , and. its principles well understood.. In that 
earliest treatise on the subject of insurance, Le Guidion de 
la mer, to which reference has already been made, it indicates 
that at the time of its publication marine insurance was known
1 
and practiced in France, Spain, Italy, Flanders and England.
For many years after the turn of the century, insur­
ance underwriting had not become a specialized business, but 
was carried on by merchants who from time to time committed 
themselves to risks by subscribing policies as a side line to 
their other affairs. In England the early policies were 
issued in this manner, and just as the insurers were merchants, 
so the business of insurance was in the hands of the sworn 
brokers who acted as the merchants’ agents in the buying and 
selling goods. It was the custom, though not followed in
1. Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 309; Marshall, op, cit.,v.1, p.22. 
172
every instance, to have the policies drawn up and attested by
2 
a notary, Lombard street seems to have been the headquart­
ers for merchants engaged in taking marine risks, though there 
appears to have been no particular control of centralization
3of facilities.
From the regulations governing the conduct of the 
business of insurance to be found in Le Guidion, it is apparent 
that at the time the treatise was compiled, the business in 
Rouen was likewise in the hands of numerous underwriters, with­
out any centralized place of doing business. Some centralizat­
ion was to be found in the provision for a registrar of policies, 
who it was provided must establish his place of business in a 
frequented location, and display over his.door a sign reading 
"Office of Insurances". He, it was specified, must be of good 
reputation, well acquainted with the details of insurance, and 
have a knowledge of book-keeping, so that he might enter and 
keep a list of the policies submitted to him, and he further was 
required to keep his office open during the entire day, with 
either himself or a clerk always in attendance. The underwriters, 
however, were not in any central location, for it was provided 
that whenever a policy was offered to the registrar for completion,
2. Wright and Fayle, History of Lloyds, p. 35.
3. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 33.
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it must be carried to all of the underwriters in a specified 
order, so that all might have an opportunity to participate in
4the venture. It may be fairly presumed that these rules, 
drawn up for the regulation of the business of marine insurance 
at Rouen, fairly depict the customary manner of carrying on the 
business of insurance in the other maritime nations of Europe.
Because of the uncertainty of the date of Le Guidion 
we are in doubt as to when in the sixteenth century the recorded 
of insurance first made his appearance. We do know that in 
England during the entire first half of the century underwriters 
were scattered, and the business of insurance unorganized and in 
the hands of merchants and their brokers. At the same time the 
importance of the business is not to be minimized. In fact it 
was so widely practiced, and commonly known that Lord Bacon in 
1548, in opening Elizabeth's first parliament said:- "Dofh not 
the wise merchant, in every adventure of danger, give part to
5have the rest insured? " So far as there is any information,
the business as carried on.proved itself adequate to the needs 
of commerce.
At this point we must mention the establishment of the 
Royal Exchange, destined for many years to be an important factor 
in the insurance field. A triumph of the labors and planning 
of the famed Sir Thomas Gresham, the first Royal Exchange was
4. Martin, op. cit., p. 41. ff.
5. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, p. 4 , 
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dedicated by Queen Elizabeth on January 23, 1571, and marked a 
long step in freeing English business from the domination of 
the Lombardy men, and the Hanseatic traders of the Steelyard. 
The Hanseatic traders, known as Easterlings, or Emperor’s men 
had for the greater part of five centuries following the reign 
of Edward the Confessor, secured a stranglehold upon British 
commerce. This group of traders in London lived upon a monas­
tic plan, never married, nor were allowed even to visit any 
person of the opposite sex, took all meals in common and sub­
mitted themselves to a strict government. They owned great 
yards and buildings on the bank of the Thames, known as the 
Staplehof. This was eventually contracted to Staelhof. and 
-anglicized into Stillyards, and finally into the Steel yard.
To break the power of the foreign influence, and at the same 
time adopt their business methods was part of the far seeing
6 design of Gresham in establishing his new exchange.
The idea of the exchange was not original with Sir 
Thomas. The question had often been considered, and the 
father of Sir Thomas, Sir Richard Gresham had for many years 
advocated the erection of an exchange in London. In the time 
of Henry VIII, plans were considered for the erection of a Burse,
6. Mason, op. cit.. j>p 11. ff. 
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but sentiment was at that time adverse. ' The merchants pre­
ferred to meet and conduct their business on the cobbles of 
Lombard street.
In 1571, however, Greshams exchange became a fact.
It became at once the meeting place of merchants, and when the 
power of the Steelyard was eventually broken, became the import­
ant business center of London. During the day merchants and 
others interested in business congregated there, and their disputes 
were;: adjusted, and the negotiations fof new transactions com­
pleted. The fast developing business of insurance, carried on 
among the merchants of Lombard street, gravitated toward the 
center of business activity that the exchange created. While 
the underwriting continued in the hands of individual merchants 
for many years, the floor of the Royal Exchange was destined to 
become a center for effecting insurance contracts. This first 
Royal Exchange, built under the guidance of Gresham, and dedicated 
by Elizabeth continued for ninety years an important center in 
the business life of London. It was destroyed in 1666 by the
7great fire.
Following the establishment of the Royal Exchange as 
a center for merchants for carrying on their business negotiations, 
including in their other affairs the business of insurance, there
7. Mason, op. cit.. p. 13 - 26 
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appeared, in the year 1574, or thereabouts, a new development 
in the field. Apparently sensing an opportunity for securing 
a profitable inonoply for himself, one Richard Candeler, obtained 
from the Queen a patent granting to him and his deputies the 
sole right of making and registering policies of all kinds, as 
well as other instruments of insurance, made upon ships or upon 
merchandise. In the preamble of the patent, reasons to justify 
the grant were set forth. Because of the secrecy possible in 
securing a policy, dishonest or unscrupulous persons were able 
to buy insurance from more than one source and thereby defraud
8the insurers. Attached to the grant was the proviso that
whenever reform of the office thus established was deemed nec­
essary, suit might be made to the Queen or her Council, and
9Candeler was to conform to their orders.
Immediately there were objections. The notaries 
petitioned against the grejnt of the patent on the ground that 
it threatened their business. The brokers likewise voiced 
their objection. As a result of the opposition there was 
appointed a commission of inquiry into the proposed Office of 
Assurances. The commission, however, confined itself to fix­
ing the rqtes to be charged for registrations and other services,
10 without interfering with the monoply.
8. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 35-6.
9. Walford, op. cit.. v. 1, p. 486
10. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 36.
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In the early days of the development of insurance, 
the courts seemed to be particularly free from disputes arising 
out of the interpretation of insurance policies. The first 
case upon insurance to be found in any book of reports was 
mentioned by Lord Coke in Dowdale's Case decided in 1588. 
An action,it appears, was brought on a policy covering a ship 
from Maicombe Regis to Abbeville. The loss alleged arose 
out of the detention of the ship by the King of France in the 
River Soane. In the course of the action the defnndant con­
tended that because the detention arose out of the realm, the
12case could not be tried in London. It was held that:-
" where as well the contract as the performance of it is wholly 
made or to be done beyond the sea, it is not triable under our
13 law, but if the promise be made in England it shall be tried." 
It seemed at that time to be the prevailing idea, however, that 
disputes arising out of the contract of insurance should be 
settled by special tribunals rather than by appeal to the courts.
The first English statute relating to the subject of 
insurance is the famous 43. Elizabeth, ch. 12, which has for its 
purpose the establishment of a tribunal, before which disputes 
arising out of the insurance contract might be heard and settled.
11. Elliott, op. cit.. p. 8.
12. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 24.
13. Elliott, op, cit,, p. 8.
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Provision was made for the establishment of a Standing Commission
for the trial of such cases, to be renewed yearly by the Lord 
Chancellor or the Lord Keeper. It was provided that both the 
Judge of the Admiralty Court, and the Recorded of London, were 
to be ex officio members of the Commission. Of the remaining 
commissioners, there were to be included two Doctors of Civil 
Law, two common lawyers, and eight merchants. Five of the 
commissioners were to constitute a quorum. The findings of 
the commission were not final, but provision waB made for an 
appeal to the Court of Chancery.
The act is of interest, representing the first English 
legislation in the field of insurance. The wording of its pre­
amble is especially significant and worthy of quotation, indicat­
ing as it does a recognition not only of the great antiquity of 
the business of insurance, but also an understanding of its 
benefits. In it we find the following:-
"Whereas it ever hathe bene the policie of this realme 
by all good meanes to comforte and encourage the 
merchante, ----And whereas it has bene tyme out of
mynde an usage amongste merchantes, both of this realme 
and of forraine nacyons, when they make any great 
adventure (speciallie into remote partes) to give some 
consideration of money to other persons (which commonlie 
are in noe small number) to have from them assurance 
made of their ^oodes, merchandizes, ships and things 
adventured, or some parte thereof, at suche rates and 
in suche sort as the parties assurers and the parties 
assured can agree, which course of dealinge is commonlie 
termed a policie of assurance; by means of whiche 
policie of assurance it commethe to passe that upon the 
losse or perishinge of any shippe there followethe not 
the undoinge of any man, but the loss lightethe rather 
easilie upon many than heavilie upon fewe, and r; 
upon them that adventure not than those that doe 
adventure, whereby all merchantes, speciallie th 
younger sorte, are allured to venture more willii 
and more freely. 14
Not only does the wording of the statute establish beyond 
doubt that insurance as a business had long been in existe: 
in England when the statute was passed, so long in fact th;
its origin was lost to memmory, but it also puts forth in 
suscint terms an appraisal of the economic effect of risk,
the benefits that
designed to shift
are to be derived from the device of ins
the burden of the risk through effecting
dispersion of the losses.
The act then refers to the custom that had been f
ed previous to the passing of the statute in settling cont
sies, and call attention to a new tendency in the following
"And suche assurers have usedwhereas heretofore 
stande so justile and preciselie upon their credi 
as few or no controversies have risen thereupon, 
if any have growen the same have from tyme to tym 
bene ended and ordered by certaine grave and disc 
merchantes, appointed by the Lorde Mayor of the 0 
of London, as men by reason of their experience 
fitteste to understands and speedilie to decide t 
causes, untill of late years that divers persons 
withdrawn themselves from that arbitrarie course, 
have sought to drawe the parties assured to seeke 
moneys of everie several assurer, by suites comme 
in her Majesties courts, to their greate charges 
delaye8; For remedie whereof be it enacted by the 
authoritie of the presente Parliamente:15
14. Quoted by Martin, op. cit., p. 11. ff.
15. Quoted by Martin, op. clt~7, p. 11'. ff. 
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Next the act proceeds to authorize the Lord Chancellor, and 
the Lord Keeper of the great seal to appoint the commission 
already described.
Here through this act was created in effect a per­
manent board of arbitration to settle disputes arising out of 
policies of insurance. The commission thus established, how­
ever, did not meet with great success, and its decisions have 
left no mark on the law of insurance. Its jurisdiction was 
confined to London, and took cognizance only of insurance on 
merchandise, and considered only the claims of the assured. 
A further limitation of its scope was found in the fact that 
it recognized only policies registered with the Office of 
Assurances, thereby helping to perpetuate the monoply of
16Oandeler and his successors. Because so many withdrew
themselves from its remedies, the court finally fell into dis-
17use, and was ultimately discontinued.
With reference to the Office of Assurances, while 
its grant provided a monoply on the registering of policies, 
all policies issued were by no means registered in this office. 
As a matter of actual practice there were many policies Issued
16. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Vol.3, p.74-5.
17. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. p. 38.
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for individuals by the underwriters without recourse to the 
registration privileges of the Office of Assurances. The
18
Office eventually dissapeared around 1688.
We may now temporarily leave the development of 
insurance in England. For our purpose it would suffice, to 
trace the contributions to the science of insurance as they 
make their appearance in England. Nevertheless, because of 
the light they throw upon the status of insurance when the 
seventeenth century is drawing to a close, we are interested 
in giving some attention to the insurance section contained 
in that justly famous code, the Ordonnance de la Marine, of 
Louis XIV., published in 1681.
The Ordonnance de la Marine was probably the first
19 complete code of maritime and commercial law ever attenpted. 
Its scope is sufficiently broad to cover the entire range of 
maritime law including insurance. Compiled under the direct­
ion and patronage of Colbert, the celebrated minister of Louis 
XIV, it is,said the distinguished jurist Kent, a "monument of 
the reign of Louis XIV, far more durable and more glorious 
than all the military trophies won by the valor of his armies." 
When we consider its originality and the extent of its design,, 
la. Hopkins, op. cit.. p. 32.
19. Duer, op. cit., v. 1, p. 43. 
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says tiie learned. Duer, and consider the ability with which it 
is executed, " we shall not hesitate to admit, that it deserves 
to be ranked among the noblest works that legislative genius
20
and learning 'have yet accomplished." Vallin has written
a commentary upon the ordinance which, says Kent, almost rivals 
the ordinance itself in the weight of its authority as well as 
in the equity of its conclusions. Commenting upon-the laws,
Vallin states that universal administration was excited by the 
appearance of an ordinance "so beautiful in its economical dis­
tribution, so wise in its general and particular policy; so 
correct and exact in its divisions; and so learned that it pre­
sents as many abridged treatises of jurisprudence as there are
21subjects which it embraces." From the Ordonnanoe de la
22 Marine we date the modern system of maritime and commercial law.
A long section of the code is devoted to the subject of insurance, 
and these statutes form the basis of the present French law upon*
23the subject.
Nor was the influence of the Ordonnanoe de la Marine 
confined to French law. The influence upon English law is 
known and recognized. The English nation never had any general
20. Kent, Commentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 15.
21. Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 312.
22. Halleck, International Law, p. 11.
23. Elliott, op. cit., p. 3.
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and formally enacted code of maritime law promulgated by legis­
lative authority, such as this code of Louis XIV, and the older 
codes effected by other of the European maritime nations. The 
deed was supplied first by a number of compilations of existing 
laws, and supplimented with numerous decisions based upon find-
24Ings in the older European codes. Here mention must be
made of that great and distinguished juror, Lord Mansfield, 
whose work was so largely instrumental in shaping the maritime 
law, and the law of insurance in Great Britain. Finding little 
in the way of help in the English common law, he turned to the
25foreign codes and authorities. Early in his judicial
career he brought to the notice of the English Bar the Rhodian 
Laws, the Oonsolato del mare, the Roles D*Oleron, the treatises 
of Roecus, the Laws of Wisby, and above all the then famous 
Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV. with -tehe■equally netable 
Commentary of Vallin. These authorities were cited by him
in Luke v. Luke (2 Burr. 882) and a new direction was given to
26the development of English law. The Ordonnance of Louis XiV
containing a digest of the older usages and customs was frequently
24. Kent, Commentaries on American Law, v. 3, p. 18.
25. Marshall, op. cit., v. 1, p. 28.
26. Kent, op, cit.. v. 3, p. 19.
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cited in subsequent cases, as was also the Commentary of Vallin. 
The English text books of law, based as they were upon the de­
cisions of the courts, were thereby directly influenced by the
27 provisions of this French code.
We are here interested in the sections of the code 
dealing with insurance, for by their means we are enabled to 
judge the long strides that had been taken in the development 
of the business of insurance up to the time when the code was 
promulgated. The regulations are specific, and in the light 
of any insurance legislation that had preceeded them, surpris­
ingly complete.
In the beginning of that division of the code devoted 
to the subject of insurance, after authorizing both subjects 
and foreigners to insure "ships, goods, and other effects that 
may be carried by sea, or navigable rivers," the insurers are 
then authorized to fix the price to be charged for’ assuming the
28 risk. In other words rates are to be made by the insurers.
Next in order are several regulations covering the 
policy contract. It is provided that the agreement be drawn 
up in writing, but it may be executed without notarial verifi­
cation. A subsequent section prohibits under penalties named,
27. Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 313,
28. Ordonnance de la Marine. Division "Of Insurances" quoted by 
Walford, op. cit., v. 4, p. 310, sec. 1. 
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any clerk, secretary qf an insurance chamber, notary, or broker, 
from having a policy underwritten in which there were any places 
left blank. Nor were they, themselves, to be concerned either 
directly or indirectly in insurances. There are enumerated 
detailed information the policy must contain. First comes the 
name, and place of residence of the insured, with a statement 
as to whether the person who is securing the insurance is act­
ing in the capacity of owner of the insured goods, or broker. 
Next in order after naming the property to be ooveE^dc by the 
insurance, the name of the vessel and the master are required, 
as well as the port of loading, the port- of destination, points 
the ship will touch, the time of the beginning and ending of the 
risk, the amount of insurance, the premium, and other details 
that may be pertinent or agreed upon. A declaration was re­
quired that any disputes be settled by arbitration. Here we 
find enumerated the essential details to be included in the 
policy when drawn up, including the arbitration clause that
29 
finds its place in the present day policy of insurance.
Following the regulations governing the drawing up 
of the policy, there are several sections dealing with except­
ions or specific points. Without enumerating them all, mention
29. Ordonnanoe de la Marine, sec. 2 - 8.
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may be made of authorization to effect insurance against cap­
tivity and slavery, though insurance upon lives was specifi­
cally prohibited. It was forbidden masters to insure the 
freight money their vessel might earn, and merchants were like­
wise prohibited from insuring profits. To this day, profits 
are not included in measuring a loss under a property insurance 
policy, though there has now been devised a policy specifically
30covering profits.
31 
Reinsurance is expressly declared lawful. nVhile
in times past subject to many abuses, reinsurance is now recog­
nized as an important factor in the conduct of the business of 
insurance, and is in effect a contract entered into by an 
assurer, in order to secure relief from risks to which he no 
longer desires to be committed. By this means he transfers 
a part, or all of a burden to the shoulders of other, under­
writers, who are called reinsurers.
The principle of Indemnity was recognized by the code. 
It was provided that if a policy were made without fraudelent 
intent, but for an amount in excess of the actual value of the 
goods insured, in case of loss the insurers were liable only 
for the value of the goods lost, and the underwriters were to 
contribute to the loss pro-rata. A difference in procedure
30. Ibid., sec. 9 - 16.
31. Ibid., sec. 20-22. 
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from that now practiced, under our law was followed in the event 
that the insurance was written in several policies. Instead of 
all contributing pro-rata to the loss, as would now be the case 
in this country, the policies in meeting the loss are to be 
exhausted in the order of their issue, and those that represent 
an insurance in excess of the value of the goods insured 4® not 
contribute. The law provided that such insurers as do not con­
tribute shall withdraw and return all but a small per-centage of
33the premium.
The risks insured against, and for which under the
law the insurers were liable, included loss from ’’tempest, ship­
wreck, stranding, running foul of other ships, changing the 
course or the voyage of the ship; jettison, fire, capture, plun­
dering, detention of princes, declaration of war, reprisals,
33and generally all other accidents of the sea.” It was pro­
vided, however, that if a change of course was made by order 
of the insured without consent of the insurers, the insurers 
are not liable. This rule is extended to other losses that
34may happen through act or fault of the assured. Under
modern practice, deviation from a specified route, certain 
instances being excepted, will void the policy. On the other
33. Ibid., . sec. 33-35.
33. Ibid., sec. 36.
34. Ibid., sec. 37.
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hand modern insurance law does not recognize negligence as a 
ground for voiding the policy, but allows indemnity to the 
assured for loss by the peril named, in spite of contributing
35 negligence on the part of himself or others.
The doctrine of concealment was made operative by the 
code. This doctrine, briefly stated, recognizes that the 
subject of the contract of insurance is a chance, and that both 
parties must contract with reference to the same chance. Under 
this doctrine, facts, material to the risk, known to one party 
only, must be made known to the other party. If the under­
writer, by some- means or other knows that the voyage is ended 
safely, it would quite clearly be a fraud for him to accept a 
premium for insuring it. On the other hand, if the ship be
36 already lost, insurance would be likewise fraudelent. The 
Ordonnanoe takes particular cognizance of such contracts, and 
declares them void if made after a loss that the insurer knew 
of, or after an arrival that had been made known to the insurer. 
And it was presumed that such information would feach the parties 
concerned, if the neww could have been brought, allowing a lapse
37 of an hour for each league and a half of distance.
Elaborate instructions are given for reporting losses, 
abandonment to the insurers, and the time within which losses
35. Richards, Fundamentals in the Law of Insurance, in The Fire 
Insurance Contract, p~ 76.
36. Ibid., p. 75.
37. Ordonnanoe de la Marine, sec. 38-40 .
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may be presumed, to have occured. Provision is made for
declaring insurance carried as well as bottomry loans in the 
event of loss, and in the event of over insurance, where there 
is any concealment the insurance is declared void, and the in­
surance feature of the bottomry contract inoperative. That 
is the bottomry loans must be repaid, even though the ship be 
taken or lost. Exemplary punishment is provided for whoever 
sues for the sum insured if it be above the value of the effects
39insured, or the interest of the assured in them.
Provision is made for settling claims. Methods are 
named by which goods are to be valued, and for the care and dis-
40
position of goods detained or abandoned. There are regulat­
ions governing the business operations of brokers, notaries, 
clerks and secretaries of chambers of insurance, having to do
41 particularly with the issuance of policies and their records. 
Detailed procedure is lined out for carrying on the arbitration 
42of disputed-claims. The attention which the Ordonnance gives
to these and other details is indicative not only of the scope 
of the law, but also of the extent of the business of insurance
38. Ibid., sec. 42-52.
39. Ibid., sec. 53-55,
40. Ibid., sec. 56-65.
41. Ibid., sec. 68-69.
42. Ibid., sec. 70-74. 
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when the code was promulgated. ■
The interest of Louis XIV, and his advisers in the
field of insurance, was not confined to legislation, for in
1686 the King together with Colbert and Boucherat, signed a
decree establishing the creation of a Oompagnie Generale pour 
les Assurances Grosses Aventures de France in the city of Paris.
(General Company for Insurances and Bottomry Bonds of France).
Here at this date we have the organization of the first stock 
insurance company. The importance of insurance was set forth 
in the beginning of the edict. The preamble and first article 
are here quoted:-
"Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, 
dauphin of Viennois, Count of Valentinois and Dijois, 
Provence, Forcalquier and adjacent lands, to all those 
present and to come, GREETINGS.
"Since we have devoted outselves to the reestablish­
ment of maritime commerce, the jurisprudence of which 
we have established by various regulations and by our 
decree of the month of August, 1681, several of our 
subjects have concluded policies and contracts of in­
surance with great advantage to themselves, thus avoid­
ing large losses by means of the payment of modest 
amounts to have their vessels and merchandise insured. 
This has caused us to urge several merchants and others 
versed in business to combine and form a General 
Insurance Chamber, it. the form of a Company having a 
common capital and signature, in order to amass a large 
amount of money, so that merchants who wish to avail 
themselves of this method of reducing the risks which 
they incur in their ordinary business may do so and 
continue their business with greater facility and safety.
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"For these reasons and others we have stated and 
declaired, and we state and declair by these presents, 
signed by our hand, what is our wish and pleasure.
”1. That there be established a Oompagnie Generale 
des Assurances et Grosses Aventures in our good city 
of Paris, at such place as the interested parties may 
find most convenient, to constitute it the general 
office for insurance business, hold the necessary 
meetings there, and there to negotiate the business 
of the company." 43
Following this, the decree fixed the number of associates 
at thirty. They were to have a capital stock of 300,000 livres, 
divided into seventy-five shares of 4,000 livres each, and the 
term for which the association was to function was fixed at ten 
years. Certain stipulations were inserted with reference to' 
the policy that the company should.issue. For example the 
clause agreeing that disputes be submitted to arbitration was 
required, though provision was made to regulate appeals. Fees 
were established for the registrar, and all persons but those 
who were members of the association were forbidden to engage in 
the business of insurance or bottomry in the city of Paris, 
thereby creating a monoply for the company. It was provided, 
however, that merchants, traders, and others of the cities of 
Rouen, Nantz, St. Malo, Rochelle, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Marseilles, 
and others should be permitted to continue in the business of 
insurance, but only upon the footing that existed previous to 
the date of the edict. The association was permitted to
43. Quoted in General Fire Assurance Company of Paris.France.
1819 - 1919, p. 6.
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m'ake its own by-laws for the company's regulation, so long as 
they were in conformity with the conditions specifically set 
forth in the decree. Here was the first marine Insurance 
company. Then?e were but thirty stockholders, and anyone 
else who wished to engage in the business of insurance in Paris 
in order to do so must first purchase the stock of some member
44of the company.
There was an effort made to establish a great marine 
insurance company in England, at a period considerably earlier 
than the date of the establishment of the French company, but 
the efforts seem to have been marked with no degree of success. 
In 1660, the proposal was made by a group of individuals, with 
a view to providing greater security and centralized facilities, 
that a great corporation be established under royal patent for
45 the purpose of effecting insurance upon ships and cargoes.
The originators of the idea, in their estimates placed the 
foreign trade of the country at seven million pounds a year, 
and pointed out that if they secured even half this business at 
.5$, they would have a premium income of one hundred seventy-five 
thousand pounds. As a capital to secure the assured, the pro­
moters of the company were to raise a capital of a half million
44. Walford, op, cit., v. 4., p. 313.
45. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 40. 
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pounds, to be deposited with the East India Company, or other­
wise safely placed.
A favorable report was given the project by the Council 
of Trade, upon two conditions. These were that losses should 
be paid without the abatements that were then customary, and 
that no one should be prevented from insuring elsewhere. Un­
like the Frenoh company, there was here created no monoply. 
This may have been the reason for allowing the project to fall 
through. Without a monoply the projectors were apparently un­
willing to raise the necessary half million capital. Whether 
this was the reason, or some other, the company was never or­
ganized, and the idea of a company for writing marine insurance
46 was not seriously brought forward for over a half century.
Following the dissapearance about 1688 of the Office 
of Assurances created by the grant of Elizabeth in England, 
the business of insurance to the end of the seventeenth century 
was carried on in much the same manner as it had been under 
Elizabeth before the establishment of the registry. The in­
surers, for the most part, were at this time merchants engaged 
in other lines of business. There was, however, one noticeable 
development. Whereas, in the time of Elizabeth, merchants
46. Wright and Fayle, op, cit.. p. 39. 
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were the insurers, and the business was carried on largely by 
the brokers who represented the merchants in other lines, by 
the-beginning of the eighteenth century the business of insur­
ance broker had become a specialized occupation.
Two marked defects in the system eventually forced 
themselves to the attention of the commercial community, and 
were instrumental in effecting the next steps in the evolution 
of the business. The first short coming was to be found in 
the lack of any kind of a financial guarantee of stability on 
the part of the underwriters. They committed themselves, as 
individuals, to a part of the risk insured by the various poli­
cies. And there was a number of these individuals concerned 
in each risk. Next there was no recognized center for carrying 
on the business, but brokers who had policies to complete were 
obliged to go from office to office, in oroer to secure suffi-
47cient insurers to complete a policy.
Without any concerted action, or preconceived design 
on the part of any group, underwriters and brokers with common 
interests began to assemble in the coffee houses. Lacking other 
meeting places, the coffee houses seemed admirably designed to 
serve their needs. Not only did they serve as a place to gather,
47. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 40. Martin, op. cit.. p. 55 
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but it was here also that latest developments in the field were 
carried, and here the latest news might be obtained. The
48 
first coffee house of which there is any record opened in 1652. 
Within a very short time these coffee houses had become the 
popular resort of merchants who patronized them for business 
purposes. Utilizing the facilities of the coffee houses to 
their own ends, the merchants engaged in underwriting, and the 
brokers, engaged in completing policies, formed the habit of 
frequenting these institutions. The actual business of under­
writing was carried on at this time on the floor of the Royal 
Exchange, but in the business of underwriting marine risks news 
was the all important factor, and the best sources of news were 
found to be the coffee houses. There appears to have been
no effort on the part of the managers to limit their patronage 
to any given class. Any one who desired might be served. 
But it was natural that those with common interests should be 
attracted, and specialization in the coffee houses -waBe the 
result.
With insurance underwriting and the coffee houses, the 
name of Edward Lloyd has become inseparably associated. His 
coffee house, destined to become famous in insurance history was
48. Martin, op, cit., p. 52.
49. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. p. 9. 
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by no means the earliest of these institutions, nor was it in 
the beginning the sole resort of the insurance interests.
There were other coffee houses well known and patronized before 
his time, and it may fairly be said that the great institution 
known as Lloyds traces its beginning to all of those early 
coffee houses that served the insurance interests.
It was by going about from place to place that the 
merchant was enabled to learn of the important events of the 
day, and of the developments of interest to his business. 
There were very few newspapers, and what there were contained 
but little of value to the business man. Mails were slow and 
postage expensive. News was spread largely by personal contact. 
Merchants obtained their news by an exchange of information, and 
for this the coffee house served as a place of meeting.
Recognizing the value of supplying this business news, 
it seems to have been an early custom, not only to supply such 
newspapers as were available, but also to post up, or circulate 
letters containing matters of interest to those assembled, a 
custom not unlike that to be seen among groups gathered in the 
board room of a stock exchange house today. It was due to the 
Initiative of Lioyd that his coffee house outdistanced its com­
petitors. Lloyds became recognized as a center for news, and 
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in 1696 Lloyd began the publication of his own paper, Lloyd's
News, consisting of a single page that appeared three times 
vn 50 51
50. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 21-2.
51. Martin, op, cit., p. 51 ff.
weekly.
The earliest notice of Lloyd’s coffee house is found
in the London Gazette, of February 18-21, 1688. From this
advertisement it is evident that the first Lloyd's was doing
51business in Tower street at this date. From the numerous 
advertisements it appears from the beginning that Lloyd's was 
frequented by merchants and shipmasters. It was not until 
1691, however, that Lloyd left the old location to establish 
himself in the heart of the business world, and to enter into 
competition with a group of prosperous and flourishing coffee 
houses that clustered around the Royal Exchange. It is apparent 
that Lloyd's from the beginning was a success, and became one 
of the largest establishments in the vicinity. One of the first 
advertisements mentioning the house to appear, following the 
change to Lombard street, dated in 1692, concerned the sale at 
auction of three ships and their furniture, and gave an intimat­
ion of the trend in the class of business'. At the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, Lloyd's had not yet become a distinct 
insurance center, but was one of a group of prominent coffee
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houses frequented by underwriters. The business of insurance 
was still carried on by merchants, and the brokers had to go 
from office to coffee house, and coffee house to exchange, in
5. the course of carrying out their business of completing policies. 
Iln - this early coffee house of Lloyd's, however, the ground 
was prepared for the sowing of a seed that was to develop into 
one of the greatest insurance institutions in the whole world.
The close of the seventeenth century finds the business 
of insurance still conducted largely on the floor of the Royal 
Exchange, or as often happened carried on directly with individual 
underwriters without reference to the Exchange. There was as 
yet no centralization of the business, and so far as specializat­
ion was concerned it was at this time limited to the brokers. 
Coffee houses were frequented by both insurers, brokers, and the 
insured. Their function was at this time primarily to furnish 
a meeting place for those having common interests, and as a 
source of news. With the turn of the century, however, develop­
ments in the field of Insurance were rapid. Because at this 
point the different branches of insurance merge, the further 
development of marine insurance, during the first decade of the 
eighteenth century is treated in the discussion of the Bubble
52. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 55-6.
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Period., which brings us to the granting of charters to the 
companies organized, to carry on the business of insurance.
2. Life Insurance.
In the order of development, marine insurance was 
first to become permanently established. Following, life 
insurance takes the second position. When the underwriters 
began to write policies upon the lives of individuals is not 
clear. The earliest life insurance policy of which we have 
anj detailed information was made in June of 1583 at the Office
53of Insurance at the Royal Exchange, in London. When this
policy was made, however, life insurance was probably not at 
all uncommon. As a matter of fact we do know that life in­
surance was written many years before this time, for the 
treatise Le Guidon to which reference has already been made, 
while treating mainly of marine insurance does mention life 
insurance. Stating that while life insurance was practiced 
in other nations, it was prohibited to insure the lives of 
persons in France, as contra bonos mores. This form of in­
surance, it was stated, permitted innumerable abuses and frauds,
53. Relton, op. cit.. p. 5, note.
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and it was Lecau.se of these that some of the other nations had 
"been forced to discontinue the practice. It may be that
England was one of the countries in which the practice of in­
suring lives was permitted when Le Guidon was published. In 
any case we have definite evidence of the existence of the 
business in the registering of the policy of 1583.
The circumstances attending the issuance of this eatly 
policy are interesting. On the 18th. of June, 1583, the in­
surance was effected on the life of William Gibbons, for
”tr 383, 6s. 8d, for twelve months. The policy was signed by 
sixteen underwriters, each individually for his own share, and 
the premium charged was 8 percent. The history of this early
undertaking hardly reflects credit upon the business dealings of 
these early underwriters. It so happened that Gibbons died on 
May 29th, 1854, and it would clearly seem that the insurers were 
liable for the amount of the policy. However, they were not 
averse to seeking a way out for themselves, and in an effort to 
save themselves from payment contended that the policy had ex­
pired before the date of Gibbons deatij. Their argument was
based upon the assertion that when they named a period of twelve 
months as the term of the policy, they intended it to run for
54. Walford, op. cit.. v. 4, p. 295. 
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twelve months of twenty-eight days each. Reckoning upon this 
basis Gibbons had outlived the term of his policy, and the under­
writers were thereby not liable for payment under the terms of 
the contract. It is recorded that the law failed to recognize
55 
this quibbling, and the underwriters were obliged to pay.
The business of life insurance had made little progress 
up to the beginning of the eighteenth century. The first life 
policies issued by the chartered companies in 1720 were for a 
term of twelve months, and were based upon little else than 
chance and guess work. The progress of life insurance has 
been made possible through the development of a scientific system 
of probabilities. To the mathmatician of the seventeenth 
century, the business of insurance is indebted for both the 
formulation of the theory of probabilities, and for the compu­
tation and construction of tables of mortality. Without these, 
life insurance in its modern form would not have been possible.
The earliest consideration of probability is to be 
found in the writings of the theologians. They were concerned 
with the course an individual was obliged to follow in cases of
56 doubt concerning the existence, or the application of a law.
55. Street, The London Assurance, p. 15-16.
56. Mercier, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, v.2, p. 261. 
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It was understood that when there was certainty with regard to 
a prohibiting law, all subject to the law were bound to abstain 
from performing suet action as the law forbade. On the other 
end of the scale no obligation existed where there was no law. 
In either of these oases there is no doubt, but certainty. 
Between these two extremes, however, there can be all degrees 
of uncertainty as to the existence or application of a prohibit­
ing law. Doubt in its strict sense is said to exist when there 
are no positive arguments either way, or when the arguments are 
equal. Then there can be a preponderance of opinion in favor of 
the law, with the opposite opinion still probable. The opinion 
favoring one view can be more probable than the opposite, most
57 
probable, or slightly probable.
/
'Out of the problem thus presented grew up the moral 
system termed grobabilism. - Bartholomew Medina, a Dominican 
theologian, was born in 1527 and died in 1581 after a life 
devoted to the teaching of theology at Salamanca, and is usually 
termed the Father of Probabilism. Writers are not in agreement 
upon the question as to whether he introduced the system or merely 
formulated it, when he taught "if an opinion is probable it is
57. Sabetti, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, pp. 43 ff.,
Konings, Theologia Moralis? pp? 23 ff.
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lawful to follow it, even though the opposing opinion is more 
probable." So far as we have any record, however, Medina 
was the first to expound the doctrine.
In the discussion of probabilism, the opinion which 
favors the law is termed the safe opinion, while the opinion 
which favors liberty is termed the less safe. With the rise 
of Ja.nsenism probabilism became a center of controversy. The 
Jansenist theologian Sinnichius, a professor of Louvain, a de­
fender of rigorist doctrines, taught that it was not lawful to 
follow even a most probable opinion in favor of liberty. This 
brings us to the mathematican Blaise Pascal.
Blaise Pascal, "one of the most sublime spirits in
58the world" is known to literature as one of the greatest 
Frenchmen of the seventeenth century. His fame would rest
, secure on his writings alone, but he was moreover a scientific
59 investigator, a great-mathematician, and a theologian. While 
he is noted particularly for his works in the field of mathe­
matics, in 1646 becoming a member of the Jansenists he devoted 
a great part of his time to religious study. In 1650, on the 
advice of physicians, he withdrew from active pursuits because
58. Smith, History of Mathematics, p. 381, quoting Bayle: 
Dictionaire, iv, 500.
59. Pascal, Provincial Letters., Preface, p. 9. 
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of failing health. In 1654 abandoning all of his mathematical 
and scientific studies he devoted himself entirely to religion 
and became a regular guest at the Abbey of Port Royal a center 
of Jansenism.
Perhaps the most famous of the literary works of 
Pascal are his Provincial Letters, or Letters from a Provincial 
to one of his friends, and to the Reverend Fathers, the Jesuits. 
In the work he bitterly attacked the Jesuits, and made bitter 
accusations against them. Parts of two of the letters he
60devotes to the system of probabilism. The Letters are held
one of the most brilliant pieces of writing that France had to 
that time produced, and their satire, charm, and eloquence 
attracted multitudes of readers. Because of the emphasis they 
gave to the question of probabilism,' it may be stated that with 
the publication of the Provincial Letters the question of pro­
bability was taken from the discussions of the monasteries and 
schools of theology and brought to the attention of the world.
While the Provinvial Letters brought the question of 
probability to the attention of the world, we owe much more than 
this to Pascal. It is to him we are obligated for the first 
explicit formulation of the principle >f recurrence, stated in
60. Ibid., pp. 82 ff., pp. 99 ff
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a tract called The Arithmetic Triangle published in 1654.
It has been found upon investigation, however, that the material 
in this tract was also contained in the correspondence between 
Pascal and Fermat regarding a problem in gambling, and the 
material here discovered is now regarded as the point of beginn-
6”
ing from which developed the mathematical theory of probabilities.
Pierre de Fermat, like Pascal was one of the most
noted mathematicians of his time. He was a counselor of the 
Parliament of Toulouse, an office of no great importance. He 
is said to have given no serious consideration to mathematics 
until after he was thirty years of age, yet was destined to be 
one of the greatest writers on the theory of numbers. Publishing 
little on his own account his discoveries exist in the form of
• marginal notes, or are made known through his letters to Pascal,
■ Descartes, and others.6^
The correspondence between Pascal and Fermat which 
gave rise to the development of the theory of probabilities had 
to do with a problem proposed by a gambler regarding the divis­
ion of stakes in an unfinished match. The problem is stated:
fl 1 it An -hha •mim'hAV nf nnintfi nAnpfiftarv t.n finich -hViA rrpma anH thp 
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game is interrupted, requires two points to win while his 
opponent B needs three. It can be seen that the game oan be 
decided in not over four more trials, for if B should win the 
first two and lose the next two A will secure the necessary 
score. If B wins the first two, and either the third or 
fourth B will win. By no shifting of the possible arrange­
ment of scores will there be more than four more trials.
Fermat in determining the chances of each player takes two 
letters, a and b and writes down all the possible combinations 
that can be formed by four of them as follows:- aaaa, aaab,aaba, 
aabb, abaa.... bbbb, and finds the total possibilities to be
sixteen in number. He then takes his array and determines 
which of the cases are favorable to A and which to B. Because 
A needs two successful’ trials to win, he determines that those 
cases where a appears two or more -times are favorable to A, and 
by the same reasoning where b occurs three or more times, those 
cases are favorable to B. Upon inspection of the sixteen cases, 
it appears that there are eleven favorable to A, with five favor­
able to B. The stakes, therefore, are in this 'instance to be 
divided in the proportion of eleven to five. There was another 
problem considered which concerned itself with the probability 
of throwing a six with a die in eight throws. Fermat apparently 
carried the work no further, but Pasca.1 developed the work,
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carrying his researches to other and more difficult cases.
The theory thus evolved has, in the field of insurance,
proved to be an instrument of incalculable importance. The 
measure of probability is expressed algebraicly by means of a 
fraction whose numerator is the number of favorable (or unfav­
orable) possibilities, and whose denominator is the number of 
all possible cases. Using the following notation, in which 
n represents the number of ways an event can occur, a of which 
are to be considered as favorable and b as unfavorable, then
El the probability of £ a favorable outcome can be expressed.p=^
Id and the probability of an unfavorable outcome is written p=j
. A simple illustration of the formula is found in the experiment 
of tossing a coin. There are but two ways in which a coin 
may fall, either head' up, or tail up. The probability that 
it will fall head is found by using the number of possible
successful chances as the numerator of the fraction, and the 
total number of chances as the denominator, and we have the
probability of tossing a head
64 will fall tail is the same.
aged 35 will live 10 years is
the American Experience Table
as -g-. The probability that it
The probability that a man 
according to the data taken from
74173
of Mortality the ratio 81822 •
63. Sullivan, History of Mathematics in Europe, pp. 68-9.
64. Mills, Statistical Methods, p. 516.
208
According to the table of 51,822 men living at the age of 35 
there are living 10 years later 74,173. That is there are 
74,173 chances of success, which number is used as the numer­
ator of the fraction, and 81,822 the total number of chances
65is the denominator. The value of the theory of probabili­
ties to the science of insurance, it can readily be seen, is 
dependent upon the accuracy of statistical data.
John DeWitt, a Dutchman, was the first to apply the 
doctrine of probabilities to the subject of life annuities, in 
a report made to his government. Here for the first time were
66•used mathematical calculations. The government in April,
1671 decided to raise funds through the medium of life annuities, 
and in July the report of DeWitt was presented, explaining the 
basis upon which such an enterprise could with success be carried 
out. In the process of formulation df his theory of annuities, 
DeWitt not only applied the principle of probabilities and 
compound discount in the ascertainment of the annuity value, 
but he also invented a mortality table based upon a plan of
67
equal decrements. Actual statistical data, however, was
still lacking.
65. Ibid., p. 522.
66. Mason.-op. cit., p. 76-7.
67. Dawson, Development of Insurance mathematics, in Yale Readings, 
v. 1., p. 99.
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The first steps in this direction grew out of the 
terror inspired by the great plague. The '’sweating sickness" 
which caused, death in a few hours carried, off thousands, and. 
there were numerous visitations previous to 1665 causing great 
destruction of life. Rumors, then as now were exagerated, 
and in order to reassure a public whose morale was being under­
mined, the government ordered the various parishes to issue 
bills of mortality. These bills, however, had a grave defect 
as a basis for insurance calculations. A statement was included 
giving the cause of death, but not the age. For scientific 
computation this was fatal. Bills of mortality were issued
in London as early as 1562. The beginning of the weekly
69 
issuance of bills by order of Elizabeth is placed at 1594.
The first, so far as we know, to turn his attention 
to an analysis of the bills of mortality was John Graunt, and 
his work constituted one of the outstanding contributions to 
the science of insurance. He gave considerable thought to 
the population figures, and in 1661 there appeared the first 
edition of his work entitled Natural and Political Observations 
mentioned in the following Index, and made upon the Bills of
68. Mason, op. cit., p. 78.
69. Walford, bp. cit., v. 1, p. 283.
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Mortality, chiefly with Reference to the Government, Religion, 
Trade, Growth, Air, Diseases, and the Several Changes of the 
said City. The work attracted wide attention at the time
of its publication, and a second edition was published in 1662, 
followed by a third in 1665. While the book was not received 
with favor by many, for one reason because Graunt placed the 
population of London at 384,000 when it had Heretofore been 
measured in millions, nevertheless his work came to the atten­
tion of Charles II and this monarch recommended the writer to 
the Royal Society.
Among a large number of interesting problems consid­
ered in this work, we are interested in the mortality table 
which he presented. He computed that seven men out of every 
hundred lived to be seventy, of that number only one will be 
alive at 76, and none at 80, while thirty-six died before the 
age of 6. He then made a table showing in 229,250 deaths, 
the cause of each. This work of Graunt’s is the first sem-
70 
blance of a mortality table we have in modern times.
The next to study the question of mortality was Sir 
William Petty. He wrote An Essay on Arithmetic concerning the
70. Mason, op. cit., pp. 80 ff. Walford, op. cit., v. 5, p. 538
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Growth of the City of London, with the Measures, Periods, 
Causes and Consequences thereof. In this work he estimated
the population of the city to he 670,000 in 1682, it having 
doubled in the previous forty years. He was at a loss to
account for this growth, but predicted that the world would 
be fully peopled in the next 2,000 years and that the growth 
of the city of London must stop pf its own accord before the
71year 1800. Among his other works he carried forward a
table based upon results deduced from the London Bills of Mor­
tality for a period of eighteen years, 1665-82 inclusive.
The worses of Petty and Gruant exerted a wide influence both in 
England and on the Continent, and doubtless were instrumental 
in bringing about needed amendments to the Bills of Mortality, 
and more exact registrations of births and deaths. In 1728 
not only the causes of the death, but the ages of the deceased 
were included in the records.
In 1693 the final step was made with the construction 
of a mortality table from actual data scientifically arranged. 
In that year Halley, known for his work in Mathematics, and 
more particularly as an astronomer, published in a pamphlet a 
table of probabilities of the duration of human life at every
71. Mason, op. cit., p. 84.
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age. Unlike Oraunt and Petty, whose tables were .only approx­
imations because the Bills of Mortality from which they computeci 
did. not record the ages of death, Halley had secured some definite 
data. It was found that in the City of Breslau, in Silesia, 
records were kept which showed, among other data, the age of 
the deceased at death. This was exactly the data for which 
the scientific men of the time interested in this field had been 
searching. A member of the Royal Society made application
in 1692 for copies of these records, and copies of the registers 
for a period of five years 1687-91 were obtained. The lists 
showed a total of 6193 births, and 5869 deaths.
At this time Dr. Halley’s reputation as a mathematical! 
had already won for him great recognition, and he was selected 
as the one most competent to work with the materials thus obtained. 
The results of this work were published in 1693 in a paper sub­
mitted to the Royal Society under the title:- An Estimate of the 
degrees of the Mortality of Mankind, drawn from curious Tables 
of the births and funerels of the Pity of Breslau; with an attempt 
to ascertain the price of annuities upon lives. Halley assumed 
in his computations a stationary population, and proceeded to 
construct his mortality table from the record of deaths, showing 
the dimunition of the number of lives each year out of an original
72group.
72. Walford, op. cit., v. 1, p. 106.
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Halley’s table was arranged in a form that showed how many 
out of the group of 1,000 at the age of one might be expected 
to survive at a given year. Likewise of the number surviving 
at any given year, it could be determined how many of them might 
be expected to survive at any subsequent year. From his table 
the chances of living and dying for all ages might easily be/
determined. The number of expectant survivors represented the 
chances of living, and the remainder, -or those who were not ex­
pected to survive, the chances of death. This work of Dr. 
Halley’s marked an important contribution to the development of 
Insurance science, and it is to this work that actuarial science 
is•heavily indebted.
The next great advance, and the final one to be here 
considered takes us into the early part of the eighteenth century 
when Abraham de Moivre in 1725 published his work on life annui­
ties which appeared under the title:- Annuities upon Lives; or 
the valuation of Annuities upon any number of lives; and also of 
Reversions. Preceeding the publication of this work in
1725 de Moivre had already distinguished himself in the field . 
of mathematics. Although born in France, from the age of 18 
he lived in London, and supported himself largely by priva.te 
teaching, lecturing, and solving mathematical puzzles. Because 
of straightened circumstances he was unable to devote his time
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entirely to study, and is said to have spent a large part of 
his time in a London coffee house, where he picked up sufficient 
funds to meet his needs in solving problems. Among his earlier 
works is to be found a paper De Mensura Sortis, submitted to the 
Royal Society in 1710, and enlarged into a book in 1718 under 
the title The Doctrine of Chances. The work published in
1725 made practical application of his learning in determining
73 
the values of life leases and other life annuities.
When de Moivre turned his attention to the values of 
annuities, the mathematicians had already worked out methods for 
arriving at the summation of a series, whem the elements follow 
some mathematical law. De Moire was keen enough to see
that it would be a comparatively simple matter to compute annuity 
values if a mortality table could be shown to follow a mathe­
matical law. With this idea in mind, he studied the Breslau 
table of Halley, and found within reasonable limits, that for a 
considerable period, and possibly for the whole span, the number 
that survived to each year, out of a given number starting from 
the earliest age of the table, was a term in a decreasing arith-
74metical series. Working from this point he developed the
hypothesis that bears his name, and which is briefly expressed 
as follows: Of 86 persons, one dies every year until all are
73. Smith, History of Mathematics, p. 450, Walford, op, cit., 
v.2, p. 180.
74. Dawson, op, cit., p. 101.
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extinct. - The hypothesis assumed, that each year the number of 
deaths would be the same, but this number would each year be a 
larger proportion of the survivors, who it will be seen were
75diminishing each year. Thus the probability of death
would each year become greater, not because of any increase in 
the annual number of deaths in the group, but because of the 
steady decrease in the survivors, who constituted the denomi-
76
nator in the probability ratio. The value in arranging
a mortality table in an arithmetical series, for the purposes 
of. computation, is readily seen. De Moivre continued to 
elaborate upon his work, and included in his computation not 
only the element of probability as determined from the mortality 
tables, but also the factor of interest in the form of discount. 
With de Moivre, we are on the threshold of the scientific develop­
ment of statistics as applied to insurance. An able and far
■ seeing worker, his accomplishments in the field of mathematics 
won him widespread recognition, and he was admitted to member­
ship in the Royal Society and into the academies of Paris and 
Berlin. We may leave insurance mathematics at this point, 
for the further developments that followed take us into the more 
modern contributions to the ecience.
75. Walford, op. cit., v. 2, p. 181, and v. 1., p. 122.
76. Dawson, op. cit., p. 101.
216
While life insurance, up to the early part of the 
eighteenth century was largely in the hands of individual 
underwriters, and policies were written ordinarily for a single 
year, there was a mutual association formed during this period 
that enjoyed a long and successful existence. The formation 
of this society dates back to the 24th. of January, 1705. The 
promoters obtained a charter from Queen Anne the following July 
and they and their successors were incorporated under the name 
of the Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office, The 
principle feature of the insurance element is to be found in the 
amount of the death benefit. A certain amount was set aside 
to be divided among the representatives of the deceased. The 
larger the number of deaths in a given year, the smaller would 
be the benefit each would receive. The element of certainty 
was entirely lacking. There was no limitation as to the age 
of those who might participate, nor was there any difference in 
the amount paid for membership by those of different ages, and 
the benefits were the same for all who died in any given year. 
There appears to have been some concern, however, in selecting 
the applicants for policies. Those who wished to become members 
of the association were required to appear personally before the 
members of the board of directors for questioning. Each
director might put such questions as he wished, and upon the 
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withdrawal of the applicant, gave hie opinion of the eligibility 
of the candidate. There was no formal medical examination.
The society did, in the course of time, recognize certain hazar­
dous occupations as disqualifying for membership. Among
these were foreign residence, and members of the army or navy. 
The society thus organized continued its operations for one
77hundred and sixty-one years.
Life insurance in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century merges with the other forms of insurance^ Any further 
study of the subject finds its treatment with the general con­
sideration of the development of insurance during the first 
quarter of that century. Up to this point the recorded con­
tributions to the actual development of life insurance have 
been slight. The developments of the mathematicians, how­
ever, which had not yet been to an appreciable extent applied, 
represent a turning point in the history of all insurance.
3. Fire Insurance.
Friday, September 2, 1666, murks the date of the Great 
Fire. It is also an important landmark in the development of
77. Walford, op. cit., v. 1., pp. 74 ff 
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the business of fire insurance. It is hardly correct to say 
that fire insurance dates from that day, though the stimulus 
that the fire gave to the introduction and growth of the idea 
is not to be denied. A consideration of the eafly attempts 
to establish a means for effecting fire insurance indicates how 
little known and poorly understood was the idea, but it like­
wise indicates that it did not originate with the London fire 
of ’66.
For example in the early part of the century the 
proposal was made that all proprietors of land should insure 
the houses of their subjects against fire, in return for the 
payment of a premium that should be a percentage of their value. 
The originator of this idea presented it for consideration to 
Count Anthony Gunther von Oldenburg in 1609. It was his idea, 
considering the number of fires and property lost thereby, that 
the Count might, after showing.his subjects the danger of such 
losses, propose to them that he would upon receipt of a specified 
annual payment agree to pay the amount of the loss to those 
whose property should be damaged by fire. The proposal called 
for the placing of a valuation upon the property, and to pay at 
the rate of lfo for the insurance. Fire from any cause was 
apparently to justify a claim, with one exception mentioned, 
that arising out of the misfortunes of war.
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The originator of the plan was quite confident that 
over a period of years it would prove profitable for the in­
surers. While it would probably be true that losses would be 
heavy at first, he thought a calculation of the number of houses 
consumed over a long period would show that the losses were by 
a considerable margin less than the premiums collected. He 
also recognized the value of careful underwriting, for he did 
not recommend that all the houses in each town be accepted for 
insurance, but that the risks be selected. He does not in­
timate upon what basis the selection was to be made, but does 
state that indiscriminate acceptance might result in unduly large 
claims.
The Count evidently gave the matter serious consider­
ation, but eventually decided against entering into the venture. 
This decision was founded, as it happens, not upon his finding 
any fault with the plan, but because it seemed to him that 
Providence might be tempted. He felt, moreover, that his 
subjects might be displeased, and forming improper ideas of his 
conduct accuse him of avarice. "God," he is reputed to have
said, "had without such means preserved and blessed for many cen­
turies the ancient house of Oldenburg; and he would still be 
present with him, through His mercy, and protect his subjects 
from destructive fires." Because of these scruples he rejected
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the scheme, but in dismissing the author of the idea, it is
78 reported that he rewarded him liberally.
Turning from continental Europe to Great Britain, 
we find under date of 1635 a petition addressed to Charles I, 
in which his attention is invited to the suffering caused from 
losses by fire. The petitioner, whose name by the way does 
not appear, prays that the King grant him authority to insure 
against losses from this cause. The petition carried with 
it an agreement for a payment to the King, and an upper limit 
for rates. This petition is considered to be a preliminary 
draft, submitted for consideration. In 1638, hox^ever,
William Ryley and Edward Mabb petitioned the King to grant them 
a patent to run for a term of 41 years, permitting them to in­
sure against losses from fire in accordance with a set of pro­
positions which they annexed to their petition. In tracing 
the development of the fire insurance idea, we are interested 
in the term of these early proposals. They state;-
'•Propositions touching the prevention of fires in 
London and the parts and suburbs thereof. The 
owners or inhabitants of houses within the City and 
suburbs of Lond., together with the Citty of West­
minster and Borrough of Southwake, paying 12 pence 
per ann. for every, house yielding 1^20 yearly rent, if more or less after the rate or 12 pence yearly ’ 
for every it 20: shall have his house or houses re- 
edified according to His Majesty’s proclamation, and 
sett in as good or better state as they were before 
in case any loss or casualtie by fire shall happen 
73. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 439
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unto them. For security hereof there shall be de­
posited Jr 5000 into the Chamber of Lond. which shall 
continually lay wholly and entire to receive for int. 
i. 5 in the Jr 100, which increase shall runne until it 
shall amount to L- 10,000. And there shall also be 
kept a continual watch in all parts of the Citty and 
suburbs all night, that if any fire should break forth 
it may presently be espied. And engines shall be made 
and kept in every ward thereof to be ready at hand for 
the quenching of the same, and the watch brought 
speedily to the fire, and those severall watchers in 
every ward shall speedily repayre themselves to assist 
where the fire shall be. Reserved of water shall be 
made in convenient places for sudden use." 79’
The petition was referred to the Attorney General, who approved
of the plan. There is no evidence however, that it ever 
became operative.
On the continent, however, fire insurance was known
and practiced. Relton, quoting Beckman, who wrote in 1781, .
refers to the institution of insurance offices to indemnify
losses sustained by fire, and calls them a most useful imitation 
of marine insurance. Beckman states that so far as he is able 
to learn, fire insurance offices were first formed toward the 
middle of the century before he wrote, though he adds, houses 
were insured by individuals much earlier. Commenting upon 
this statement,’ Relton says that a German writing in a general 
way might fairly be presumed to draw his information from German
79. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 440
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sources, and. that possibly his opinion was based, upon some 
transaction in his own country of which knowledge has been 
lost. We have no idea, he adds, that his statement applied
80in any way to England. It is possible that Beckman had
reference to some of the early German gilds that ^ere in some 
instances converted into distinct insurance associations. An 
instance in point is the Feuer Oasse at Hamburg, said to be 
one of the earliest distinct Fire Insurance Associations of 
which there is any knowledge. This association was the out­
growth of a merger in 1676, of several small Brandgilden (Fire 
Gilds) that had as early as 1591 entered into Fuer Contracts 
for mutual insurance. There were fire gilds in Schleswig- 
Holstein in the early part of the fifteenth century, in the 
form of local mutual fire insurance associations on the state
81
or municipal plan. There seems to be no evidence that
the gilds in England developed into distinct insurance assoc­
iations, nor that any fire insurance association following the 
decline of the gilds, had become fairly established previous 
to the fire of 1666.
September 2, 1666 marks the date of this conflagration, 
and so great was the calamity that the anniversary was observed 
as a Fast Bay fof over a. hundred years. The fire burned for
80. Relton, op. cit., p. 18.
81. Relton, op. cit., p. 7. 
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four days end nights, and its destruction spread over 436 acres 
of the city’s area. Over 85% of the buildings of the city 
were estimated destroyed, with a property loss estimated at ten
82 million pounds. The blow staggered the city and the king­
dom, and it is not surprising that the attention of business 
interests was then drawn to the field of fire insurance.
Immediately following the fire, it is reported that
83 mutual insurance groups were formed to effect fire insurance. 
These societies granted insurance, not exceeding five hundred 
pounds on a single risk, and continued in active business for a 
considerable period.
In 1667 Dr. Nicholas Barbon opened his office for the 
insuring of houses and buildings against loss from fire. Dr. 
Barbon, having failed in the practice of medicine, for which 
profession he was educated, turned to building, and was one of 
the first of the builders to engage in extensive operations 
following the fire. He became involved in numerous financial 
and business schemes, one of them being insurance, and died in 
1698 heavily in debt, leaving a stipulation in his will that his 
executor should never pay his debts, a stipulation which the 
executor, after reading the will to the creditors, promised re­
ligiously to fulfill. Our interest in Barbon centers in the
82. Bissell, History of Fire Insurance in Europe. In Yale Res.d- 
ings, v. 2, p. 61, also Pepys1 Diary, Sept.2,1666, et. ff.
83. Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 441.
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fact that he was the first projector of fire insurance in
84 
England who succeeded in bringing his scheme to maturity.
In the beginning Barbon carried on his business as an individual, 
and in principle his policies were the same as the marine policies 
of the time, that is policies underwritten by individuals.
Barbon’s office merged in 1680 into The Fire Office,
in which he joined with himself several others in the organizat­
ion of the first joint-stock proprietary company for fire insur-
85 
ance in London, and probably the first of its kind in the world.
The name assumed by the company was The Fire Office, thought it
was for a considerable period commonly known as The Insurance
Office at the backside of the Royal Exchange. A significant
reference to this company is found in the advertisement appearing 
in the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, of May 7, 1680.
The advertisement states
"There is a new office to be kept at the backside of 
the Royal Exchange, London, and will be opened on 
Thursday next. They do undertake for a very reasonable 
rate to secure the houses in London and the suburbs 
thereof from fire, and if burnt down to build them 
again at the cost of the office, for which end is pro­
vided a considerable bank of money, and a fund of free 
land, to such a value as will secure those that agree 
with the office. There being now in print a particular 
thereof, we need not give you any further account." 86
The company continued in business for a considerable time, and
in 1705, adopting the name Phenix Office from the mark it placed
84. Relton, op. cit., p. 21.
85. Ibid., p. 28.
86. Quoted by Walford, op. cit., v. 3, p. 444. 
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upon buildings that it insured, and operations were then carried 
on under that name. The date when this office discontinued
86 
business is unknown.
In 1683 there appeared the proposals for a new society 
to provide protection, but this society unlike Barbon’s was 
organized on a mutual basis. The proposal was entitled:- 
A Proposal of a New Way or Method for Securing Houses from any 
Considerable Loss by Fire, by Way of Subscription and Mutual 
Contribution. The project was to be known as the Friendly 
Society. The following year the original proposals were 
amended, and the mutual insurance association was launched. In 
accordance with the proposals of the society issued in 1684, 
every person becoming a member was obliged to obligate himself 
by subscribing an instrument to submit to a tax or assessment 
limited to 30s for every hundred pounds of insurance. This 
money the assured is to retain, but makes a deposit of 6s. 8d 
to remain in the hands of the association as a pledge. There 
follow other clauses providing for the profits of the undertakers, 
expenses and the like, and give the basis for estimating the
87 
necessary contributions. De Foe is his Essay on Projects,
86. Quoted by Walford, op, cit., v. 3., p. 444.
87. Relton, op, cit., p. 58., Walford, op. cit., v.3., p. 456. 
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after having mentioned Barbon’s office, in connection with his 
discussion of the origin of fire insurance, says that this 
office was soon followed by another, where all who subscribed 
pay their quota to build up any man’s house who is a contributor, 
If it shall happen to be burned. It was said that considerable 
rivalry existed between this new organization and the older 
Fire Office. The age old controversy that wages today, was 
at its height, and hinged upon the question as to whether mutual 
or non-mutual insurance was the superior. Sensing the contro­
versy, De Foe states that while he will not decide which is the 
best, or which succeeds the best, he is willing to venture the
88 
opinion that the mutual form brings most money to the contriver.
Just as with The Fire Office we had the first non- 
mutual insurance society, so the Friendly Society was the first 
mutual fire insurance association. The time when the society 
ceased to do business, and the circumstances of its ending, are 
both shrouded in uncertainty. There is a reference made to 
it in a digest of the laws of insurance published in 1781, and 
it is believed that possibly because of depleted funds after the 
fires that occured during the years from 1784 to 1786 the company 
sought to strengthen its proposition in a merger. It is stated 
that in 1714 the society was absorbed into another organization
88. Relton, op. cit., p. 62.
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the beginning of mutual fire insurance associations in England.
known as the Union. The Friendly Society may be said to mark
89
Between the scheme of Barbon, that became the Fire
Office and the establishing of the Friendly Society, the corporat-
ion of the city of London went into the business of issuing fire
policies A considerable business was written, but the under­
taking was short lived, and just a year and a month after the
authorities had entered upon the venture, they decided to abandon
the business and the Chamberlain
advanced and
was ordered to return the premiums
90 cancel the outstanding policies.
We come now to the first of these early societies that
survived into the period
In 1696 the Hand in Hand
in which modern insurance was developed 
mutual insurance office was opened.
The original title of the organization was Contributors for insur­
ing Houses, Chambers, or rooms from loss by Fire, by Amicable 
Contribution within the cities of London and Westminster and the 
liberties thereof, and the places thereunto adjoining. The 
title was afterward shortened to the Amicable Contributors for
Insuring from loss by Fire, and after a final trimming it was 
reduced to the brief Amicable Contributorship. It was not 
until 1706 or thereabouts that the name Hand in Hand attached
itself to the company. This name probably grew out of a reference
89. Relton, op. cit., p. 68.
90. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 455. 
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to the emblem or trad.e-me.rk of the company which consisted of 
two clasped hands. The name was not formally adopted by the
91 
company until considerably later, probably about 1713-4.
Because this was the oldest of these early companies to survive 
int<5 modern times, the Hand in Hand has sometimes been referred 
to as the first fire office to transact business in England.
This,however, is not the case, for policies were actually written 
by Dr. Barbon, both as an individual and through The Fire Office, 
as well as by the corporation of London and the Friendly Society. 
This Hand in Hand fire office is not to be confused with the 
American company of the same name, though it served as its model. 
The American company was not organized until 1752. Like its 
English model it began with a long cumbersome name, that was 
eventually shortened to the Philadelphia Oontributionship, 
adopting however the plan and badge of the older company, and 
was known as the Hand in Hand. This was the first fire insur­
ance company to be started in America, and is today one of the
92 outstanding institutions in the field.
Up to the time of the organization of the Hand in Hand 
the business of fire insurance was confined entirely to the in­
suring of buildings. It was not until 1704 that the idea was
91. Relton, op. cit.. p. 71., Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 460.
92. Gray, One Hundred Years, pp. 42-3., Gall and Jordan, One 
Hundred Years of Fire Insurance, pp. 12-3.
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extended to the insurance of goods. It is recorded that at 
this time there was founded the Lombard House, in Duke street, 
Westminster, and had for one of its aims the insuring of house­
hold furniture and stocks of merchandise from loss by fire. 
This was a mutual insurance venture adopted by an organization 
that had the previous year been organized under the name of the
93Charitable Corporation. The original idea of the corporation 
was to lend small sums of money to the poor, and it received a 
charter from Queen Anne in 1707. The insurance feature of the 
organization, because it represents the first attempt to extend 
the idea of fire insurance to household furniture, or to mer­
chandise, is of particular interest. The company operated 
by requiring a deposit, depending upon the amount of coverage 
the insured desired. This deposit was to be returned at the 
end of the policy term to the insured with interest, the pro 
rata share of all losses occuring during that time first being 
deducted. It is interesting to note the optimism of the pro­
moters of the scheme. The organizers expected to be able to 
more than meet such losses as would happen from the interest on 
the insurance fund. Losses they believed would be small, for
93. Walford, op. cit., p. 3., p. 463. 
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among the other precautions, the company had provided " a 
competent number of watermen with coats and silver badges" 
who were to attend fires and help to remove the insured goods 
to a place of safety. In addition, warehouses were provided 
in all sections of the city, to which goods that were insured 
might be sent, when in danger, and left thereuntil the danger 
had passed, without any charge to the assured. While in the 
agreement there was a liability on the part of the assured to 
further contributions, the sponsors of the idea were of the 
opinion that the need for such an assessment seemed hardly 
probable. So far as the rates were concerned, there seems to 
have been no distinction between classes of goods, but there 
was a provision that goods in timber houses should pay double 
the rates provided in the proposals. While the first to write 
fire Insurance on merchandise, this association made no lasting 
mark in the business of insurance.
We next come to the name of Charles Povey, inseparably 
associated with the development of the modern business of fire 
insurance. Povey appears on the scene around 1706, and the 
period between that date and 1710 marks a turning point in the 
history of fire insurance. It was possibly in 1706 that Povey 
set in motion his project for writing fire insurance, that was 
known as the Exchange House Fire Office, and was located in
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Hatton Garden. Relton is not certain that the business of
fire insurance was actually commenced at this time, and basing 
his conclusion upon references in Povey’s secret history, places 
the date of beginning of the fire business at 1707-8. Accord­
ing to Relton, in 1706, Povey started the Traders1 Exchange 
House, for insuring lives, and it was after this probably, that 
the fire insurance scheme was set on foot. Though it may have 
been planned in 1706, the fire business was probably not in
95
operation until 1707-8. The first of Povey’s fire offices
was organized to write business in the city, and the policies 
were issued by himself. The office was essentially a one 
man affair. This earlier city office was followed by another 
undertaking, known as the Exchange House, Fire Offices in the 
Country. The exact date of the beginning of this office is
96 
surrounded in obscurity, but is placed by Relton in 1708-9.
Povey as was the custom adopted an emblem for his company, and 
for this purpose used a figure of the sun. Just as in the 
case of the Amicable Contributionship, the company was eventually 
known as the Hand in Hand from its emblem, so Povey’s office 
became known from its mark as the Sun Fire Office.
94. Walford, op, cit., v. 3., p. 465.
95. Relton, op. cit., p. 261.
96. Relton, op. cit., p. 268.
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Povey, however, soon found, the business of fire in­
surance more of an undertaking than was suited to the assets of 
a single individual. From the evidence, it appears that his 
early ventures were not entirely profitable, and he then pro­
jected a company to take over his ventures, upon terms it is 
to be presumed that reflected to his advantage. In 1709 the 
Company of London Insurers was in the process of organization, 
but it was not until the following yea.r that organization was 
completed and the new company ready for business. The new 
company absorbed the two Exchange House Offices, and on April 7, 
1710, the deed of co-partnership of the new company was executed, 
and the business of fire insurance had turned a corner, and this 
date stands as another important landmark in the history of the
97 
business. The Sun Fire Office, or the Company of London
Assurers marks the beginning of fire underwriting by non-mutua.l 
companies, and this company organized in 1710, is today the old­
est non-mutual fire insurance company in the world.
Because the company marks a turning point in the de­
velopment of the business of fire insurance, we are interested 
in some of the details effecting the organization. The preamble 
to the deed of co-partnership stated that the Company of London 
Assurers had set up an office of insurance named the Sun Fire
97. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 467.
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Office, within the cities of London and Westminster, and the 
Liberties thereof, and that proposals had been published, and 
that the company intended to carry on the business of insurance 
in all parts of Great Britain and Ireland. The organizers of 
the company agreed that the number of members or partners should 
never exceed twenty-four, and that if any right or interest in 
any of these partnerships should devolve upon a "female or infant" 
she or it should while owners of the share appoint some one to 
act in their stead. All losses were to be equally borne by 
the members, and expenses are to be likewise apportioned. Calls 
were to be made when necessary, and profits equally divided 
among members. There were regulations as to meetings, the 
making of by-laws, fines, committee rules, the appointment of 
a treasurer and secretary, and other such details. While there 
was a power granted to transfer shares, there was no right of
98
survivorship.
The first contracts of this association with the 
assured provided for the payment of losses up to five hundred 
pounds, but only upon the condition that there be a sufficient 
sum of money in the bank to satisfy all the claims arising from 
that quarter, otherwise but a proportionate part was to be paid.
98. Relton, op. cit. , pp. 277-8. 
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By the terms of the first set of proposals, hated. April 10, 
1710, provision was made to reserve out of the quarterly pay­
ments received, Poth in London and all parts of Great Britain, 
an amount that was deemed to be more than sufficient according 
to careful calculations, to make good each sufferer’s whole loss 
and damage. It was provided that the money thus reserved 
should be equally divided among the sufferers in proportion 
to the amount of their losses, but not in any case to exceed 
five hundred pounds on each policy. There was nothing in the 
policy that pledged the twenty-four members to contribute to 
losses, and under the terms of the proposals Insufficiency of 
funds to meet claims left the assured definitely the loser, 
for the policy holders were excluded from contribution.
This exclusion thus expressed: "No person insured shall ever 
be liable to make any further payment or allowance towards 
repairing the Loss and Damage of any Sufferer." definitely
99 
removed this insurance project out of the mutual classification. 
Because of this limitation on the payment of losses, it is easy 
to see that in the event of a serious fire in any given quarter, 
the policy holders might be heavy losers. As a matter of fact, 
it is believed, however, that the company from the beginning
100paid all losses in full. The fact, however, that an option
99. Relton, op. cit., p. 279.
100. Walford, op. cit., p. 3, p. 468. 
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was left to the company to pay only so much of the losses as 
the reserve fund permitted, made the policy an unsatisfactory 
form. - This fact was early recognized by the officials of the 
company and a change was made. In 1715, or thereabouts, the 
old arrangement was discontinued, and a new policy was issued, 
in which the company bound themselves to satisfy the assured's 
entire loss, up to the limit of the policy, which was still not
101to exceed five hundred pounds.
From the very beginning the company took a leading 
position in the business of fire insurance. It was the first 
company to undertake the insurance of merchandise and household
102 furniture, as well as buildings, throughout England. By
1720 the company had reached a point in its development where 
it had outstanding nearly 20,000 policies, and insured approx­
imately ten million pounds sterling.. This amount was deemed 
too great a risk for twenty-four persons, and with the business 
still growing it was decided to divide each share into one 
hundred parts, with the arrangement that the original members 
might sell as many of the new shares as they deemed wise. The 
active management of the company was kept, however, in the hands 
of twenty-four members. TheJLr capacity was now changed from
101. Relton, op. cit., p. 237.
102. Walford, op. cit., v. 3., p. 468.
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that of the original board, where each represented his own in­
terests, but under the new organization, the new board had the
103 same powers and authority as the original members. The
name of the company was eventually changed to the Sun Insurance 
Office. The partnership organization was abandoned, in 1726, 
with the formation of a joint stock company, with the capital
104 stock divided into shares.
The organization of the Sun brings us to the threshold 
of modern fire insurance practice. The Sun, if we were to trace 
its development, would in fact bring us down to the present time. 
During this early period which we have just considered, there 
were other companies. We have, however, considered those 
that mark turning points, or decided contributions in the de­
velopment of the insurance idea. From this point on, the 
different branches of insurance thus far developed, marine, 
life, and fire, either merge or overlap, and must now be con­
sidered together.
4'. The OharteredOemp&Biee'.
The second decade of the eighteenth century will
always be remembered as an era of stark speculative madness.
103. Relton, op. cit., p. 287.
104. Walford, op. cit.. v. 3., pp. 478-9.
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Strange as it may seem, when the bubbles had burst, and the 
wreckage had cleared away, we find the business of insurance 
in the final stages of the development that carried it to the 
threshold of modern times. In fact, if a date can be named 
that marks the beginning of insurance as practiced today, that 
date may be fixed at the close of the Bubble period, with the 
granting of Royal Charters to the London Assurance and the 
Royal Exchange.
In the early years of the eighteenth century, John 
Law, a Scotchman, held at one time in a London Prison under 
sentence of death for murder, escaped to Paris, and there or­
ganised the now famous Missippi Company. France was gripped 
by a furor of speculative madness. Closely following the 
schemes of Law in France, came the huge South Sea Bubble in 
England, attended by a speculative mania that held in its grip 
the people of all stations and classes.
The South Sea Company was organized in 1711 by Robert 
Harley, Earl of Oxford, to take over England's floating debt 
of ten million pounds. While the government guaranteed a 
return of six percent for a term of years, the important feature 
of the venture that lent it its speculative flavor was the grant 
of the monoply of trade with the southern Atlantic coa.sts of 
America. The project, it may be stated, met with strenous
238
opposition on the part of some of the cooler heads associated 
with the government. The speculative fever, it seems, had 
already commenced its work, and reason and speculation have never 
been known to go hand in hand. And so the South Sea Company 
was founded.
Crowds swarmed to Change Alley, and stock prices 
began to soar. So loud was the uproar, and so great was the 
confusion that attended the mad scramble of the multitudes 
seeking the path to quick and easy riches, it has been stated, 
that the market was at times in utter confusion. The soaring 
market for the South Sea Stock, however, soon carried it out 
of the range of thousands who were unable to purchase the 
coveted security. Yet the fever for quick and easy wealth 
had played no favorites. Rich and poor alike were scrambling 
for stocks. Nor were there lacking swindlers and rogues to 
satisfy the demand. Other companies sprang up in the neigh­
borhood, and opportunities to subscribe for their stock were 
offered a gullible public. The advertised capital of these 
undertakings, when the South Sea Company was riding on the 
crest of public favor, reached the stupendous sum of five 
hundred millions sterling, an amount said to be about five
105
times as much as the current cash of all Europe.
105. Mason, op. cit., p. 57.
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It has been calculated that during the period the
South Sea mania lasted there were launched more than two 
thousand schemes, mostly in the form of joint-stock undertakings. 
One project after another was put forth. Some of the organizers 
remained in business but a few hours. But their profits were 
great. And the stream of buyers seemed never-ending. A 
glance at some of the proposals is enlightening. One under­
taking was organized to furnish funerals in any part of Great 
Britain. There was another that had for its purpose the 
making of looking glasses and coach glasses, and required for 
capital the modest sum of two million pounds. Another scheme, 
with a bit more of the speculative zest, had for its purpose 
the transmutation -of quicksilver into malleable fine metal.
There was a scheme, with a capital of three million pounds, for 
•the building and rebuilding of houses throughout all of England, 
and another for supplying a town with fresh water. Another 
device was to manufacture boards out of sawdust, and most in­
genious of all, there was organized a company 11 for carrying on 
an undertaking of great advantage, but no one to know what it is." 
The guiding genius of this last mentioned undertaking decided 
upon a modest half million pounds as capital, to be divided into 
five thousand shares, each of one hundred pounds. But we still 
have to come to an illuminating feature of the organization. 
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A subscriber was not required to deposit a hundred pounds for 
a share. Two pounds only were required, and in return for 
this payment, the subscriber was promised a hundred pounds a 
year on each share thus taken. It is reported that the sub­
scriptions for stock in this promising venture were opened in 
the morning, and before night deposits amounting to two thousand 
pounds had been collected. And when the manager closed that 
night with his two thousand pounds, he closed his door for the 
last time. In the morning his office and company were no
106
more.
In the midst of this orgy of speculation, and the 
organization of get-rich-quick undertakings, it was not to be 
expected that the business of insurance would be slighted. 
Nor was it. During the period of the Bubble mania, there 
were brought forth about a hundred schemes that were concerned 
with insurance. Besides companies for insuring houses and 
goods from fire, as well as ships and merchandise at sea, 
there were companies organized to insure "horses dying natural 
deaths, stolen, or disabled," and another office undertook to 
insure "Masters and Mistresses against losses they shall sustain 
against servants thefts, etc". There were insurances for
106. Mason, op. cit., p. 60.
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"Insuring and Increasing Children’s Fortunes"; for "Insurance 
from death by drinking Geneva"; for "Assurance from lying"; 
for "Insurance from Housebreakers"; for "Rum Insurance"; for 
"Insurance from Highwaymen"; for "Assurance of Female Chastity"; 
for "Insurance Against Divorce"; and numerous others. The 
extent to which the absurdity was carried may be estimated from 
the organization of "A project to insure uniformity amongst 
Protestant dissenters"; and "Another to insure it amongst the
107Orthodox".
Among all these insurance projects there was one that 
stood out because of its simplicity. The project was easily 
grasped, and the promises were attractive. Organized by an 
old man named Le Brun, there was opened in Change Alley, the 
Office of Insurance and Annuity for Everybody. LeBrun's
career was a spotty one, and his response to the easy money of 
Change Alley was prompt and immediate. Nor was he in this 
period of ingenious schemes to be found wanting. Upon opening 
his office he announced that anybody who paid him five pounds 
was to be assured of a hundred pounds annually for the rest of 
his life "as soon as a sufficient number had subscribed".
108
The number, however, was never "sufficient". Nor, as a
107. Martin, op. cit.. p. 89; Walford, op. cit.. v. 1, pp.398-9.
108. Mason, pp. cit.. p. 59.
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matter of fact, would it ever be. But this was apparently 
no concern of Mr. Le Brun. Nor did the scores of other rogues 
concern themselves with the fulfilling of their promises. 
They were concerned chiefly getting the initial payment on a 
subscription.
But all great speculative moves seem destined to the 
same end. The stock of the South Sea Company, around which 
the craze developed, continued to soar until it had touched the 
dizzy figure of 800 per-cent. Here it hesitated, and those 
who had realized great profits began to sell. This brought 
about a decline but the decline was only temporary, and in a 
short time the stock ha,d crossed the old high to a figure of 
1000 per-cent. And then came the crash. This time it was 
complete. Consternation and rage were everywhere, and the 
credit of the country was shaken to its very foundations. 
Parliament was hastily summoned, and upon investigation frauds 
in the affairs of the company were uncovered, in which members 
of the government were involved, and the scandal was terrific. 
It was in striking the death blow to the bubbles of the period 
that brought forth the final development we are here to consider 
in the business of insurance.
Strange as it may seem, in this period noted particularly 
for its frauds and cheats, there were organized two great insurance 
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companies that have enjoyed an uninterrupted business from that 
day to the present, a span of over two centuries, and they rank 
today among the leaders in the field. We are now concerned 
with the events leading to the organization and incorporation 
of these companies.
The first of the subscriptions, leading to the organ­
ization of an incorporated insurance company was opened in the 
fall of 1717. It was proposed to raise a capital of a million 
pounds, for the purpose of insuring ships and merchandise at sea. 
.The project was known as the Mercers’ Hell Marine Company.
During the following January the |ist was closed, and a petition 
was presented, praying for a charter of incorporation. To the 
petition there was affixed 286 signatures. The name of Lord 
Onslow appears among them.
While the petition expressly stated that there was
no intention to ask for a monoply of marine insurance, and private 
insurers were not to be excluded from the business, nevertheless 
a storm of bitter opposition broke forth from this quarter.
There was conducted several inquiries, by representatives of 
the government, into the feasibility of the undertaking, and it
109
was finally turned down and the charter refused.
109. Mason, op, cit., pp. 62-3; Wright and Fayle, op. cit., pp.45-6.',
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Onslow and. his associates, however, were persistant, 
and soon hit upon an idea. It appears that during the reigns 
of Elizabeth and the early Stuarts, charters had been granted 
to a number of private monopolists, and while many of the under­
takings had long since been abandoned, the charters had not 
become without effect. The associates resorted to the expedient 
of buying one of these old companies. The Mines Royal Mineral 
and Battery Works was an amalgamation of two older companies. 
Upon advise of council that underwriting might be carried on 
under the charters possessed by the amalgamated society, the 
Mercers’ Hall subscribers acquired them. By March, 1719, a 
nominal capital of fr 1,152,000 had been subscribed, and the new 
company under the name Governors and Court of Assistants and 
Societies of the Mines Royal Mineral and Battery Works entered 
upon the business of insuring ships and their cargoes.
The next step taken by this agreesive group was the 
filing of a petition in their corporate capacity, asking that 
they be granted the privilege of insuring ships and cargoes, 
exclusive of all other corporations. As a result of this 
petition, there was opposition from the private insurers on the 
ground: that the charters were being illegally used. While the 
question was pending Onslow and others of his associates presented
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a new petition for a charter. This wasin January of 1720.
In 1719 a new face; appeared, on the horizon. Walter 
Ohetwynd, a member of an old family and influential in politics, 
was in 1717 created Viscount Ohetwynd. of Bearhaven, County Cork, 
and Baron of Rathdowne, County Dublin, in the peerage of Ireland. 
Lord Ohetwynd was an influential figure. On December 22, 1917, 
at the Marine Coffee House, a new. subscription for marine insur­
ance was opened with a capital of 4r 2,000,000. Ohetwynd was 
one of the prime movers in the venture and the following month, 
with 380 others, a petition for a charter of incorporation was
111presented. Recalling that this petition was presented
while the South Sea mania was raging, it is not surprising that 
the undertaking became known as "Ohetwynd*s Bubble."
It would not have been surprising to have found the 
Mines Royal group in opposition to the Ohetwynd petition. This, 
however, was not the case. As a matter of fact there is little 
doubt that both Onslow and Ohetwynd had pooled their influence, 
and were acting in collusion, believing the field big enough 
for a charter for both companies. But if there was harmony 
between the two petitioning groups, there was opposition enough 
from the private underwriters. The battle raged fiercely,
110. Wright and Fayle, op. cit.. pp. 47-8. Mason, op. cit.. p. 64 
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a.nd arguments for and against the petitioners were advanced, 
while the Attorney General, to whom the petitions were referred,
112 took them for consideration. In March of 1720 the Attorney
General, Sir Nicholas Lechmere made his report. The important 
point to be found in this report lies in the complete reversal 
of the position previously taken by the Government, The 
report stated that there was no objection to a charter of in­
corporation, provided others were not excluded from the business. 
This represented a decided victory for the proponents of the 
corporations.
Just when it seemed to be fair sailing, there was a 
new development. Sir William Thompson charged corruption, 
accusing the Attorney general of receiving bribes from the pe­
titioners. An inquiry was held, and Lechmere ftas ultimately 
exonerated. In the meantime the House of Commons had begun 
to concern itself with the frauds that were being perpetrated 
upon the public through the organization of the innumerable 
bubble projects elready mentioned, and in taking steps to curb 
the practice made no distinction in favor of marine insurance
113companies.
112. Ibid., pp. 50-6.
113. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 58.
247
Ghetwynd and Onslow were apparently resourceful and 
far seeing men. In the face of what seemed to be inevitable 
defeat, they played another card. The Government of George I, 
it appears, was heavily in debt. There were great arrears in 
the Civil Lists, with no means at hand to make provision for 
them. In this critical juncture there appeared on the scene 
two patriotic gentlemen, who realizing the difficulties in which 
the King found himself, ventured to offer assistance. Each, 
with his associates, offered the Government the sum of tr 300,000 
— provided of course that the Government could see its way to 
granting the petitioners the charter for which they were asking. 
From this point the story is short. It is surprising the 
light that the promises of ir 300,000 threw upon the subject of 
Marine insurance, and the utility of chartered companies. The 
King, through the mouth of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, re­
cognized the usefulness and advantages to trade and commerce 
that would accrue from the existence of the chartered companies, 
incidentally mentioning the additional advantage of taking care 
of the Civil Lists, without recourse to the tax payers. On 
May 4, 1720, a Royal Message was sent the House of Commons, con­
veying the King's approval and recommendations. The Commons 
were prompt with their response, and voted an address of thanks 
to the King for his gracious condescensions in desiring their
248
advice upon a matter of such importance.
From this point the petitioners had no further trouble 
in securing their charters. On May 31, 1720 the now famous 
Bubble Act passed the House by 123 votes to 22, passed the Lords 
soon rafter, and received Royal approval under date of June 10. 
Under the terms of the act, the King was authorized to grant the 
two charters for marine insurance, and all other corporations 
were expressly prohibited to enter upon this business. The 
right was still reserved, however, for individual underwriters 
to continue in the business, and this provision exerted a power-
115 ful force in shaping the trend of the insurance business.
On June 22, 1720 Royal Charters were granted both 
companies. Ohetwynd*s company was chartered under the name of
the London Assurance Oorporation, and Onslow's group was called 
the Royal Exchange Assurance Oorporation. The Mines Royal 
Mineral and Battery Works then discontinued business, its 
capital being absorbed into the Royal Exchange. While it was 
apparently the intent of the organizers of these companies to 
write marine business at the beginning, and for this purpose 
charters were granted, the following year both merged fire 
insurance offices that had already been established, and in 
April, 1720 were granted charters that permitted the writing
114. Street, op. cit., p. 21.
115. Wright and Fayle, op, cit., pp. 60-61.
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116 
of fire and life "business.
With the granting of the Royal Charters to the London 
Assurance and the Royal Exchange we are brought down to the 
early days of the modern business of insurance. Both of these 
companies have been continually in business from the date of 
their incorporation. It is to be remembered, that under the 
terms of the Bubble Act, individual underwriters were still 
permitted to do business. As a matter of fact, the Bubble 
Act served as a great stimulus to the business of the individual 
underwriters, because under its terms, all insurance that was 
not placed with the two chartered companies must be given to 
them. It was the further association of these individual 
underwriters, that gave rise to the development of Lloyds, 
from whose method of doing business has grown not only the 
great organization in England that bears the name, but also 
the considerable number of similar groups of individual under­
writers, whose business is located in different parts of the 
world, and who are known as Lloyds groups.
Here we leave the business of insurance as established. 
The seed of the idea we have seen was slow in germinating, slower 
still in its earlier development, and it can be said in truth 
that not until very recent years did the delicate shoots "grow
116. Wright and Fayle, op. cit., p. 63.
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and wax strong,11 and become indeed a tree planted by the river.
The principle has gradually, steadily, and definitely established 
itBelf in the economic structure, and spread like a blanket its 
protecting influence to every form of human activity, to all 
classes and conditions of people, and to the furthermost corners 
of the globe. It has become a very foundation stone of credit, 
and a stabilizer of the business expansion that has made possible 
the wealth, prosperity, conveniences, high standard of living, 
and luxuries we now enjoy. It was in fact a long precarious 
journey from the Royal Charters of 1720 to the present, bu$ 
with that journey we are not here concerned.
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